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   her husband also, and he praises her:  
 
"Many women have done excellently, 
   but you surpass them all."  
 
- Proverbs 31:26, 27-29
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CHAPTER I 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 Increasing interest in school-level productivity - brought on my No Child Left Behind as 
well as technological changes that make micro-level data collection more efficient and cost 
effective - has resulted in a related interest in school-level finance equity.  Termed intradistrict 
equity, this research field has been dominated by methods adapted from interdistrict and 
intrastate equity studiers.  This dissertation proposes a new unit of analysis for intradistrict 
school finance equity studies – student sequences of schools attended.  It further adopts a new 
method in assessing equity within the intradistrict context – quantile regression.  Through a 
series of steps, this dissertation examines whether sequence-based intradistrict equity analysis 
provide additional insight into intradistrict equity than those that arise from school-based 
analysis.  Additionally, this dissertation assesses the use of quantile regression as a tool for 
examining equity within the intradistrict context. 
This introductory section addresses the characteristics of intradistrict finance analysis 
compared to interdistrict and interstate school finance analyses.  It specifies the research 
questions, and reviews methods and techniques for answering those questions.  Finally, this 
section provides an overview of the organization of this dissertation.  Taken together, these 
sections of the introduction present a rationale for analysis of intradistrict school finance equity 
via school sequences.   
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Purpose of the Research 
This research examines the use of school sequences as units of analysis when conducting 
intradistrict resource equity analysis.  Understanding the role of sequences is aided by an 
understanding of the larger enterprise of intradistrict school finance studies.  The following 
section describes intradistrict finance before describing the contribution that a sequence-based 
analysis will make to the field.   
Intradistrict resource studies examine the distribution of resources across schools within 
a district.  This type of study is different from interdistrict or interstate school finance studies.  
Interdistrict and interstate finance studies assume variation in property wealth and effort as 
reflected in assessments and tax rates (Berne and Stiefel, 1984).  Interdistrict analysis examines 
the relationship between a district’s wealth, ability to pay, and levels of funding to determine if 
property poor districts, for example, are receiving funding to compensate for their poverty.  
Evaluation of interdistrict and interstate analysis is based upon a concept – formulated in 
California’s Serrano v. Priest case – that has become know as school finance’s proposition 
number one:  “The quality of a child’s schooling should not be a function of wealth, other than 
the wealth of the state as a whole.”  (Serrano v. Priest, 1971; Guthrie, et al., 2006).  These 
studies further assume that students are allocated into schools by market forces such as Tiebout 
sorting (Tiebout, 1956; see also Bayer, Ferreira, and McMillan, 2004), and not through direct 
state intervention.   
The intradistrict context, however, is different.  There is no variation in tax effort or 
valuation, since taxation occurs at the district level.  Instead of analysis between wealth and 
spending, intradistrict analysis focuses more directly on relationships between race and funding, 
poverty and funding, or between geographic location and funding (Berne and Stiefel, 1994).   
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Compared to other topics within school finance such as adequacy, the role of the courts, 
and the appropriate construction of cost function and production methodologies, there have been 
few intradistrict school finance studies conducted over the last 12 years (Berne and Stiefel, 1994; 
Hertert, 1995; Rubenstein, 1998; Stiefel, Rubenstein and Berne, 1998; Burke, 1999; Owens and 
Maiden, 1999; Iatarola and Stiefel, 2003; Condron and Roscigno, 2003; Roza, Hill and Miller, 
2004; Stiefel, Rubenstein and Schwarz, 2004; Roza and Evans, 2005).  A number of those 
conducted, however, have found substantial variation in funding across schools within the same 
district.  They have also found variation in funding related to teacher salaries, and have found 
conflicting associations between student characteristics such as poverty or minority status and 
funding levels.  While these studies examined variance in funding across schools with and 
without pupil weighting, none of these studies explicitly took into account the sequences of 
schools a student may attend and resulting disparities in funding.   
School sequences develop as a result of district policies in three ways.  First, students 
may be assigned directly to schools by district policy.  Secondly, students may take advantage of 
choices – such as magnet schools – provided to them by the district.  Finally, students can 
change schools regardless of district policy by changing their residence.  Such changes may be 
made for familial reasons, or intentionally made to game the student assignment system.1  
Under the first scenario, families face constrained choice in schools provided to them.  
Since school assignment is usually determined by neighborhood or by street address, families are 
essentially assigned into specific sequences of schools that extend from kindergarten until the 
twelfth grade.2   
                                                 
1 A fourth option, here unaddressed, is that students and families create school sequences by exiting the public 
system and entering into charter, private or home school arrangements.  Students taking this option may have 
sequences that are combinations of public and private schools.   
2 Technically, houses are assigned to schools by the district, and the families that reside in those houses follow suit.   
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In the second scenario, families may have magnet schooling options available through 
application, lottery or audition.  Alternately, districts may present students with school 
attendance options based on geography; for example, a student may be able to choose between 
two middle schools geographically proximate to the student’s home.  In this scenario, school 
sequences might reflect student or parental efforts to determine a specific educational course 
through a specific sequence of schools.   
In the third scenario, students and parents choose schools either indirectly (through 
moves within district made necessary by economic or vocational circumstances) or directly, by 
relocating within a district to take advantage of a better school assignment.  Students and 
families can also resort to dishonesty in an effort to game the system and attend a different 
school by using a false home address.   
School assignment sequences under any of the three scenarios, since they are direct or 
indirect creations of district policy, may change over time.  For the purposes of understanding 
the manner in which schools are resourced and the levels of resources experienced by students 
attending those schools, a district may better be conceived as a collection of school sequences – 
and types of school sequences – rather than as a collection of schools.   
It follows, then, that resource levels for school sequences would exist as averages or sums 
of the individual school resources that comprise that school sequence.  One implication of the 
differences between examinations of interdistrict equity and intradistrict equity is that, in the 
intradistrict context, important variation may lie between these school assignment sequences.  
For example, sequence may exacerbate slight inequities between schools if students are assigned 
into consecutive schools with lower levels of resources available to them.  Conversely, additional 
resources available at a student’s subsequent school may ameliorate lower levels of resources at 
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one individual school.  Researchers examining intradistrict equity using schools as a unit of 
analysis may, consequently, under- or over- estimate levels of equity present in a system.   
School sequences can be examined cross-sectionally or longitudinally.  School sequence 
analysis conducted with one year of data is a cross-sectional study that would examine levels of 
funding equity present across sequences in a given district for a given year.  No student actually 
experiences these sequences since a student can only be in one grade in any given academic year; 
they are more profitably considered a reflection of district intention and district policy.  In any 
given year, districts may seek to privilege diversity in school-level student populations, they may 
seek to privilege geographic proximity when assigning students to schools, or they may seek 
additional policy priorities through student assignment.3   
Assuming sequences for any one year are stable over time, draw from the same 
geographic area over time, and operate at the same levels of efficiency and effectiveness over 
time, they may be used as indicators of the equity impact of district policy on resource allocation.  
A cross sectional analysis can only present sequences as designed by district policy; it cannot 
represent the possible trajectories that any given student might take.  As such, these cross 
sectional analyses are “static” sequences.  While static sequences provide insight into equity of 
resources provided across specific schools, and while findings from an analysis of static 
sequences may provide different results than those analyses conducted across schools, they will 
not be able to provide information on the levels of resources experienced by students through 
time, and thus have less relation to the levels of resources confronted by students over time as 
district policies and priorities change.   
                                                 
3 These values are often opposed to each other, since many large school districts display patterns of residential 
segregation.   
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An alternate method for examining school sequences – one to be tested in this 
dissertation – is to use student level data and district level data to construct assignment sequences 
over time.  These sequences, unlike the static sequences described above, reflect changing 
district policies, since a student’s school assignment in any one year will be determined by the 
policy in place in that year.  As a student moves through multiple years, he or she also progresses 
through multiple assignment policies.  An individual student may take different sequences than 
those assigned to him or her, by opting into magnet or alternative programs, by changing 
residence, or (in rare cases) by deliberately gaming the system.  To the extent that district 
assignment policies are framed around a larger policy goal (such as a move towards 
neighborhood schools or a commitment to diverse school-level student populations), these 
“dynamic” sequences will indicate the long-term impact of district policy on resource allocation.  
Using student assignment sequences as a unit of analysis may also provide a clearer picture of 
resource equity across students as they matriculate through a school district.  For these reasons, 
the use of school sequence represents a methodological contribution to the literature on 
intradistrict school finance as well as student assignment policy. 
This dissertation explores the use of student school assignment sequences as a unit of 
analysis for intradistrict school finance studies.  Insights from this work will guide researchers in 
determining if districts provide horizontally or vertically equitable opportunities for students 
over time. In addition, this proposed research may aid policymakers in their construction of 
student assignment sequences via district-level policy.   
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Research Questions 
There is increasing interest in intradistrict school finance studies.  Many studies, 
conducted at the school level, do not account for the manner in which district policies may 
contribute to the distribution of resources over time and across different students.  This study 
investigates the effects of school sequences in intradistrict resource allocation studies.  Student 
sequences represent district level policy decisions that may mediate or interact with district level 
finance policies.  As such, they represent an intriguing new unit of analysis that may contribute 
to larger discussions about the role of district policy in providing resources and opportunities 
equitably to students.  This dissertation seeks to analyze such school sequences within a school 
finance equity framework.  Specifically, this dissertation asks:  
1. Are measures of intradistrict equity different when measured across school sequences 
than when measured across schools? 
2. Do school sequences for poor and minority students differ from school sequences for 
other students?  If so, do poor and minority students attend sequences with greater or 
fewer resources than their non-poor, non-minority peers? 
 
Methodological overview 
 Studies of intradistrict resource allocation rely on a framework developed by Berne and 
Stiefel (1984; see Berne and Stiefel, 1994 for an application of the framework in intradistrict 
analysis).  This framework provides a methodology for examining the distribution of resources 
across sub-units of a larger governing entity (i.e., states within a country, districts within a state, 
or schools within a district).  The Berne and Stiefel equity analysis framework includes measures 
of horizontal equity and vertical equity.    
   
  
 8
Horizontal equity as a concept seeks to measure the equal treatment of students 
regardless of student characteristics.  Vertical equity as a concept seeks to measure the treatment 
of students accounting for student characteristics that may justify additional spending.  An 
adaptation of this framework for school sequence analysis provides the best method at arriving at 
answers to the research questions posed above.  Application of the Berne and Stiefel framework 
also allows for more direct comparisons between findings from school sequence analyses and 
findings from school level analyses.  There will have to be significant changes in the manner in 
which vertical equity is modeled, however.  As will be discussed below, quantile regression 
applications are necessary to account for variation across the distribution of dependent variables. 
 
Analytic techniques 
 Techniques for analyzing levels of horizontal equity within the Berne and Stiefel 
framework include the computation of indices to reflect distribution of resources such as the 
coefficient of variation, the McLoone Index and the Gini coefficient.  Techniques for analyzing 
levels of vertical equity and equality of opportunity within the Berne and Stiefel framework 
include correlations and multivariate regression.  Regression coefficients will isolate the 
direction, strength, and significance of relationships between an independent and dependent 
variable net of the effects of other independent variables.   
This dissertation will use quantile regression to obtain vertical equity regression 
coefficients at the school sequence level, and will therefore use quantile regression to analyze 
vertical equity using both schools and sequences as the unit of analysis.  Quantile regression is a 
new application in school finance analysis, but has a longer history in econometric and 
ecological research.  Quantile regression will allow for a test of the differential impact of student 
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characteristics on resource distribution.  These methods will address levels of inequity present 
across school sequences as a whole, clarify shifting relationships between independent and 
dependent variables across 5 quantiles of the distribution of the dependent variable (.10, .25, .50, 
.75, .90), and assess the strength and direction of change in one independent variable holding all 
other independent variables constant.   
 Since the purpose of this research is to examine what additional information is available 
from intradistrict school finance analysis conducted across school sequences, this research will 
compare results with results from traditional models of intradistrict school finance analysis.  
  
Limitations 
This study will use multiple years of data to examine the effect of using school sequences 
on intradistrict school finance.  The use of student level data, while rich, presents challenges.  
Not all student data collected for the 1999-2004 timeframe will contain all years of data.  More 
importantly, not all students will enter into the database at grade K or leave at grade 12.  In this 
sense, students will enter the database with unknown histories and leave the database with 
unknown trajectories.  Analysis of this database will take care to distinguish students by their 
time in the database when constructing sequences. 
Additionally, regression models may fail to account for relevant variables in the creation 
of models.  Through the use of year fixed effects in school-level analysis and the adaptation of 
year fixed effects for use in sequence models, this research will seek to control for external 
factors that may disproportionately impact regression-based findings. 
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Overview of the dissertation 
 An examination of school-level data by school sequence presents researchers with an 
alternative method for assessing levels of distributional inequity across schools within a district.  
This dissertation will examine the use of school sequences by constructing the aforementioned 
sequences of schools, populating those sequences with spending and demographic variables, and 
assessing degrees of inequity relative to more traditional analyses of intradistrict school finance.   
This proposal will proceed in the following manner:  Chapter two will review insights 
gained from equity research as well as findings from previous intradistrict school finance studies.  
Chapter two will end with a critique of current methods and an explanation of the potential value 
of using student assignment sequences as a unit of analysis.  Chapter three will review the 
specific data to be used as well as methods for constructing variables and answering the 
questions posed above.  Chapter three will also propose an analytic framework within which to 
apply these methods to answer the research questions above, and describe the selection and 
operationalization of five resource-related dependent variables.  Chapter three will address 
limitations and problems posed by the data and proposed methods for addressing those issues 
and problems.  Chapter four will present finding from analysis of horizontal and vertical equity 
using five resource-related dependent variables, and compare findings from horizontal and 
vertical equity analysis across schools (as it is traditionally conducted) and across sequences of 
schools.  Finally, chapter five will review findings, discuss the methodological and research 
implications this research holds for the field of school finance, and chart directions for additional 
inquiry.   
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CHAPTER II 
 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
 
Overview 
 
 This chapter reviews prior work on school finance equity.  First, this chapter presents an 
historical overview that describes the state of equity-based school finance research over time.  
This chapter then focuses on a review of prior research in intradistrict finance, addressing 
theoretical perspectives, data and methods used, and empirical findings.  This chapter then 
addresses the need for an analysis of school sequences as a unit of analysis for examining levels 
of intradistrict horizontal and vertical equity by reviewing the challenges posed to school finance 
research by research on school segregation and peer effects.  Overall, this chapter describes key 
insights, methods, and findings as a prelude to framing this study around school sequences. 
 
Equity research – from state-level to school-level 
Equity, variously defined, has been a topic of interest in the field of education 
administration and policy for a century.  Although Elwood P. Cubberly was one of the first 
academics to examine equity as a dimension of school funding (Cubberly, 1906; Guthrie, Garms 
and Pierce, 1988; Guthrie, et al, 2006), a rash of court cases in the 1970s brought more intense 
interest in resource equity (Berne and Stiefel, 1994; Serrano v. Priest, 1971).  The examination 
of resource distribution begun in the 1970s as a result of school finance litigation helped to bring 
the study of school finance into the modern era (Guthrie, 2006) through the development of 
measures, methods and theories of school finance equity.   
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Berne and Stiefel’s book The Measurement of Equity in School Finance (1984) defined a 
framework for examining levels of equity within a school finance system.  Berne and Stiefel’s 
framework described the subjects of equity analysis, objects of equity concern, principles for 
determining equity, and measures for assessing levels of equity.  This framework has survived 
over time with surprisingly little alteration or challenge (see Berne and Stiefel, 1994), and has 
framed equity studies of single states and groups of states, as well as national comparisons.  
These studies find that resource inequity has decreased over time both within state and between 
states, often as a result of finance litigation and reform (Murray, Evans and Schwab, 1998; 
Springer and Liu, 2005).  Recently, the primary emphasis in school finance research has moved 
from considerations of input equality to considerations of appropriate levels of resources 
necessary to meet accountability requirements.  This move has been termed the shift from equity 
to adequacy (see Clune, 1993; Ladd, Chalk and Hansen, 1999).  Despite this conceptual shift, 
researchers still confront issues about the manner in which educational funds are distributed.  
Often, knowledge of equity conditions is a precursor to understanding the role of resources in 
education production.  Equity studies, therefore, still have a part to play in education finance 
research.   
Additionally, a parallel but smaller body of research has focused on the distribution of 
resources across schools within districts.  These intradistrict finance studies often rely on school 
level data that were, until the school-level analysis demanded by No Child Left Behind, uniquely 
available.  These studies apply the methods of analysis commonly used in interdistrict studies to 
assess level of equity across schools.  Although some studies were conducted throughout the 
1970s (Owen, 1972; Hornby and Holmes, 1972; Summers and Wolfe, 1976), renewed interest in 
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intradistrict equity studies formed during the 1990s.4  This renewed interest was fueled by three 
developments in intradistrict study: a court case, a research article, and one journal’s dedication 
to the topic.  The sections that follow review each in turn.   
 In 1992, plaintiff parents in the Los Angeles Unified School District brought suit against 
the school system, claiming that students in the district were denied rights because of inequitable 
intradistrict funding.  A component of the plaintiff’s case was that schools with high minority 
populations had, on average, teaching staffs with less experience and less training other schools 
across the district (Rodriguez v. Los Angeles Unified School District, 1992; Warner-King and 
Smith-Casem, 2005).   
 In 1994, Berne and Stiefel published an article applying their 1984 equity framework to 
an examination of intradistrict resource allocation in New York City schools.  Berne and Stiefel 
cited three reasons for an increased interest in intradistrict study, as well as reasons for receding 
interest in interdistrict study.  According to Berne and Stiefel, the “dominance of the district as 
the unit of analysis in school finance equity” was challenged by: 
• A belief that the most critical educational activities are those closet to the student; 
• A developing interest in studying the relationship between inputs, process and outcomes, 
which were assumed to more effectively studies at the school level; and, 
• Technical advancements making the collection and review of school level data both 
possible and palatable (p.405). 
Berne and Stiefel conceptualized their work as the first of a long line of intradistrict studies, and 
were correct in that assumption, as a review of pertinent studies below will attest.   
                                                 
4 Although intriguingly titled, the 1988 American Education Finance Association Yearbook, Microlevel School 
Finance: Issues and Implications for Policy, yielded little information on intradistrict finance issues.   
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Finally, editors dedicated a special edition of the Journal of Education Finance to 
exploring the issue of school-level data and intradistrict finance research.  In the introduction, 
Busch and Odden (1997) reviewed issues that school level analysis could help address 
“governance, efficiency and productivity of resource utilization, accountability, equity, 
adequacy, comparability of data, and longitudinal analysis” (p.228).  In the same issue Berne, 
Stiefel and Moser (1997) assessed the field of intradistrict finance: 
School-level analysis is a relatively new area and as such it is worthwhile to continue to 
let a thousand flowers bloom…it is too early to cut off potentially productive ways to 
gather and analyze data…We eventually need a good sense of the kinds of analyses that 
are used for decision making and the kinds of data necessary for analyses (p.253).  
 
Roza and Hill (2004) advance the theory (further developed in Roza, 2005) that the 
district practice of allocating teachers positions to schools – regardless of actual teacher costs – 
contributes to intradistrict disparities as teachers with more experience (and higher salaries) 
move away from high-minority, high-poverty schools.   
Finally, in a most recent analysis of the state of intradistrict finance, Stiefel, Rubenstein, 
and Schwartz (2004) summarize the current state of intradistrict equity analysis: 
First, though evidence directly comparing school-level and district-level disparities is 
limited, the resource disparities found across schools within districts are often large and, 
in some cases, may be larger than the more widely-recognized disparities across districts. 
Second, these disparities are generally perversely related to school and student 
characteristics; schools with greater student needs often find themselves disadvantaged 
relative to other schools in the same district, particularly in terms of the quality of teacher 
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resources. Third, these patterns are not caused by the intentional targeting of resources to 
lower-need schools…. these resource disparities are frequently the result of intradistrict 
funding formulas that allocate positions, rather than dollars, to schools, and teacher 
sorting patterns that allow higher paid teachers to systematically opt into lower need 
schools without financial ramifications for the schools to which they transfer (p.11). 
 
The following section reviews the data, methods and findings of important work in 
intradistrict finance that led Rubenstein, Schwartz and Stiefel to this conclusion.  Although most 
intradistrict finance studies have applied some variation of the Berne and Stiefel framework, and 
found substantially similar relationships between funding and school-level characteristics 
(especially poverty), there has been some variation in both methodology and findings, which will 
be highlighted.   
 
Review of intradistrict studies 
 Intradistrict studies of resource equity have most often been conducted in large, urban 
school districts.  Findings from these studies often reflect patterns of inequity.  For example, all 
studies find that a majority of district funding is allocated at the school level (59 to 68 percent 
across studies) and that the largest piece of school level expenditures is staffing costs, 
specifically teacher salaries.   
All studies report disparities across schools within districts, and all studies find 
relationships between school-level variables such as racial composition and poverty and costs per 
pupil at the school level.  Stiefel, Rubenstein and Schwarz (2004) caution that funding disparity 
patterns are unique across four urban school systems in their study, attributing this dynamic to 
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the variety of school-level data available for specific districts.  Indeed, the field of intradistrict 
study is necessarily a case-based endeavor, as there exists little regulation regarding the manner 
by which districts provide school-level revenue and expenditure data.  This section will review 
key studies of intradistrict equity as a frame for the methods needed to answer the research 
questions.   
In an early study, Summers and Wolfe (1976) provided an early analysis of school level 
resource equity in the Philadelphia schools.  Using two years of data, Summers and Wolfe used 
regression analysis to examine the distribution of school characteristics and school-level funding. 
Summers and Wolfe controlled for percentage of a schools’ students that were African American 
and percentage of a school’s students that were impoverished through two separate regressions.  
While Summers and Wolfe found evidence of compensatory spending at the local, state and 
federal levels (an additional 7% of total spending was targeted to African American students; an 
additional 13% was targeted to poor students), as well as lower student/teacher ratios for schools 
with greater proportions of African-American students, they also found that schools with higher 
proportions of poor and African American students were likely to have less experienced 
principals, higher teacher vacancy rates, and teachers with lower exam scores and lower quality 
undergraduate educations than schools with smaller proportions of poor and African American 
students.  The Summers and Wolfe study was an early effort at exploring the relationships 
between school level composition characteristics and school resource allocation.   
As described above, Berne and Stiefel (1994) adapted their school finance equity 
framework for intradistrict analysis.  In addition to their adaptations (reviewed above) Berne and 
Stiefel applied their methods in a study of New York schools.  They examined 32 New York 
geographic sub-district budgets and 800 school level budgets, and found significant disparities 
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between high-wealth and low-wealth sub-districts within New York City.  Berne and Stiefel used 
five outcome measures as dependent variables in their vertical equity regressions:  general 
education budget per pupil, general education expenditures per pupil, teacher salary budgeted per 
pupil, average teacher salary per pupil and student/teacher ratio.  The results of the study provide 
baseline information that would serve as comparatives for further studies.  Berne and Stiefel 
report that 86.5% of district allocations were direct to schools.  They further report that 74% of 
school budgets were dedicated to teacher salaries.  Berne and Stiefel reported that the percent of 
students in poverty was associated with decreased teacher salary at the elementary school level, 
but was associated with increased teacher salary at the middle school level.5  In addition, Berne 
and Stiefel found significant differences in resource allocation between elementary and middle 
schools, with middle schools spending more on additional staff to compensate for teachers with 
lower salaries (salary being a proxy for experience) at high poverty schools.   
Most important for this proposed study is that Berne and Stiefel compared findings of 
analysis conducted at the school level to analysis conduced across New York’s 32 school sub-
districts.  Each sub-district functioned more or less as an independent district, so sub districts are 
not the same as attendance sequences.  However, this study represents the only review of the 
literature that examines units of aggregated schools within districts.  Berne and Stiefel found that 
the relationships between poverty and general education spending were no different when 
analyzed across schools or across sub-districts.  However, when conducting school level 
analysis, Berne and Stiefel were only able to assign each school the sub-district mean teacher 
salary.  Because Berne and Stiefel were not able to use school-level teacher salary data in their 
analysis, it is possible that their work underestimated the effect of independent variables on the 
teacher salary dependent variable.   
                                                 
5 The R-squared values in these models were modest; the highest r-squared value achieved was .115.   
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Hertert (1995) examined the distribution of educational funds across and within 
California districts.  Hertert used a sample of California school districts, which accounted for 
31% of the school-age population, 1,042 schools and 926,740 students.  Hertert used regular 
expenditures as a dependent variable, net of federal and state categorical funding. Following 
Berne and Stiefel’s 1984 framework, Hertert used the range, restricted range, federal range ratio, 
coefficient of variation, Gini coefficient and McLoone Index to assess levels of horizontal equity 
and stepwise multiple regression to assess vertical equity.  In her assessment of levels of 
horizontal equity, Hertert reported 19 of 25 districts with coefficients of variation above .15 and 
13 of 25 districts with Gini coefficients greater than .10.6  When assessing vertical equity, Hertert 
found little effect of ethnicity variables.  Most variation in expenditures was explained by school 
type – elementary, middle or high school.  Hertert’s assessment was that the horizontally 
equitable distributions in California came as a result of changes to statewide school finance 
policies that increase state responsibility and decrease local discretion in providing educational 
funds, thereby increasing horizontal equity.  These policies were viewed as a direct result of 
school finance litigation California.   
Rubenstein (1998) analyzed spending within the Chicago Public Schools utilizing school-
level budgets at an incredible level of detail (157,000 line items per school).  Rubenstein finds 
that base funding per pupil, defined as the core amount allocated by the district net of additional 
funding streams, was equally distributed across schools.  Inequity occurred when additional 
funding streams were added, so that total funding per pupil exhibits horizontal inequity.  
Rubenstein found that high schools are more equitably funded than elementary schools, and that 
funding became more horizontally equitable as more narrow budget categories were used as 
                                                 
6 Although Hertert stated her use of .10 as a threshold for the coefficient of variation, as suggested by Odden and 
Picus (1992), she assessed equity within districts with a coefficient of variation threshold of .15, a more conservative 
estimate.   
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dependent variables.  Rubenstein’s vertical equity analysis found weak, significant and positive 
relationships between funding and poverty save for Title I and Chapter I funds.  As expected, 
Title I and Chapter I funds were distributed to schools with higher percentages of students in 
poverty.  
Rubenstein’s models did not adequately control for the effects of teacher salary or prior 
performance on fund allocation. For example, to assess the relationship between Tile I funding 
and poverty, Rubenstein models  
 
εβα ++= LowincomeTitleI 1    (2.1) 
 
To examine relationships between total budget and spending, Rubenstein modeled 
 
εββα +++= EnrollmentLowincomeBudget 21   (2.2) 
 
with little regard for interactions with race, the influence of teacher salary, or prior year 
performance that may cloud the estimates of the independent variables.  To analyze teacher 
salary, Rubenstein places it as a dependent variable in equation (2.1) above, and finds that 
schools with higher percentage of low-income students employed teachers with smaller salaries.  
However, Rubenstein failed to use multiple regression to examine the impact of enrollment and 
poverty simultaneously.  These controls would have made interpretation of his findings more 
clear.   
Stiefel, Rubenstein and Berne’s 1998 study used Berne and Stiefel’s 1994 intradistrict 
framework and compared equity of school funds across four cities: Chicago, Fort Worth, New 
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York and Rochester.  For horizontal equity analysis, the authors relied upon the coefficient of 
variation and used regression analysis to examine vertical equity relationships.  Because each 
city represented a different a socio-political context and a different district-level capacity to 
collect and organize information, data were not parallel across the four cities, and not even 
across the same academic year.  Nonetheless, Stiefel, Rubenstein and Berne found coefficients of 
variation in three cities to be below .15 across budget subcategories in three cities; Rochester 
consistently scored a coefficient of variation above .15 in all budget categories.7  This finding 
indicated that spending was horizontally equitable within three of the four districts.   
When assessing vertical equity, Stiefel, Rubenstein and Berne found positive 
relationships between poverty and total budget in New York and Rochester, but negative 
relationships between poverty and general fund expenditures in Chicago.  Findings from all four 
cities revealed the relationships between race and funding to be weak and only occasionally 
significant.  Rochester was the only city that indicated vertically equitable funding; center-city 
schools comprised mostly of impoverished students received additional funding from the district.  
Data limitations across the four sites hampered the researchers’ abilities to draw strong 
conclusions about these relationships. 
Burke’s 1999 study deviates from the traditional use of the Berne and Stiefel framework, 
instead using the Gini coefficient to examine differences between inter-state, intra-state and 
intra-district funding disparities using a national dataset.  Burke used the pupil/teacher ratio as a 
proxy for educational resource allocation to examine resource distribution across 1,204 school 
districts in 37 states.  When evaluating districts without state boundaries, Burke finds that only 
75 of the 1,204 districts had Gini coefficients above .10 (a standard metric for evaluating Gini 
                                                 
7 Although Stiefel, Rubenstein and Berne used a cut off of .15 to assess he coefficient of variation, this proposed 
dissertation will evaluate the coefficient of variation with a cutoff of .10 (Odden and Picus, 2000).   
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coefficients).8  When evaluating all districts and imposing state boundaries, Burke reports 
significant variation in Gini coefficients for all 37 states in her study.  In her intra-state analysis, 
Burke finds Gini coefficients that range from .068 to .12, with an unweighted mean of .09.  In 
all, 37.8% of states having Gini coefficients above .10.  In her inter-district analysis, Burke 
reports Gini coefficients that range from .019 to .078 with an unweighted mean of .042.  Burke 
interprets these findings as an indication that district level practices matter in the distribution of 
educational resources, specifically pupil/teacher ratios.   
 Adopting a methodology from Lambert and Aronson, Burke decomposes state-level Gini 
coefficients to account for inter- and intra-district disparities.9  Burke finds that intradistrict 
Gini’s demonstrate sometime substantial levels of inequity while state and district level 
examinations reveal relatively stable Gini coefficients that represent horizontal equity.  Burke’s 
interpretation of these findings is that, while there is substantial distributional inequity within a 
district, school-wide disparities are not that great once district boundaries are removed.  This 
finding places the role of the district in a more important light than in previous studies.  It also 
provides support for the use of teacher-level variables as appropriate proxies for resource 
distribution.   
Owens and Maiden’s examination of school spending in Florida examined all elementary 
schools net of district boundaries (1999).  Owens and Maiden used four measures of instructional 
expenditures as a dependent variable (per-pupil, basic program only; per pupil, program 
adjusted, basic program only; per pupil, compensatory programs included, and per pupil, 
program adjusted, compensatory programs included) to examine the distribution of resources 
across Florida schools.  At the school level, Owens and Maiden report substantial inequity across 
                                                 
8 A description of the Gini coefficient is provided in chapter two.   
9 The formula for this decomposition is ε+•+= )( intintint radistircterdistrictrastate GiniWeightGiniGini  
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elementary schools with some evidence that Title I funds may be “supplanting” regular 
instructional funds.  Regression analysis results indicated that increases in percentages of African 
American and impoverished students resulted in decreased spending across all four dependent 
variables.  Owens and Maiden interpret this finding to demonstrate that although compensatory 
spending dampens inequities, it does not remove them.  An additional level of analysis revealed 
that none of the significant effects were apparent using district level analysis.  Owens and 
Maiden conclude that school-level analysis is an important addition to the school finance 
researchers’ toolbox.   
Iatarola and Stiefel (2003) examined intradistrict equity among New York City schools.  
Their study represents a careful application of the Berne and Stiefel framework, and represents 
the direction intradistrict finance can take as school-level data become more available and as 
technological innovation makes more complicated multiple regression analysis possible.  This 
study examined equity across five measures: operating funds per pupil, direct service funds per 
pupil, pupil/teacher ratio, teacher salary and percent of teachers who were certified.  Data were 
cross sectional for the 1997-1998 school year.  Iatarola and Stiefel examined horizontal equity 
using the mean, coefficient of variation and range.  Across 664 elementary schools, the 
coefficient of variation for the five dependent variables ranged from .09 to .19.  Across 186 
middle schools the coefficient of variation on dependent variables ranged from .08 to .20.  For 
both elementary and middle schools, the coefficient of variation on teacher salary was the only 
variable which did not exceed the traditional threshold of .10, indicating some inequity in the 
distribution. 
Iatarola and Stiefel assessed vertical equity through regression analysis using each 
measure as a dependent variable.  Independent variables included percent of students on free and 
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reduced price lunch, percent of students who were limited English proficient, percent of students 
who were immigrants, percent of students who did not complete the academic year in the same 
school, and the percent of special education students at the school.  The percentage of students 
receiving free and reduced price lunch at a school was associated with decreased operational 
funds per pupil, decreased pupil/teacher ratio, decreased teacher salary and a decrease in the 
percentage of certified teachers at a school.  These findings were the same across elementary and 
middle schools and were significant at the p<.05 level.  Other variables were also influential, 
although not as consistently significant as the variable for free-and-reduced price lunch.  Using 
traditional thresholds for horizontal equity (Rubenstein, 1998; Odden and Picus, 1992; 2000; also 
see explication on evaluation of horizontal equity methods in the data and methods section 
below), the study reported inequitable spending levels across elementary and middle schools.   
Iatarola and Stiefel also examined outcome equity through regressions using two 
different test results as dependent variables in a production function.  Outcome equity was 
defined as an analysis of the distribution of test scores across schools and the relationship 
between school level student body composition variables and those test scores.  Each of these 
analyses was run separately for elementary and middle schools.  Outcome equity analysis run by 
Iatarola and Stiefel reported negative and statistically significant coefficients on independent 
variables for percent of student who received free lunch, percent of students who were Limited 
English Proficient (LEP), percent of students who were immigrants, and percent of students who 
were mobile, i.e. did not attend one school for the entire academic year.  In a replication of Berne 
and Stiefel (1994), Iatarola and Stiefel, when examining sub district equity in New York City 
schools, were able to account for New York’s 32 sub districts, but only used this information to 
examine variation when sub districts bordered on another state.   
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Another examination of intradistrict equity used data from 89 Ohio elementary schools 
within one district.  Condron and Roscigno (2003) used production function regressions to 
determine the impact of school composition and funding on academic achievement.  Condron 
and Roscigno’s regressions controlled for achievement three years prior to the year of available 
finance data, used five subject specific achievement measures, separated the effects of local 
spending, federal Title I supplemental spending, and maintenance spending, and included 
independent variables from the school system reports that addressed broad topics of school 
adequacy, safety, healthfulness and appearance as well as school level measures of racial 
composition and poverty.  The study found significant correlations between local spending (total 
spending per-pupil with Title I funding per pupil subtracted) and school-level race and class 
variables.  Regression models demonstrated positive and significant relationships between 
spending and achievement through instructional spending (spending per pupil without Title I 
funds) and maintenance spending.  Coefficients on independent variables in which math and 
science scores were the dependent variable were smaller and less often significant than with 
subjects such as reading and writing.   
 In a policy brief prepared for the Pioneer Institute, West and Shen (2003) examined 
intradistrict equity using the Boston area’s seven largest school districts.  According to West and 
Shen’s derived inequity measure, intradistrict inequity across all seven districts was reported to 
range from .12 to .20, above their threshold for inequity of .10.  In addition, West and Shen used 
instructional expenditure per pupil as a dependent variable in a regression to assess relationships 
between school-level characteristics and expenditures.  In six non-Boston districts, West and 
Shen found positive and significant relationships between spending and percentage of minority 
students in schools.  Boston schools exhibited negative relationships between percent of minority 
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students and expenditures.  West and Shen also found that higher enrollments were associated 
with decreased instructional expenditures per pupil.  
Stiefel, Rubenstein and Schwarz (2004) use better-specified multivariate regressions 
controlling for enrollment, special education, English Language Learners, 4th grade achievement 
in their analysis of intradistrict spending in New York, Cleveland and Columbus, Ohio.  For New 
York, Stiefel, Rubenstein and Schwarz found significant relationships between the percentage of 
students eligible for free and reduced lunch and expenditures, between 4th grade reading 
achievement and expenditure variables between enrollment and expenditure variables, between 
percentage of special education student and expenditure variables.  Expenditures include school-
level and classroom-level spending per pupil, as well as teacher salary.  Both the free lunch and 
special education variables were associated with increased school and classroom level spending 
but decreased teacher salary, as well as fewer teachers with a master’s degree.  In Columbus, 
Stiefel, Rubenstein and Schwarz found significant relationships between enrollment and school-
level expenditures.  Free lunch and middle school status were associated with decreased teacher 
salary, and school-level free lunch percentage was associated with a smaller percentage of 
teachers with a master’s degree.  In Cleveland, only elementary school enrollment was 
associated with decreased school-level spending; middle school achievement was associated with 
increased teacher salaries and percentage of teachers with a master’s degree. Stiefel, Rubenstein 
and Schwarz’s conclusion sums up the findings of previous intradistrict analyses well: 
Overall, the comparison of the three cities confirms that there is a trade-off in which, as 
poverty increases, schools receive more funds but exhibit lower teacher quality and 
teacher salaries…No clear pattern emerges in the relationship between school 
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characteristics and teacher salaries and the relationship between school size and resources 
is complex (p.10).   
Finally, Schwartz, Stiefel and Amor (2005) use three years of panel data and cost 
function analysis to examine the efficiency of Ohio schools (n=6,963).  Stiefel, Schwartz and 
Amor used school-level fixed effects estimators as efficiency proxies in addition to holding 
teacher characteristics, enrollment, school level academic performance, and school level 
demographics constant.  The resulting cost function equation was: 
 
(2.3) 
 
where S was the school fixed effect, W is the set of input prices, Y is a set of school-level 
outputs, SD are a set of school and district characteristics, YEAR is a dummy variable for year, 
M is the number of inputs, R is the number of outputs, P is the number of school and district 
characteristics, S is the number of schools, and T is the number of years.  Stiefel, Schwartz, and 
Amor used this same model with additional lagged achievement variables as well.   
Across four separate model specifications using different combinations of independent 
variables in equation 2.3, Stiefel, Schwartz, and Amor found that enrollment was associated with 
increased expenditures at a decreasing rate, with a threshold enrollment of 90, at which point 
increases in enrollment are associated with decreasing per pupil expenditures.  In these cost 
function regressions, which controlled for individual school effects, neither race nor poverty 
were significantly associated with changes in the natural log of total expenditures per pupil.  
Each specification accounted for approximately 30% of the variation in log of total expenditures 
per pupil.   
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Additionally, Stiefel, Schwartz and Amor were able to use school level fixed effects 
estimates – again, as proxies for school efficiency – as a dependent variable to better understand 
the role of time invariant school level characteristics in education production.  In these 
regressions, race and poverty were positively and significantly associated with increased costs at 
the school level.  Although they did not set out to do so, Stiefel, Schwartz and Amor found 
indications of vertically equitable spending patters in Ohio schools.   
These key studies of intradistrict resource distribution provide a broad foundation for 
analysis of school sequences and district resource allocation patterns.  Taken together, these 
studies provide a basic framework for assessing levels of horizontal and vertical equity, a basis 
from which to construct a theoretical model and select independent variables and a framework 
for extended analysis using cost function analysis.  The following section will describe the data 
available, the analytic tools to be used and potential problems and solutions in framing answers 
to questions about the role of school sequences in intradistrict resource distribution.   
 
Discussion of existing methods 
The studies reviewed above contributed to researchers’ understanding of the manner in 
which district allocation policies to schools may contribute to the measured inequity of 
resources.  These studies further illuminate the role that teacher salaries play in these inequities, 
and further still point to disturbing negative associations between race and poverty on one hand 
and resources allocated on the other.  Nevertheless, these studies do not account for the manner 
in which students move through a school district over time.  Using school sequences as a unit of 
analysis is a new method for analyzing intradistrict equity that accounts for total resources 
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expended on students throughout multiple years of education.  The need for this new 
methodology is twofold: it is motivated by both methodological and policy considerations.   
The first reason for examining school sequences as a unit of analysis is a methodological 
one.  By holding the level of analysis to the school level, current intradistrict studies cannot 
account for the resources allocated to students in schools in prior or subsequent years.  While a 
school may receive additional funds in a given year, little is known about resources allocated to 
students in previous or subsequent years.  Theoretically, then, a student receiving adequate or 
compensatory funds at a school in one year my not have received such funds in previous years.  
In production function equations, this would lead to underestimation of the relationship between 
spending and an educational outcome.  In addition, student assignment creates peer conditions 
that, in turn, influence the movement of experienced teachers away from schools thought to be 
difficult teaching environments.  Peer conditions are also thought to influence student 
performance.   
Peer effects as a resource 
Peer effects, described above, occur when a student’s classmates and schoolmates exert 
an influence on individual student learning.  Research on peer effects has focused on issues of 
integration and segregation of schools, a well as more recent interest in the specific role peers 
play in school-specific measurements of performance and achievement.  Wells and Crain (1994) 
find long-term benefits of desegregation on economic performance and educational attainment as 
well as mixed results in the short term.  Trent (1997) found longitudinal impacts of desegregation 
for minority youth, but also found increasing concentrations of poor and minority youth in 
schools, using the Youth Longitudinal Survey (YLS) and High School and Beyond (HSB).  Gary 
Orfield and colleagues (1999) find a relationship between resegregation and increased dropout 
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rates for minority populations.  Lee and Bryk (1989), also using HSB, found direct effects of 
social composition on student academic achievement. Hoxby (2000) used Texas statewide data 
and found peer effects even when controlling for enrollment trends by randomizing the years of 
her dataset.  Other economists have reached similar conclusions.  Using the same Texas data, 
Hanushek, Rivkin and Kain (2001) found a significant impact for African-American elementary 
school students of .024 standard deviation increase in test scores associated with a 10 percent 
decrease in African-American classmates.  Additionally, Hanushek, Rivkin and Kain (2004) 
found peer effects using panel data of Texas students over time; specifically, African American 
student achievement was most impacted by percentage of African American students in classes.  
The percentage of African American students in classes, however, seemed to have little impact 
on the performance of white students.  These findings occurred independently of achievement or 
school quality differences. 
Teacher mobility 
In addition to finding peer effects on student achievement, research also suggests that 
peer factors such as race may be a factor in teacher mobility between schools.  One study reports 
Georgia teachers leaving high-minority schools at increasing rates through the 1990s (Freeman, 
Scafidi and Sjoquist, 2002).  Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin (2001) used panel data from Texas to 
examine relationships between teacher salary, school level characteristics such as racial 
composition, and teacher transition decisions.  Hanushek, Kain and Rivkin found teacher 
preferences for low-minority, low-poverty and high achieving schools.  Teachers in Texas who 
made a transition to a school that was, on average, populated by 2.5% fewer African American 
students, 5% fewer Hispanic students, and 6.6% fewer students who receive free and reduced 
price lunch.  Additionally, teachers moved to schools that scored 3 percentile points, or 0.8 
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standard deviations, higher on academic achievement tests than the schools they had vacated 
(p.12).  Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff (2002) found similar patterns among teachers in New York 
State.  Among four New York districts, Lankford, Loeb and Wyckoff found a negative 
association between school levels of nonwhite and poor students and teacher quality.  Lankford, 
Loeb and Wyckoff defined teacher quality as training and skills observed trough traditional 
record keeping.  The question of teacher quality, i.e., what specific teacher characteristics impact 
student academic achievement, is a question very much under debate in the field.10  Teachers 
who are under qualified are often those that are new to the profession (Ingersoll, 2001).  This 
relationship between school racial characteristics and teacher mobility has been observed in 
Nashville as well.  Goldring and Houck (2005) reported that Nashville schools with greater than 
60% African American students were staffed by less experienced teachers as well as higher 
proportions of new teachers (no years of prior experience) and non-tenured teachers (0 to 3 years 
of experience).   
If a school’s level of poor and minority students affects teacher mobility, then there is a 
link between student assignment and levels of school funding, specifically the allocation of 
teachers – by far the largest item in instructional expenditure budgets.   
The second reason for examining school sequences as a unit of analysis is policy driven.  
The need to clearly understand the equity implications of policy decisions has become 
increasingly important as districts find greater freedom in crafting student assignment policies 
and greater freedom is distributing students across schools.  Recent court decisions in large urban 
districts such as Atlanta (Mills v. Freeman, 1996), Charlotte, NC (Capacchione v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg, 1999), Denver (Keyes v. Denver School District No. I, 1995), Nashville (Kelly v. 
Metropolitan Board of Education, 1998), and San Diego (Board of Education v. Superior Court, 
                                                 
10 For competing perspectives on this question, see Loeb and Page (2000) and Ballou and Podgursky (2000).   
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1998) have declared large urban school systems to be unitary, thereby freeing them from court 
ordered desegregation plans focusing on the manner by which students are assigned to schools.  
Unitary status decisions have additional impact on neighboring or peer districts, which have 
responded by altering their student assignment policies as well.  (See Making Choices, 2003 for a 
review of this dynamic among North Carolina school districts).  One outcome of these changing 
policies is a resegregation of schools in these districts (Orfield, Frankenberg, and Lee, 2003; 
Orfield, 2001).  Unlike the racist practices of de jure segregated school systems, which 
chronically and intentionally under-funded segregated schools (see Walker, 1996; Anderson, 
1988), today’s segregating school districts have introduced a number of compensatory spending 
measures.  Nashville officials, for example, created special school types – designed to provide 
additional resources and located in impoverished neighborhoods – as one method of blunting the 
negative effects of concentrations of poor and minority students.  Charlotte-Mecklenburg 
officials provided additional instructional resources for schools with high concentrations of poor 
and minority students and paid teachers additional salary for teaching in those schools 
(Charlotte-Mecklenburg Schools, 2006; Goldring and Smrekar, 2002).   
Urban districts have enacted polices which provide compensatory spending as a remedy 
for resegregation.  There is debate among researchers about the extent to which school resources 
(in this case, spending) contribute to school productivity and efficiency (Hanushek, 1981; 1986; 
Hanushek, Kaine and Rivkin, 1999; Hedges, Laine, and Greenwald, 1994; Greenwald, Hedges 
and Laine, 1996).  There is also a line of thinking that district offices may be more of an 
impediment than a help in implementing policy effectively (Chubb and Moe, 1990; Galvin, 
2000; Walberg and Walberg, 1994).  Therefore, it is important to know if – through the 
combination of student assignment and compensatory spending – students of minority 
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background or impoverished circumstances matriculate in sequences of schools where the 
additional educational resources intended for them are available.   
Analysis of intradistrict equity across schools will only partially answer these questions.  
Since the relationships between student racial and economic characteristics and funding carry 
over time across a student’s matriculation within a school system, it becomes important to 
determine if districts are committed to providing resources equitably across schools across a 
student’s time in the district.   
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CHAPTER III 
 
DATA AND METHODS 
 
Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the data and analytic techniques used to answer the 
following research questions:  
1. Are measures of intradistrict equity different when measured across school sequences 
than when measured across schools? 
2. Do school sequences for poor and minority students differ from school sequences for 
other students?  If so, do poor and minority students attend sequences with greater or 
fewer resources than their non-poor, non-minority peers? 
 
Answers to these questions will be tested using one district as a case – the Goodville 
Public Schools (GPS).  Goodville is an unnamed metropolitan Southern city school system that 
has recently moved into unitary status.  The Goodville context is one that involves a move to 
unitary status, compensatory spending and student assignment shifts that make it appropriate for 
study.  Subsequent sections describe the data collection and management, including the 
construction of dependent and independent variables; the methodology to be applied and the 
specific techniques to be used in this analysis.  This section presents the specific models used at 
each level of analysis.   
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The Goodville context 
This research examines school sequences using data from the Goodville Public Schools 
(GPS).  Goodville represents an appropriate case for studying the effects of school sequences on 
intradistrict finance studies.  Goodville moved voluntarily into unitary status in 1998.  In moving 
to neighborhood based student assignment policies, the Goodville community committed itself to 
providing resources to dampen the effects of high concentrations of poor and minority students.  
Goodville therefore represents a case of a district making direct policies to use additional 
resources to address segregating schools.  The final year of student assignment (2003-2004) 
should reflect policy changes made over the last five years to provide vertically equitable 
resources to schools based on student demographic variables.  Finally, the move to 
neighborhood-based student assignment policy was a gradual one; Goodville student assignment 
policy changed slightly over five years to arrive at the current configuration of schools and 
student assignment sequences. 
Anticipating resegregation, Goodville created s series of school types to be located in 
comminutes that would address the needs of poor and minority students.  These school types 
were to provide additional resources to a resegregating student body.  Additionally, students in 
Goodville were often held harmless as the district changed student assignment policies.  That is, 
students, or their siblings were allowed to remain in school sequences although the district had 
changed those sequences as a matter of policy.  In addition to strengthening their magnet school 
program, Goodville created enhanced option and design center schools.   
Figure 3.1 demonstrates the changes in GPS school configurations and assignments over 
time.  In the 2000-2001 academic year, GPS supported 18 separate school/grade configurations.  
In the 1999-2000 academic year, GPS provided 788 separate pathways for s students to progress 
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from kindergarten to the twelfth grade.  This variation allows for an examination of patterns of 
resource allocation over time to see if Goodville schools provided systemic levels of resource 
allocation.  Taken together, these dynamics make Goodville an attractive site to study school 
attendance sequences as a unit of analysis over multiple years of student assignment.   
Table 3.1: Grade configurations and student assignment sequences, GPS, 1998-2005 
Year 97-98 98-99 99-00 00-01 01-02 02-03 03-04 04-05 
K-K K-K K-K K-K K-K K-K K-4 K-4 
1-2 1-2 1-1 K-2 K-2 K-4 5-6 K-5 
1-3 1-3 1-2 K-3 K-4 3-4 5-7 5-8 
1-4 1-4 1-3 K-4 3-4 5-6 5-8 6-8 
1-6 1-6 1-4 K-6 5-5 5-7 7-8 9-12 
3-6 3-6 1-6 3-4 5-6 5-8 8-8   
4-6 4-6 2-2 3-6 5-7 7-7 9-12   
5-6 5-6 3-4 4-4 5-8 7-8     
7-8 7-8 3-6 4-6 6-6 8-8     
9-12 9-12 4-6 5-5 7-7 9-12     
    5-6 5-6 7-8       
    5-8 5-8 8-8       
    7-8 6-6 9-12       
    8-8 6-12         
    9-12 7-7         
      7-8         
      8-8         
Grade Configurations 
      9-12         
School configurations 10 10 15 18 13 10 7 5 
School sequences 564 564 788 514 377 280 154 68 
 
Goodville’s policy shift, occurring over five years, allows for the construction of data that 
capture the historically accurate sequences of schools attended by GPS students.  Creating this 
database involves pulling data from three main sources: students, teachers, and street level 
school assignments.    
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Data 
Prior work in the area of intradistrict finance has decried the difficulty in obtaining 
relevant data that capture school by school variation in staffing costs and supplemental funding, 
in addition to more easily captured data about school level demographics and performance 
(Stiefel, Rubenstein and Berne, 1998; Guthrie, 1997; Berne, Stiefel and Moser, 1997; Farland, 
1997; Busch and Odden, 1997; Roza, 2005).  Often, school level data in the literature come 
through district-directed policy initiatives such as the data collection systems set up in the state 
of New York.  Researchers have attempted to more clearly categorize school level data by 
function code or other organizational schemes, to little visible effect (Cooper, at al, 1997; 
Speakman, et al, 1997).  Although these efforts have met with limited success, intradistrict 
studies find that a majority of funds go to varieties of instructional expenditures, the largest 
category of which is teacher salaries.   
Data for this analysis comes from three major sources:  student enrollment data, street-
level student assignment data, and teacher level salary and experience data.  Each of these three 
datasets contributes to a more complete understanding of the manner in which student 
assignment sequences contribute to the levels of resources provided to students.  Consequently, 
each will be discussed in turn.   
The first source of data is student enrollment data from GPS.  Records in this database 
cover the 1998-1999 academic year to the 2004-2004 academic year.  Student racial, gender and 
free and reduced price lunch information was aggregated across all six years to arrive at 
independent variables describing students.11  In addition, each student’s grade level and school of 
                                                 
11 These are reported with school type information in Table 3.5 below.   
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record were included in the files.  An identifier number matched students across years.  This 
resulted in a database of 123,537 observations, representing students who moved through GPS 
between 1998-1999 and 2003-2004.   
Students who attended preschool or post-12th grade special programs were removed from 
the database, resulting in 118,698 observations.  This database was used to construct peer 
variables of percent minority and percent free lunch for each school within GPS over the time of 
the study.  Finally, because the goal of this study is to examine the impact of successions of 
schools, students were dropped from the database unless they were present in GPS for three 
academic years.  This reduced the database to 69,274 observations.  For descriptive purposes, 
each student in this database was assigned a cohort based on the numbers of specific grade/year 
combinations possible within that cohort.  Table 3.2 illustrates the configuration of the sequences 
along with the population of each cohort.  For example, a student was assigned to cohort five if 
they were in first grade in the 1999-2000 academic year, second grade in the 2000-2001 
academic year, third grade in the 2001-2002 academic year, fourth grade in the 2002-2003 
academic year or fifth grade in the 2003-2004 academic year, or any three-year combination 
thereof.  
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Table 3.2: Student cohorts in GPS, 1999-2004; all students with 3+ years in system. 
 
Cohort 
(n) 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
1 
(3,876) - - - K 1 2 
2 
(4,498) - - K 1 2 3 
3 
(4,872) - K 1 2 3 4 
4 
(6,220) K 1 2 3 4 5 
5 
(6,128) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6 
(6,038) 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 
(5,757) 3 4 5 6 7 8 
8 
(5,581) 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9 
(5,243) 5 6 7 8 9 10 
10 
(5,133) 6 7 8 9 10 11 
11 
(4,977) 7 8 9 10 11 12 
12 
(4,272) 8 9 10 11 12 - 
13 
(3,741) 9 10 11 12 - - 
14 
(2,938) 10 11 12 - - - 
Total 69,274 
 
The next data source consisted of GPS student assignment data files.  These data also 
originated with GPS.  The student assignment files for the 1998-1999 through the 2004-2005 
academic year consist of 32,259 street-level student assignments.  Each record consists of a street 
name, an address range, school identifier and grade range.  These data were combined to reflect 
every unique pattern of school attendance available to students within a given cohort.  Table 3.1 
shows that for the 2004-2005 academic year, GPS students who made no school choice by 
applying to a magnet or other school could be assigned into one of 68 distinct sequences of 
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schools for grades K-12.  Similar data files exist for academic years from 1998-1999 to 2003-
2004.12  These records were combined over time to reflect the number of student assignment 
sequences available to each cohort of students.  Conceptually, a student could fall into one of 
three broad categories: 
• Students whose sequences of schools within a cohort match with the school sequences in 
the district student assignment data files are aligned with district student assignment 
policies.   
• Students whose sequences of schools within a cohort do not match with the school 
sequences in the district student assignment data files but who attended magnet schools 
are aligned with district choice policies.   
• Students whose sequences of schools within a cohort do not match with the school 
sequences in the district student assignment data files and do not contain magnet schools 
are assumed to have transferred residence, obtained an administrative waiver such as a 
grandfather provision or (perhaps) gamed the system in order to attend a different 
sequence of schools than anticipated by school district policy.   
Coding of students in this manner isolates those students who most directly represent the 
intentions of district assignment policy and those who make magnet choices in schools.   
The next source consisted of data on individual teachers and instructional staff.  Staff 
level data files exist for the academic years 1998-1999 to 2003-2004, and were also provided by 
GPS.  Each teacher file contains individual records, which describe each teacher’s race and 
                                                 
12 Although magnet schools are filled through a lottery process, some neighborhoods were actually zoned to attend a 
magnet school.  These assigned magnets are reflected in the school sequences.   
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gender, credentials, years of experience, salary and work location.13  Categories of professional 
staff in these files include classroom teachers, art and music teachers, librarians, guidance 
counselors and principals.  When aggregated to the school level, these records provides school-
level average teacher salary value.  These school-level teacher salary variables represent an 
improvement over the traditional use of district average teacher salary, as recent research has 
shown that disparities in teacher salaries across school represent a key source of intradistrict 
inequity. 
Teacher salaries as inequitably distributed resources 
Marguerite Roza and Paul Hill, working with the Center for Reinventing Public 
education (CRPE) have conducted a number of intradistrict school finance studies.  In a 2004 
Brookings Education Paper, Roza and Hill review the role of teacher salary in assessing 
intradistrict disparities, Their review of the literature suggests that, although teacher salary is a 
tenuous proxy for teacher quality, the demands of the teacher labor market are such that schools 
with aggregate higher teacher salaries will usually have more capable or experienced teachers, as 
schools with more teacher applicants will be able to hire more highly paid (and perhaps, more 
highly effective) teachers.  Roza and Hill found variation around the district mean teacher salary 
across schools within districts in Baltimore, Cincinnati, and Seattle.  However, since all of these 
districts (and 16 other alluded to in the study) report district-wide average teacher salaries, this 
variation is lost to school finance researchers.  In Baltimore City schools, for example, Roza and 
Hill found an average monetary discrepancy of $101,786 per school based on comparisons of 
                                                 
13 Experience is measured as years working in the district.  Experienced teachers who transfer into the district will 
have artificially low years of experience.  In these cases, each teacher’s salary would be a more accurate reflection 
of years of experience.  Therefore, all teachers will have their salary and highest degree held compared to district 
salary schedules to determine actual years of teaching experience.   
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school-level mean teacher salary to district level mean teacher salary.  That figure was $120,612 
in Baltimore County, $106,974 in Cincinnati, and $72,576 in Seattle.   
Since one flaw with many intradistrict studies addressed in the literature is the use of 
district mean salary at the school-level (Roza, 2005), and teacher salary represents a majority of 
school-level instructional funding, this information provides important variation across schools.   
Goodville teacher salaries were computed with administrative and professional staff 
included, to provide a measure of  “other professional salary” and without administrative staff to 
reflect a “teacher salary.”14  These school level data were imported into the student records 
database, so that every student, for every year, is assigned her or his school’s average teacher 
salary.  These data were also aggregated to the school level to provide data on teacher quality 
characteristics at the school level.  Since students attended the district for different years (even 
within the same cohort), the new teacher and salary variables were weighted by student years of 
attendance to provide comparable percentage values.  Table 3.4 provides an overview of select 
teacher salary and quality calculations by cohort.  Teacher salary is positively statistically 
correlated with teacher experience at the p<.05 level with a coefficient of .802.   
Finally, each school was coded by school type as reflected on the Tennessee Department 
of Education report cards and GPS data for a given year.  These school types included: enhanced 
option, design center and magnet schools.  These school types are supposed to receive additional 
funding and should be controlled for later in the analysis.  Table 3.5 provides an overview of 
demographic characteristics and school types for each cohort in the dataset.   
 
 
                                                 
14 All salary figures were adjusted for inflation using the consumer price index; all dollars are 2004 dollars.   
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Table 3.3: Teacher characteristics by cohort, all salary figures in 2004 dollars 
Cohort Percent non-tenured 
Mean teacher 
experience 
Mean teacher 
salary 
Mean  
salary 
Salary 
difference 
1 .19 13.15 43,788.18 44,484.44 696.26 
2 .20 12.96 43,455.33 44,294.97 839.64 
3 .21 12.83 43,210.27 44,135.75 925.48 
4 .23 12.31 42,801.15 43,797.43 996.28 
5 .24 12.15 42,920.82 44,004.01 1,083.19 
6 .26 11.86 42,729.23 43,842.43 1,113.20 
7 .27 11.66 42,763.73 43,960.99 1,197.26 
8 .26 11.81 43,097.67 44,381.39 1,283.72 
9 .25 12.07 43,579.79 44,891.55 1,311.76 
10 .23 12.74 44,399.93 45,688.42 1,288.49 
11 .21 13.66 45,518.99 46,767.31 1,248.32 
12 .20 14.18 46,141.30 47,452.07 1,310.77 
13 .20 14.41 46,451.52 47,857.09 1,405.57 
14 .20 14.33 46,293.02 47,803.85 1,510.83 
Mean .23 12.87 44,082.21 45,240.12 1,157.91 
  
Combining these three datasets allows for close comparison of a student’s actual 
sequence through the system versus the district level idea of students progress through the 
system.  In addition, each student can be assigned the values of his or her total enrollment and 
total teacher salary over all years for comparison across cohorts, or the mean of the same 
variables for the same analysis within cohorts.   
   
  
 43
 
 
Table 3.4: School type characteristics, by cohort 
 
Cohort Mean enrollment 
Percent years 
magnet 
Percent years design 
center 
Percent years enhanced 
option 
1 491.64 .025 .058 .038 
2 499.21 .029 .063 .042 
3 510.94 .028 .050 .043 
4 527.68 .049 .037 .040 
5 557.81 .056 .023 .028 
6 576.98 .074 .014 .012 
7 595.63 .097 .006 .006 
8 718.61 .111 .003 .003 
9 825.74 .133 .001 .003 
10 957.17 .137 .0001 .0002 
11 1,064.15 .131 0 0 
12 1,163.81 .167 0 0 
13 1,255.17 .177 0 0 
14 1,234.19 .179 0 0 
Mean 784.20 0.10 0.018 0.015 
 
Methods 
This dissertation makes use of traditional framework of school finance equity to assess 
the equity of student school sequences as a unit for analysis in intradistrict school finance 
studies.  As outlined by Berne and Stiefel (1984), the procedure for assessing the equitable 
distribution of resources involves both horizontal and vertical analysis.  Because of the data 
available and the nature of the research questions posed, vertical equity analysis will utilize 
quantile regression, a technique that estimates relationships at differing percentiles of the 
dependent variable (Koenker and Hallock, 2001).  Specific methods for assessing levels of 
horizontal and vertical equity are described below.   
Horizontal equity is popularly conceived as measures of the equal treatment of equals 
across a population.  Although Berne and Stiefel note that it is readily obvious that not all 
children are equal and caution that horizontal measure should only be used to assess distribution 
of resources across like subgroups, horizontal equity analysis is traditionally presented as a 
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foundational analysis for understanding the degree of inequity present in a system across 
variables of interest (Berne and Stiefel, 1994; Rolle and Liu, in press; Iatarola and Stiefel, 2003).  
Measures of horizontal equity are calculated as indices or ratios.  While Berne and Stiefel list 
eleven measures of horizontal equity, this analysis will be concerned with three: the coefficient 
of variation, the McLoone Index and the Gini coefficient.  The following section discusses each 
in turn. 
The coefficient of variation is a simple measure of dispersion, calculated by dividing the 
standard deviation of a distribution by its mean.  The formula for the coefficient of variation is:  
 
     (3.1) 
 
The greater the inequity in the system, the larger the coefficient of variation.  As outlined by 
Odden and Picus (1992), coefficients of variation greater than .1 reflect some degree of 
undesirable inequity across a distribution.  For reference, Iatarola and Stiefel found coefficients 
of variation ranging from .08 to .195 in the dependent variables of their intradistrict equity 
analysis of New York City schools.  Stiefel, Rubenstien and Berne (1998) reported coefficients 
of variation ranging from .09 to .26 in their review of intradistrict equity in four cities: Chicago, 
New York, Rochester, and Fort Worth.   
The McLoone Index is a more recent development in econometrics, designed to provide a 
measure of the impact of inequity within a distribution on those located below the median within 
that observation.  The McLoone index is a ratio of the total amount of funding allocated to the 
bottom 50% of a distribution expressed as a ratio to the total amount of hypothetical funding that 
same bottom 50% of a distribution would receive if each were funded at the median level.  The 
formula for this ratio is: 
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where J is the number of schools in district below the median value (M) , P is the per pupil 
amount of revenue for school J, M is the median value of revenues, where values between 1 and 
J are less than pM .  McLoone values reach zero in inequity and one in equity.  Again, a guide 
from Odden and Picus is that McLoone values below .9 are generally considered equity 
concerns.  Although the McLoone index has not been used often in academic research, it has 
been highlighted in recent work.  In an examination of Tennessee districts, Rolle and Liu report 
McLoone indices that range from .88 to .93 across the years of 1994 and 2001 (Rolle and Liu, in 
press). 
The Gini coefficient is a standard economic measure of dispersion.  It expresses the ratio 
between the percentage of any given population and the cumulative percentage of resources 
expended.  The Gini coefficient is calculated by: 
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and represents the ratio between a hypothetical situation in which each percent of a distribution 
receives that same percentage of revenue (i.e., 1 percent of the population receives 1% of total 
funding, 2% of the population receives 2% of total funding, etc.), and the actual distribution of 
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revenue by percent of population.  The Gini coefficient approaches zero in an equitable 
distribution and one in an inequitable distribution.  iP   represents the number of pupil per school, 
jP  represents the number of pupil across all schools, X represents mean revenues, and pX  
represents mean revenues across all pupils.  For this analysis, pupils and schools will be replaced 
with schools and district level measures.  Some intradistrict analysis has reported Gini 
coefficients, with Burke (1999) making extensive use of the measure; decomposing it to 
demonstrate inter- versus intra- district sources of disparity across Chicago schools as described 
above.  As reported by Odden and Picus, a Gini coefficient of .1 is a desirable representation of 
equity.   
Taken together, measures of horizontal equity provide information about inequalities in 
resources across a distribution.  It may be case (and often is) that spending is horizontally 
inequitable for appropriate reasons – additional funds are being expended to assist traditionally 
low-performing groups.  Additional vertical equity analysis can assist in determining the 
relationships between spending and student and school characteristics.   
Recent work in school finance vertical equity analysis has eschewed the correlational 
analysis called for by Berne and Stiefel (1984) in favor of multivariate regression.  The results of 
regression present an overview of strength, sign, and significance between school and 
community factors and school spending.  Interdistrict analysis utilizes vertical equity to assess 
relationships between spending, outcome and property wealth.  Since intradistrict analysis 
examines schools within an area that is similarly valued and similarly taxed (i.e., there is no 
variation in the relationship between property wealth and taxes raised), intradistrict school 
finance research uses vertical equity regression to assess relationships between school-level cost, 
school student body composition and schooling outcomes (Condron and Roscigno, 2003; Iatarola 
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and Stiefel, 2003; Schwartz, Stiefel and Amor, 2005).  In most cases of vertical equity analysis, 
input costs are excluded, and multiple school characteristics are regressed against cost.  An 
example of a regression used in intradistrict finance analysis would be: 
 
εββββ ++++= nn XXXTS .....22110     (3.4) 
 
where TS = teachers’ mean salary at a given school (or any other pupil weighted cost dependent 
variable, such as total instructional expenditures, etc.), 1X  through nX  represent relevant 
independent variables such as student population characteristics; e is a randomly distributed error 
term, and 1β  through nβ  represent estimates of the impact of a one unit change in the relevant 
independent variable on teacher salaries at the school level.15   
 Although this type of vertical equity regression has been used to provide insight into 
resource distribution across schools, it will not suffice in an assessment of resource distribution 
across school sequences.  Measures of resource distribution for school sequences are averages of 
school-level variables within that sequence.  Since regression coefficients provide insight into 
the relationship between the average value of an independent variable and the average value of a 
dependent variable, and since sequence level variables are simply arithmetically transformed 
school level variables, results from sequence level regressions will be substantially the same as 
results from school level regressions. 
One way to address this issue is with quantile regression.  Quantile regression builds 
upon the insights of maximum likelihood (ML) estimation to create a method to assess changing 
relationships between dependent and independent variables across a distribution.  Originally 
                                                 
15 This model represents the model used in Iatarola and Stiefel, 2003.   
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designed a more robust method for estimating relationships between variables in populations 
where the distribution of the error term did not meet the Gaussian assumptions of ordinary least 
squares (OLS) based methods (see Koenker and Bassett, 1978), quantile regression has gained 
popularity as a method to gain information about relationships between independent variables 
and a dependent variable at different points in the distribution than the conditional mean used by 
OLS (Eide & Showalter, 1998; Koenker, 2005).   
To do this, the τ th quantile of a variable Y is defined as the inverse function of the of the 
probability distribution of Y.  That is, if Y is a random variable with a probability distribution 
function of 
)(Pr)( yYobabilityyF ≤=     (3.5) 
then the τ th quantile of Y is the inverse function such as 
})(:inf{)( ττ ≥= yFyQ     (3.6) 
The median in this case is Q(.5), while the 25th percentile would be Q(.25).  Optimizing this 
equation yields a different regression equation; similar in form to an OLS equation that expresses 
relationships between independent variable and a specified quantile.  The bivariate quantile 
regression equation is 
)()|( 1110 τββτ −++= uy FxxQ    (3.7) 
where Q is the given quantile and Fu is the distribution function term of the errors (Koenker, 
2005).  This assumes that the errors are identically distributed and independent.16  Quantile 
regression provides robust estimates that are also equivariant under monotonic transformations 
(see Cade & Noon, 2003) and are not overly sensitive to outliers in the distribution.  Quantile 
regression has been used in economics (see, for example, Martins and Pereira, 200), 
                                                 
16 A model in which error terms are heteroskedastic is described more fully in the section to follow.   
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environmental research (see, for example, Schröder, Andersen and Kiehl, 2005), and medical 
research (see, for example, Austin and Schull, 2003) but has only rarely been used in assessing 
education questions (see Eide & Showalter, 1998 as well as Levin, 2001 for examples).   
Levin uses quantile regression to estimate marginal effects of the role of class size in 
student achievement along different points in the distribution.  Levin states, “the researcher asks 
not what the effect…is on average, but for whom such effects are significant and how large they 
might be” (p.223).  Levin further notes the suitability of quantile regression as a methodology to 
assessing equity questions in education research (p.223).  From this perspective, the use of 
quantile regression in conducting vertical equity studies – regardless of the unit of analysis – will 
provide important information about the status of the marginal student at different points along 
the distribution of a dependent variable.  Inequity in a quantile regression framework can take 
many forms.  For example, if the funding gap between minority and white students is wider at 
the .8 quantile of resource distribution than at the .2 quantile, then inequity is assessed as the race 
gap at higher quantiles of the distribution.   
Consequently, this research will use quantile regression to estimate relationships between 
student characteristics and school level resources: teacher and other professional salary, 
percentage of racial minorities, and students eligible for free lunch, and percent of teachers in a 
school who have 3 or fewer years of experience.   
Each of the methods in assessing horizontal and vertical equity described above will be 
employed to aid in understanding the role that student assignment plays in the levels of resources 
provided to students.  The section that follows outlines the specific analytic steps that will be 
employed to determine the role that school sequences pay in the distribution of educational 
resources.   
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Analytic strategy 
 Because no assessment of intradistrict equity using school sequences has been conducted, 
this dissertation will examine intradistrict inequity at both the school level and the sequence level 
and compare findings from the two analyses.  The following sections outline a proposed analytic 
strategy to identify levels of equity across GPS schools, to examine equity across school 
sequences with special emphasis on those sequences that are aligned with district policy as 
written.    
This analysis will occur in three steps.  The first step will seek to describe the 
characteristics of students within the database by sequence characteristics - such as students in 
sequence, transfer students, magnet school attendees - and compare mean values for these 
students controlling for cohorts and for student years in the system.  This description will provide 
insight into the type of sequences encountered by GPS students between 1999 and 2004 and the 
frequency with which those sequences were encountered.   
The second step will consist of a traditional school-level finance equity study.  Results 
from this analysis: coefficients of variation, McLoone indices and Gini coefficients as well as 
estimated regression coefficients will be compared to findings from a sequence-level analysis. In 
order to obtain apples to apples comparisons between regression coefficients, quantile regression 
will also be applied in this “school level” analysis to demonstrate the manner in which the 
relationships between student characteristics and resources varies across a distribution.    
The third step of analysis will replicate the of quantile regression second step using the 
accounting for student school sequences.  Once the base comparison has been made, this step 
will also control for sequence type in order to provide a better understating of the sources of 
variation in dependent variables.  Each step is discussed more fully below.  
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Description 
An appropriate first step in an analysis with a large student database and a new proposed 
unit of analysis is to describe the variables in the database: their attributes and variation across 
the data.  Analysis of key variables across cohorts, across years of enrollment, across transfer 
status, grad retention status and magnet school attendance will be presented and interpreted 
before conducting horizontal and vertical equity analysis.   Description of this sort will allow for 
a closer examination of issues that arise from the database, while still anchoring the focus on the 
comparison of findings between school sequences and school level analysis of the equitable 
distribution of resources.  Key questions at this stage of analysis will be: 
• How many students attended schools in district created sequences, attended district 
provided magnet choices, or attended school sequences that were not developed by 
district policy? 
• How were in-sequence, magnet and transfer students resourced?  Did any group of 
students “trade up” by making different school decisions?  
 
Dependent variables 
This analysis will therefore focus on five resource variables.  Each is described more 
fully below.  Dependent variables are:   
• teacher salary; 
• other professional salary; 
• school-level percent of minority students; 
• school-level percent of free and reduced price lunch eligible students; and,  
• teacher quality as measured by non-tenure status.   
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Prior research has shown teacher salary variable to represent a high percentage of 
instructional spending (Berne and Stiefel, 1994), and to have a relationship with school racial 
and economic characteristics (Roza, 2004).  Teacher and other professional salary best represent 
the dynamics of intradistrict school finance this study seeks to capture.   
School-level percentages of minority or poor students are traditionally used as 
independent variables to predict the provision of a more pecuniary dependent variable.  
However, the literature on peer effects suggests that school composition variables such as the 
percentage of minority or free lunch eligible students at a schools may represents resources that 
impact student attainment and achievement.  The structure of the data set and the application of 
quantile regression allows for more interesting analysis.  In this case, vertical equity models 
using quantile regression provide information on the manner in which individual race and 
poverty characteristics interact with school-level concentrations of poor and minority students.  It 
is natural to expect a student’s race to predict school levels of racial composition; but the 
difference in these relationships across quantile can provide insight into the intensity of 
segregation across schools.   
Finally, teacher inexperience exists as a purchased input that may operate differently 
from teacher and  salary.  A measure of the percentage of non-tenured teachers at a student’s 
school represents a degree of teacher quality present for that student (see, for example, Rice, 
2003; Hanushek, et al, 2005).   
 
Traditional (school-based) analysis – horizontal equity 
The next step of inquiry is to conduct a standard analysis of resources as distributed 
across Goodville schools, as is found in many intradistrict school finance studies.  Three 
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measures of horizontal equity – the coefficient of variation, the McLoone index and the Gini 
coefficient will be calculated across students for two cost variables per year: teacher salary per 
pupil and other professional staff salary per pupil across GPS schools. In addition, assessments 
of horizontal equity have often also applied measures of distribution to student racial and 
economic characteristics (Rolle and Liu in press; Rolle, McColl and Houck, in review).  Some 
have even begun applying this analysis to outcomes (see Iatarola and Stiefel, 2003).   
 
Traditional (school-based) analysis – vertical equity 
 Vertical equity at the school level will be assessed in this step using multiple regression.  
Conceptually, vertical equity regressions will utilize two classes of variables: demographic 
variables and school type variables – to determine the impact of school characteristics the teacher 
and other professional staff salary dependent variables.   
One insight from the literature review is that the strength of relationship (expressed by 
the slope) between enrollment and spending may change as output changes, thereby necessitating 
the use of a polynomial term (Studenmund, 2001).  Because concentrations of poor and minority 
students were a concern for Nashvillians during the move to unitary status and because of the 
confluence of race and class variables that often occurs in educational research, the proposed 
model will include an interacted term of race and class.  Specifically, the interacted term is the 
multiplicative product of the non-white and free and reduced price lunch variables.  Using an 
interacted term of this sort allows for interpretation along three race/class dimensions:  the 
impact of minority students who are not poor; the impact of poor students who are non minority, 
and the impact of students who are both poor and minority on spending (see Rolle, McColl and 
Houck, in review, for an example of using an interacted term to tease out separate funding effects 
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for urban and rural minority students).  In a separate regression, school type variables will 
account for any changes in funding due to a school’s designation as an enhanced option, design 
center, middle school, or magnet school, net of student demographic characteristics.  The final 
two models of a school-level vertical equity regression will be: 
 
(3.8) 
and 
 
 
  
where S is one of five resource variables, E is enrollment, 2E is the squared term of enrollment, 
MIN is the minority status of an individual student, FRPL is the free lunch status of an individual 
student, DC is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a school is a design center, EO is a 
dummy variable taking the value of 1 if a school is an enhanced option school, MAG is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if a school is a magnet school, and the variables 2000,2001,2002, 
2003 and 2004 are variables which account for individual year fixed effects, and e is a randomly 
distributed error term.  The coefficients represent estimated relationships between a unit change 
in the appropriate independent variable on the percent change in the dependent variable – one of 
the five resource measures described above.  Separate equations are used to explain maximum 
variation related to either student characteristics or school types.  Appendices will present 
finding of fully specified models containing both student characteristic and school type variables.   
 This vertical equity analysis across schools represents an application of traditional 
methods of intradistrict analysis across GPS schools.  On its own, it represents a contribution to 
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the larger literature on intradistrict school finance by providing sharper analysis of resource 
distribution across an urban Southern system.  Findings from this step of analysis can be 
compared with findings from other studies to sharpen researchers’ understanding of across 
school resource distributions.   
If vertical equity appropriately asks about the unequal treatment of students under 
unequal conditions, then the use of the average relationship between changes in an independent 
variable on the mean of the dependent variable is a weak method to answer these questions.  This 
is illustrated through an examination of figures 3.1 and 3.2, below. 
Figure 3.1 presents a graphic illustrating traditional OLS regression analysis.  In this 
figure, a hypothetical example is developed using average teacher salary as a dependent variable.  
Values of teacher salary run along the y-axis.  The x-axis has values of 0 and 1, representing a 
dummy variable for student minority status (0=White, 1= minority).  The two vertically oriented 
normal curve represent the hypothetical distribution of teacher salary for only White students 
(over the 0 on the x-axis) and for only minority students (over the 1 on the x-axis).  The 
asymmetrically shifted normal curves demonstrate that minority students, hypothetically, receive 
fewer average teacher salary dollars than White students do; the curve for minority students is 
shifted down from the similar distributional curve for majority students.  The line from the mean 
value of the majority distribution to the mean value of the minority distribution represents a 
regression coefficient, the slope of a line expressing the average difference in teacher salary 
between majority and minority students.  This aligns with a traditional interpretation of a 
regression coefficient on the dummy variable of minority status: “minority status is associated 
with decrease in teacher salary dollars of 1β .”   
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 However, Figure 3.1 explains very little about racial difference in teacher salary across 
the distributions of majority and minority students.  Perhaps the average difference is slight, but 
a greater discrepancy exists between minority and majority students and very low teacher 
salaries, or very high salaries.  Figure 3.2 represents a quantile regression approach to examining 
this same issue.  Rather than one line representing the entire difference between teacher salary 
Figure 3.1 – hypothetical OLS regression 
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levels for majority and minority students, there are now three lines – representing this 
relationship at the .25, .5 and .75 quantiles of the distribution of teacher salary.   
Figure 3.2 is more illuminating.  Although the slope of the line connecting the median 
(Q50) points of the majority and minority distributions ( 50,1 Qβ ) of teacher salary is similar to line 
representing the relationship between racial differences in average teacher salary shown in figure 
3.1, the line representing the relationship between minority and majority students at the 25% 
quantile of the distribution ( 25,1 Qβ ) is steeper, indicating a larger racial gap in the provision of the 
very lowest teacher salaries.  This represents a beta coefficient in a regression equation that is 
larger than the coefficient on the same variable at the median.   
At the .75 quantile, representing high teacher salaries, the line representing the 
relationship between majority and minority students ( 75,1 Qβ ) is relatively flat, indicating that 
minority students receive roughly the same exposure to highly paid teacher than their majority 
peers.   
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When taken together, the picture in figure 3.2 illuminates how inequity works its way 
across a distribution and provides for a more nuanced interpretation of results.  Minority students 
are more impacted when they are at the low end of the distribution of teacher salary than at the 
median or at the high end of the distribution.  Minority status has a greater impact among low-
paid teachers than among other teachers.  In interpretation of quantile regression results, inequity 
can be described both in magnitude (all coefficients in figure 3.2 point towards an inequitable 
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Figure 3.2 – hypothetical quantile regression, quantiles 25, 50 and 75  
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relationship between race and salary) and in the location of greatest impact along the distribution 
of the dependent variable.   
It should be noted that figure 3.2 could be composed using either school-based or 
sequence-based analysis.  In this dissertation, quantile regression will be used in computing 
relationships at the school level and the sequence level.  The comparison between the two 
methods will determine if the relationships between the two sets of results are statistically 
different, and in which direction.   
Determining the changing relationships between independent and dependent variables 
across each distribution, as provided by quantile regression, will allow greater insight into the 
manner by which educational resources are distributed for a number of reasons. 
Because quantile regression represents a powerful new way to understand relationships 
between funding, student racial and economic characteristics and school types, it will be used in 
addition to standard OLS regression for vertical equity analysis.  Models at this stage of analysis 
will follow conventions of vertical equity analysis, but will conduct the analysis using quantile 
regression.  The basic quantile equation for a quantile regression model with a heteroskedastic 
error term is  
           
 
where  Q is the xth quantile of the distribution of dependent variable Q, and the error term is the 
inverse function of the variance for quantile x.  School type variables will account for any 
changes in funding due to a school’s designation as an enhanced option, design center, middle 
school or magnet school, net of student demographic characteristics.  The final models of a 
school-level vertical equity quantile regression will be: 
(3.10) 
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(3.11) 
 
and 
 
 
 
where Q is one of five dependent variables and  )|( xτ  is the specified quantile of the 
distribution of the dependent variable,17 E is enrollment, MIN is the minority status of an 
individual student, FRPL is the free lunch status of an individual student, DC is a dummy 
variable taking the value of 1 if a school is a design center, EO is a dummy variable taking the 
value of 1 if a school is an enhanced option school, MAG is a dummy variable taking the value of 
1 if a school is a magnet school, and τσ 1)( −Fx  is a randomly distributed error term.  Year-by-
year fixed effects will also be included in these models to control for the effects of time.  The 
coefficients represent estimated relationships between a unit change in the appropriate 
independent variable on the change in the dependent variable – one of the five dependent 
variables described above.  Analysis will be conducted across a standard range of quartiles (.10, 
.25, .50, .75, .90) using quantile regression with resampling to determined confidence intervals, F 
values and p values.18  
                                                 
17 This analysis will utilize what have come to be the “conventional” quantiles: .10, .25, .50, .75, .90.  See Levin 
(2003) for an example.   
18 The SAS PROC QUANTREG procedure uses a newer bootstrap method called the Markov chain marginal 
bootstrap (MCMB). This procedure, developed by He and Hu (2002), is more efficient in resampling for quantile 
regression because it is designed to compute p one-dimensional solutions instead of computing p dimensional 
solutions within the matrix.   
(3.12) 
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Sequence-based analysis   
The main question addressed by this research is a determination of the manner in which 
school sequences used as a unit of analysis might alter findings from intradistrict school equity 
studies.  Equity analysis will therefore be conducted with school sequences, using aggregates of 
teacher salary and other professional staff salary variables.  Horizontal equity measures will 
include the coefficient of variation, McLoone Index and Gini coefficient.  Vertical equity will be 
assessed using quantile regression, although the model will be modified to account for the 
longitudinal nature of sequences.   
Year by year fixed effects will be computed by creating a weighted variable for each year 
in the data sequence for each student.  For example, a student in the database for three years, 
2001, 2002 and 2003 will have a fixed effect for each year with a value of .33.  A student in the 
database for four years would have each of the years of her inclusion weighted by a factor of .25.  
In this manner, sequence based analysis can still account for the vagaries of time while providing 
apples to apples equations for comparisons of effects between school-based and sequence-based 
analysis.   
 As Table 3.2 illustrates, the database for this analysis consists of 69,024 records 
distributed across 14 cohorts.  By taking the weighted averages of dependent variables salary, 
analysis across all 14 cohorts can be conducted.  In some cases, simply expressing the variable as 
a mean across all years for the number of years a student was enrolled.   
In other cases, the dependent variable will be expressed as a weighted dummy variable 
much like the weighted fixed effects for year.  For example, a student who is enrolled for 3 years 
and is free lunch eligible for two years will have a free-lunch percentage of 2/3, or roughly 66%.  
A student enrolled for all six years and free lunch eligible for two years will have a free lunch 
   
  
 62
τσββ
ββββ
βββββτ
1
109
8765
43
2
210
)(20042003
200220012000)%(
%)|(
−++
++++×
+++++=
Fxww
wwwFRPLMIN
FRPLMINMEANEMEANExQ
τσβββββ
ββββββτ
1
109876
543
2
210
)(20042003200220012000
%%%)|(
−+++++
++++++=
Fxwwwww
MAGEODCMEANEMEANExQ
variable value of 2/6, or roughly 33%.  The purpose of this type of analysis is to determine 
overall levels of equity across six years of data and to locate them within the horizontal equity 
statistics computed at the school level for all six years of the study.  Vertical equity across all 
student sequences will be conducted using quantile regression.  The initial model for this 
analysis will be: 
 
(3.13) 
  
 
and 
 
(3.14) 
 
where Q is the specified quartile of the dependent variable, MEANE is average enrollment and 
MIN is the minority status of a student.  Because this analysis occurs across sequences, the 
variable %FRPL, %DC, %EO, and %MAG indicate the percentage of years a student received 
free or reduced price lunch or was assigned to a design center, enhanced option, middle or 
magnet school.  Year fixed effects are weighted as described above and noted as 2000w, 2001w, 
2002w, 2003w, 2004w.   
 A final step of analysis will be to compare the findings from those studies conducted at 
the school level to those conducted at the sequence level.  Horizontal equity statistics, since they 
are population specific, can be directly compared.  Clear interpretation of coefficients will allow 
for a determination of the impact of sequences level analysis as compared to school level 
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analysis.  Sets of coefficients from regression equations can be compared using a graphical 
comparison developed by Basset, Tam and Knight (2002) to assess whether sequence-based 
estimates fall outside of the 95% confidence interval of similarly derived school-based 
independent variable coefficients.   
 
Conclusion 
 Equity in the provision of educational resources remains a concern for educators and 
policymakers, despite growing concerns about adequacy of resources in producing educational 
outcomes.  With greater availability of data and greater technical sophistication, increasing 
interest has developed in assessing the degree to which districts distribute resources to schools 
and relationships between traditional markers of at-risk student populations and the follow of 
resources into schools with high proportions of those populations.  Intradistrict finance equity 
study places a premium on school composition variables such as race and poverty.  It follows, 
then, that consideration the manner in which school composition is created, and the 
consequences of school composition over time, be a consideration of equity analysis at the 
intradistrict level.  This dissertation research poses two research questions: 
1.  Are measures of intradistrict equity different when measured across school sequences 
than when measured across schools? 
2. Do school sequences for poor and minority students differ from school sequences for 
other students?  If so, do poor and minority students attend sequences with greater or 
fewer resources than their non-poor, non-minority peers? 
In answering these two research question, this research will conduct school wide equity analysis 
using horizontal and vertical equity measures across all students in GPS for the years 1998-1999 
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to 2003-2004 and within 14 cohorts of those students.  This research will contribute to a better 
understanding of the manner in which district assignment, choice and teacher transfer policy 
interacts with funding policies.  It will provide a framework for using quantile regression to 
assess vertical finance equity.  Finally, this research contributes to the literature on quantile 
regression as a tool for evaluating levels of equity within school finance frameworks.   
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CHAPTER IV 
 
 
ANALYSIS 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Analysis of school sequences in intradistrict resource allocation analysis introduces 
several new concepts to the field of school finance equity studies, and intradistrict finance 
studies in particular.  Therefore, this analysis will work through a number of necessary steps in 
order to arrive at satisfactory conclusions to the research questions.  First, student sequences 
need to be created and classified using available data.  Second, traditional equity analysis, 
undertaken across schools, will determine a baseline of results against which to judge sequence-
based analysis.  Third, quantile regression (QR), conducted across schools, will demonstrate how 
QR results differ from ordinary least squares (OLS) results.  Finally, QR using school sequences 
will provide the comparison between school-level and sequence-level analysis of vertical equity.  
The analytic strategy section below reviews each of these steps.  Each of these steps generates 
findings that are relevant to the field of intradistrict school finance and relevant to answering the 
research questions posed by this dissertation.   
Consequently, this chapter will unfold in the following manner.  An initial section will 
review the analytic strategy used to find answers to research questions posed in chapter one.  
Next, an overview of key findings will provide a guide to the sections of analysis to follow.  
Finally, additional sections will expand on each research finding, including methods, findings, 
and conclusions.   
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Analytic strategy 
 The purpose of this research is to examine the role that school sequences play in the 
distribution of educational resources across students within districts.  Since most intradistrict 
equity studies focus on examining the distribution of resources across schools, they may fail to 
account for the manner in which student school attendance mediates or moderates resource 
distribution.  School sequence analysis will examine the equity of resource distribution across a 
student’s entire academic career.  Specifically, this research addresses two questions: 
1. Are measures of intradistrict equity different when measured across school sequences 
than when measured across schools? 
2. Do school sequences for poor and minority students differ from school sequences for 
other students?  If so, do poor and minority students attend sequences with greater or 
fewer resources than their non-poor, non-minority peers? 
 
To answer question one, school sequences will be constructed and described for available 
data.  Once constructed, horizontal equity statistics between schools and sequences can be 
compared.19 
To answer question two, regression coefficients for poor and minority students will be 
compared across five regression models:  (1) school-level ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression using pooled data with year fixed effects with student characteristics as independent 
variables; (2) school-level ordinary least squares (OLS) regression using pooled data with year 
fixed effects with school types as independent variables; (3) quantile regression (QR) on pupil-
weighted school-level data using the same regression models as OLS analysis (2) and (3); (4) QR 
                                                 
19 Horizontal equity statistics were created using the ‘inequal’ subroutine in Stata 9.0.  McLoone indices were hand 
calculated in Stata.   
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using school sequences with weighted year controls and student level characteristic as 
independent variables; and, (5) QR using school sequences with weighted year controls and 
school type characteristic as independent variables.20   
Why so many steps?  The use of quantile regression introduces a new method for 
assessing vertical equity into the school finance framework.  As discussed in chapter three, QR is 
the chosen method for this analysis because 1) OLS would provide similar results between 
school-based and sequence based analysis and 2) QR provides information about the pattern of 
relationships between independent variables and resource allocation along different points of the 
distribution as illustrated in figures 3.1 and 3.2.   
Since quantile regression has not been used in a vertical equity application within the 
field of school finance, it is necessary to calibrate QR findings relative to OLS findings.  That is, 
since quantile regression will be the method for assessing any differences between school-based 
and sequence-based analysis, it is important to know how to interpret school-based QR relative 
to school-based OLS analysis.  Once established, QR results can be compared between school-
based and sequence-based analyses in order to determine whether sequence-based analysis 
provides different results from school-based analysis.  This process will both provide answers to 
a comparison of sequence-based versus school-based analysis, it will also provide findings that 
are comparable to traditional vertical equity analysis.   
The following steps will be taken:  Results from steps 1 and 2 will be compared with 
results from step 3 in order to determine what additional information is provided by QR that is 
not provided by OLS.  Coefficient estimates from step 3 will be compared to results from steps 4 
                                                 
20 OLS regression estimates were calculated using “PROC REG” in SAS 9.1.  QR estimates were obtained using 
“PROC QUANTREG” in SAS 9.1.  PROC QUANTREG is a SAS experimental procedure updated in January of 
2006.  Additional information about proc quantreg and downloads can be found at 
http://support.sas.com/rnd/app/da/quantreg.html.   
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and 5 to determine whether sequence-based analysis yields statistically different estimates from 
school-based analysis.   
 
Overview of findings 
 The purpose of this section is to describe key findings from each step of the analysis.  
This overview will provide an orientation to the steps of analysis as described in chapter two as 
well as above.  These findings are listed in order of their discovery throughout the analytic 
process.  The list below summarizes findings from each step of analysis.   
Findings from school sequences   
Although school sequence creation yielded over 32,000 distinct sequences and parts of 
sequences, only 27% of students in the database were classified as “in sequence.”  After 
accounting for students who repeated grades and chose to attend magnet schools, there were still 
40% of student who were not accounted for.  Descriptive analysis revealed that students not in 
sequences were no different from students in sequences vis-à-vis the distribution of five 
resources: teacher experience minority and free lunch peers, and teacher and other professional 
staff salaries.  Magnet students, however, seemed to experience higher percentages of non-
tenured teachers and considerably lower percentages of free lunch peers.  
Findings from horizontal equity analysis   
Horizontal equity analysis determined that each of the five resource variables were 
inequitably distributed across students.  Horizontal equity analysis conducted across sequences 
of schools yielded horizontal equity statistics that were often less than school-based analysis.  
That is, although sequence based horizontal equity analysis still showed the distribution of 
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resources to be unequal, those findings were of a lesser magnitude than findings from school-
based horizontal equity analysis.   
Findings from OLS vertical equity regressions   
Standard OLS regression vertical equity analysis confirmed that vertical inequity was 
related to both student characteristics such as race and class, as well as school types such as 
design center, enhanced option and magnet schools.  Overall, poor and minority students 
experienced higher percentages of non-tenured teachers, less average teacher and other 
professional staff salary, and higher percentages of poor and minority peers in the schools they 
attended.  Among school types, enhanced option schools functioned more like magnet schools – 
they both provided higher levels of salary and higher percentages of minority peers.  However, 
enhanced option schools were associated with increases in free lunch peers while magnet schools 
were associated with decreases in free lunch peers.   
Findings from school-based quantile regression vertical equity regressions  
 School-based quantile regression yielded estimates that were different from school-based 
vertical equity regressions using OLS.  Quantile estimates allowed for greater interpretation of 
results across the distribution of each dependent variable. 
Findings from sequence-based quantile regression vertical equity regressions   
Finally, results from sequence-based quantile regression were often different from similar 
estimates using school-based QR.  However, there was no systematic pattern of differences: 46% 
of coefficients were greater than school-based estimates, and 44% of sequence-based estimates 
were lower.  Although school sequences provide different estimates of vertical equity than 
school-based quantile regression, the use of sequences may be specific to the research questions.   
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 Overall, results confirm that sequence-based vertical equity analysis using quantile 
regression provide different estimates that may be useful in some contexts.  In addition, 
systematic vertical inequity based on student characteristics in particular functions through 
school sequences as well as through schools.  The sections that follow will describe the coding of 
data, the mechanics of horizontal and vertical equity analysis and results from each step.   
 
Describing school sequences in GPS, 1999-2004 
This section examines the role of school sequences in assessing levels of horizontal and 
vertical equity, using data from the GPS for the years 1999-2004.  The idea of a school sequence 
is a common one: every student has a trajectory of schools he or she attends over time.  In this 
sense, every student in the database has a school sequence, even if that sequence consists of only 
one school or one academic year.  As outlined in the introduction, therefore, it is important to 
note and classify the types of sequences students can create as they move through a school 
system over time.  Chapter one outlines three types of school sequences.  These sequences occur 
when:   
• Students are assigned directly to schools by district policy;   
• Students take advantage of choices – such as magnet schools – provided to them by the 
district; or, 
• Students change schools by changing residence, being grandfathered in by the system or 
otherwise finding a way to attend schools out of the mandated sequence.    
 
This section will outline the operationalization of these sequences are within the dataset.  
It will provide descriptive statistics as well as a breakdown of students by cohort, by years 
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enrolled, and by sequence.  The number and types of sequences will be the focus of a final 
discussion before presenting two rounds of analysis comparing school-level and sequence levels 
of equity in the provision of five resources: teacher experience, school percent minority, school 
percent free lunch, teacher salary, and other professional staff salary.  An important first step is 
to adjust the data to control for the varied number of years a student can attend schools.  This is 
done by constructing cohorts of students based on the grade of entry and subsequent progress 
through schools.   
Cohort construction 
 Table 3.2 (reprinted below as table 4.1) gives an overview of each cohort in the database, 
the years and grades attended by members of that cohort, and the number of observations in each 
cohort.   
Within the dataset, a student received a cohort designation based on the grade and year 
combinations of a student’s first year in the database.  For example, in order to be placed in 
cohort six, a student’s first year in the database could have been K in 1999, one in 2000, two in 
2001, three in 2002, four in 2003, or five in 2004.  In this manner, students who repeated or 
transferred were accounted for in cohort assignments.   
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Table 4.1: Student cohorts in GPS, 1999-2004; all students with 3+ years in system. 
Cohort 
(n) 1998-99 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 
1 
(3,876) - - - K 1 2 
2 
(4,498) - - K 1 2 3 
3 
(4,872) - K 1 2 3 4 
4 
(6,220) K 1 2 3 4 5 
5 
(6,128) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
6 
(6,038) 2 3 4 5 6 7 
7 
(5,757) 3 4 5 6 7 8 
8 
(5,581) 4 5 6 7 8 9 
9 
(5,243) 5 6 7 8 9 10 
10 
(5,133) 6 7 8 9 10 11 
11 
(4,977) 7 8 9 10 11 12 
12 
(4,272) 8 9 10 11 12 - 
13 
(3,741) 9 10 11 12 - - 
14 
(2,938) 10 11 12 - - - 
Total 69,274 
 
Eight of the 14 cohorts (cohorts number 4 through 11 in figure 3.2) cover six years of 
school attendance and 45,077 (65%) observations.  The remaining six cohorts (one through 
three; 11 through 14) cover fewer than six years of school and the remaining (35%) observations.  
Within each cohort, there are myriad possibilities for each student: they can be retained, transfer, 
opt into a magnet school, or continue in their district-assigned sequence of schools.  A cohort, 
then, only represents a student’s peer group as he or she moves through schools.  A cohort is 
ideal for comparing students to those most like them in age and grade and for controlling the 
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effects of time, but describes little else.  Therefore, additional variables describe the types of 
students within each cohort and the sequences of schools available to students within each 
cohort.  The following section will describe the creation of sequence variables. 
Sequence construction 
 This research seeks to examine the effects of school sequences on resource distribution.  
Within each cohort, there can be three sequence types.21  First, a student can attend all of the 
schools assigned to him or her by the school district for any or all of the available years in a 
sequence.  Second, a student can fail to complete the schools in the sequence they were assigned, 
either by 1) exiting the entire school system or 2) otherwise attending schools in the system in a 
sequence that does not match a district prescribed sequence for the student’s cohort.  A student 
can, therefore, be an “in-sequence” student, or a “chooser.”  The sections below describe each 
variable in more below.  Additional variables will trace the relationships between school 
sequences and magnet schools.   
• In-sequence – A student was coded as “in sequence” if the series of schools attended 
matched a series of school outlined in district policy.  School sequences were determined 
by analyzing the GPS street-level student assignment database.  Once all possible 
sequences were determined for a cohort, those possible sequences (consisting of 3, 4, 5, 
and 6-year strings of schools) were expanded to include all possible 3, 4 and 5-year 
combinations.  Duplicate strings were removed.  Remaining were 32,259 distinct school 
sequences for students.  Accounting for these partial strings of schools allowed students 
who moved into or out of the database to still be considered “in sequence.”   
                                                 
21 Specific choice policies in GPS provide for additional variations of these three sequences and will be discussed in 
a following section.   
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• “Choosers” were students who did not fit into a GPS school sequence for their years in 
the database, and accounted for 73%, or 50,570, students.  One obvious reason for a 
student to be out of sequence is that he or she attended an GPS magnet school.  Students 
who attended a magnet school but were not in sequence were labeled magnet choosers – 
they chose a magnet option and were able to attend through audition or lottery.   
 
Overall, 18,704, or 27%, of students in the database were determined to be in-sequence.  
In the database, 17% of students – or 11,777 – chose a magnet school outside of their school 
sequence.  Table 4.2 presents a breakdown of students in magnet schools across cohorts.  This 
leaves 56% of students attending schools outside of GPS school sequences – a large percentage.  
Since some students could be retained and still fall into a defined school sequence, students were 
coded as “retained” based on their grade of record in each year.  If the grade of record was the 
same for two years, the student was coded as retained.  Descriptive statistics indicate that 16% of 
students in the database were retained; that is, they had the same grade variable for two 
consecutive years.  Removing these students from consideration leaves a remaining 40% of 
students out of sequence.  It may be that these students are mobile – they moved residences and 
therefore changed schools.  It could also be the case that these students were allowed by the 
district to stay in a prior sequence through grandfathering.  This would occur outside of their 
assignment sequence, it is difficult to tell.  GPS reconfigures assignment by street and house 
address every year, adjusting for in-migration and out-migration of students.  Consequently, 
short of a physical address linked to a student record, the decision-making of these 33,427 
students is sketchy at best.  In sum, 27% of student in the database were in district-designed 
sequences, and 40% were not.  Sixteen percent were retained and 17% attended magnet schools 
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for at least one year.  Once conclusion drawn from these descriptive findings is that the system of 
student assignment is flexible, through a combination of district intention (such as 
grandfathering), lack of enforcement, or student mobility.   
Figure 4.1 provides an overview of the manner in which sequence and magnet school 
type variables are related.  The categories of transfer students, in-sequence students and magnet 
choosing students are almost mutually exclusive.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.2:  Magnet school categories by cohort, 1999-2004 
Cohort Magnet –in-sequence Magnet choosers 
1 0 (0) 
.039 
(.19) 
2 .0007 (.03) 
.05 
(.21) 
3 .002 (.04) 
.05 
(.22) 
4 .0002 (.01) 
.12 
(.32) 
5 .004 (.06) 
.15 
(.35) 
6 .003 (.05) 
.17 
(.38) 
7 .006 (.07) 
.21 
(.40) 
8 .02 (.14) 
.22 
(.41) 
9 .03 (.18) 
.25 
(.44) 
10 .03 (.16) 
.23 
(.42) 
11 .02 (.13) 
.20 
(.40) 
12 .0005 (.02) 
.23 
(.42) 
13 0 .21 (.40) 
14 0 .19 (.40) 
Mean .008 .165 
Note: Standard deviations in parenthesis.  Means may not total 100% due to rounding. 
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Figure 4.1: Sequence types 
 
School sequence and magnet school variables, as described above, provide an overview 
of the role that school sequence analysis will play in determining levels of horizontal and vertical 
resource equity.  The picture of GPS is one where students are highly mobile: 56% of students in 
the database were not in a district-assigned or a magnet school sequence, and only 27% of 
students remained in sequence, even accounting for students who attended school for only part of 
a given cohort.  
A second finding is that GPS magnet schools function as a legitimate choice for students 
– 17% of whom take advantage of magnet options.  Only .8% of students were assigned to 
magnet schools through district-assignment policies.   
Having described the manner in which students are distributed across these sequence 
types, analysis can begin by asking whether different categories of students receive different 
treatment of resources.  Specifically, do the values of teacher salary, other professional staff 
Choosers
In-sequence 
Gamers  
Magnet in-sequence 
Magnet choosers 
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salary, percent of non-tenured teachers, percent of minority peers and percent of free lunch peers 
vary by student type?  Perhaps students who are not in their assigned sequences “trade up” to 
maximize the resources available to them.  
Table 4.3 provides the mean value of each of the five dependent variables by the student 
categories of in-sequence, magnet choosers and other choosers (whose decisions are not clear but 
are not in assigned sequences) of the system who were not retained.  
Table 4.3: Comparisons of resources across sequence type 
 In-sequence 
Magnet 
chooser 
Not-in-
sequence 
Percent non-tenured 22.0% 23.7% 22.8% 
Percent minority peers 52.7% 56.5% 54.5% 
Percent free lunch peers 50.6% 37.4% 47.2% 
Mean teacher salary $43,870.46 $43,815.10 $43,836.50 
Mean other professional staff 
salary $44,887.64 $44,898.37 $44,964.74 
 
In-sequence students are those who conformed to district assignment policy.  Their 
basket of resources is important, then, as a baseline representing the results of resources flowing 
to students as the district intended.  In-sequence students were “treated” to faculty with an 
average of 22% non-tenured teachers.  The average school for in-sequence students was 53% 
minority and 51% free lunch.  Average teacher salary was almost $44,000 and average staff 
salary (including administrators) was just about $45,000.   
 Did magnet school choosers improve their lot vis-à-vis this basket of resource goods?  
Magnet-choosing students encountered 2% more non-tenured teachers than their in-sequence 
peers.  They encountered schools with higher minority populations and relatively similar teacher 
and staff average salaries.  However, magnet students encountered 13.2% fewer free lunch 
students in their schools than their in-sequence peers.  For magnet students, the trade off in 
resources was slightly greater levels of non-tenured teachers and minority peers in exchange for 
   
  
 78
considerably lower levels of peers in poverty.  The magnet effect, as evidenced in Goodville, 
seems to be more about class than about race.   
 The majority of students in the sample, however, were neither in-sequence nor magnet 
choosing, leading to a conclusion that these students somehow created their own sequence of 
schools.  Did these students trade up in resources over their in-sequence peers?  A short answer 
is no.  Even accounting for students who were retained and were therefore not exactly choosing 
their schools, students who were neither in-sequence nor in a sequence with a magnet 
experienced a .8% increase in non-tenured teachers, a 1.8% increase in minority peers, a 3.4% 
decrease in free lunch peers and similar teacher and other professional staff salaries than their in-
sequence peers.  This represents very little trade up for gamer students.  A small gain occurs with 
the variable of free lunch peers; gamers attended schools with smaller numbers of free-lunch 
peers than in-sequence students. 
An appropriate next question, encapsulated in research question one is: will an analysis of 
resource distribution across sequences provide substantively different findings than similar 
research conducted across schools?  First, a traditional equity analysis needs to be conducted to 
set a baseline for comparison.  The following section will present measures of horizontal equity 
computed across school and across sequences.  Next, a section presents result of vertical equity 
OLS regression equations, and results of quantile regression vertical equity equations using 
school-level methods, to address the issue raised in research question two: what are the 
relationships between resource distribution across sequences and student racial and economic 
characteristics?  A final section of analysis will provide results from quantile regression 
equations across sequences and sequence types.   
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Horizontal equity across schools and sequences 
 As described earlier, horizontal equity measures examine the equal distribution of 
resources across a population.  Traditionally, horizontal equity measures treat each student as an 
equal, and measure the difference in treatment both between and across students.  The following 
tables present: 1) calculations of three horizontal equity statistics (the coefficient of variation, the 
McLoone Index and the Gini coefficient) for each academic year; 2) the average of each inequity 
measure across all four years; 3) sequence-based measures of each inequity statistic.  The first 
two results are pupil-weighted, school-based measures of inequity for each dependent variable.  
The third result is a pupil-weighted, sequence-based measure of each inequity statistic.  These 
calculations as presented allow for comparison of school-based and sequence based statistics of 
inequity for each dependent variable.  Each of these measures includes all students in each year 
and all students with a sequence, respectively.  As reviewed in chapter three, although there are 
numerous horizontal equity measures available to researchers, these three provide a complete 
overview of inequity across a distribution and across the bottom half of any given distribution.   
 There is some question about comparison of horizontal equity statistics between school-
based and sequence based analysis.  From one perspective, since the database used consisted of 
all students in GPS over the time period studied with three or more years of attendance, 
horizontal equity statistics may be considered as the population of GPS students.  From this 
perspective, any difference in the coefficient of variation, the McLoone Index, or the Gini 
coefficient can be considered a significant and reportable difference.  However, if the database of 
GPS students is considered a sample – a historical sample – of all students that have been 
affected by GPS assignment policies, then horizontal equity statistics can similarly be viewed as 
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sample statistics, and should be compared based on t-tests for difference of means.  The analysis 
that follows will address both perspectives.  
 Horizontal equity statistics for each of five variables: teacher and other professional staff 
salaries, teacher experience, and school-level percentages of minority and free lunch students are 
used in creating these tables.  The discussion for each variable will include an assessment of 
levels of equity and trends in equity over time, as well as a discussion of the statistical 
significance of any differences found between school-based and sequence-based analysis of 
horizontal equity.   
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table 4.4 shows three measures of horizontal equity for school level percentages of minority 
students in GPS from 1999 to 2004.  All three measures are well above thresholds that indicate 
inequity: the coefficient of variation is consistently above .10, the McLoone Index is consistently 
less than .80, and the Gini coefficient in consistently greater than .10.  The coefficient of 
variation decreased from .344 in 2001 to .306 in 2003 before increasing again to .359 in 2004.  
The McLoone Index demonstrated more fluctuation, but had decreased to .653 in 2004 from .742 
in 1999.  The Gini coefficient grew from 1999 to 2001, decreased in 2002 and 2003 and 
increased considerably in 2004.  When taken together, the average coefficient of variation was 
.332 across all four years, and the average Gini coefficient was .188.  The trend from 1999 to 
Table 4.4: Horizontal equity measures, school percent minority, 1999-2004 
Measure of inequity Year Coefficient of variation McLoone Index Gini coefficient 
1999 .3222 .7423 .1829 
2000 .3412 .6998 .1937 
2001 .3441 .7112 .1955 
2002 .3164 .7270 .1785 
2003 .3060 .7328 .1729 
2004 .3590 .6525 .2051 
Mean 1999-2004 .3315 .7109 .1881 
Sequence .2732 .7883 .1539 
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2004 demonstrates horizontal equity statistics that indicate increasing inequity across all 
students.  This means that minority students are inequitably distributed across schools, and 
becoming more so.  This finding supports findings in other studies of GPS that report increasing 
racial segregation.   
 Sequence-based analysis confirms the findings of inequity derived from school-based 
analysis.  However, sequence based measures of inequity reported greater equity across 
sequences than was reported across schools.  The average school-based coefficient of variation 
across all six years of data was .331; the coefficient of variation across all school sequences was 
.273.  The average school-based McLoone Index was .711, whereas the sequence-based 
McLoone Index was reported as .788.  Finally, the average school-based Gini coefficient was 
.188 while the sequence-based Gini coefficient was .154.   
Although comparison of mean horizontal equity statistic values to sequence values 
indicates that sequence-based analysis results in lower levels of inequity, two-tailed t-tests run 
against school-based and sequence based statistics showed no significant differences.  That is, in 
computing horizontal equity statistics for the percentage of each school’s student body that is 
minority, sequence-based analysis shows no different results than school-based analyses.   
 
 
Table 4.5 shows three measures of horizontal equity for school level percentages of 
students eligible for free and reduced price lunches in GPS from 1999 to 2004.  All three 
Table 4.5: Horizontal equity measures, school percent free lunch, 1999-2004 
Measure of inequity Year Coefficient of variation McLoone Index Gini coefficient 
1999 .4786 .5995 .2738 
2000 .4991 .5971 .2862 
2001 .5173 .6049 .2960 
2002 .4919 .5945 .2822 
2003 .4589 .6614 .2619 
2004 .4077 .6544 .2326 
Mean 1999-2004 .4756 .6186 .2721 
Sequence .4357 .6518 .2498 
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measures are well above thresholds for indicating inequity; free and reduced price lunch students 
are the most inequitably distributed resource of all five dependent variables.  Each of the three 
measures of inequity indicates trends of improvement over time.  The coefficient of variation 
increased slightly from .479 in 1999 to .517 in 2001 but decreased to .408 in 2004.  Similarly, 
the McLoone Index increased from .600 in 1999 to .654 in 2004, indicating small improvements 
in the bottom half of the distribution of free and reduced price lunch eligible students across the 
district.  The Gini coefficient decreased slightly from .274 in 1999 to .233 in 2004.  These 
findings, although they indicate small improvements over time, show that GPS is segregated by 
income in addition to being segregated by race.   
Sequence based analysis once again confirms the findings of school-based analyses and, 
although sequence based horizontal equity statistics seem to indicate that sequence based 
analysis indicates smaller degrees of inequity within the population of all GPS students with 3+ 
years in the system between 1999-2004, these differences were not statistically different from the 
average of school-based horizontal equity analysis.  The sequence-based coefficient of variation 
was .436, compared to the six-year average coefficient of variation of .476.  The McLoone Index 
for school-based averages and sequence-based analysis was .619 and .652, respectively.  Finally, 
the Gini coefficient for the average of six years of school-based analysis was .272, while the 
sequence based Gini coefficient of .250.  Overall, the distribution of poor students across schools 
remains inequitable, with slight improvements over time.  Measuring inequity by sequence types 
reports similar levels of horizontal equity as the average of six years of school-based analysis.  
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Table 4.6 shows three measures of horizontal equity for school-level averages of non-
tenured teachers in GPS from 1999 to 2004.  The measure of non-tenure status is a proxy for 
teacher inexperience; research suggests that teachers with little experience (particularly no 
experience) are less effective than teachers with more experience.  All three measures are well 
above their conventional thresholds for inequity, indicating that non-tenured teachers are 
inequitably distributed across GPS schools.  Analysis of school-based findings across all six 
years indicates that the distribution of non-tenured teachers remained stable over time, with very 
slight increases in the inequity of the distribution.  For example, the coefficient of variation 
increased from .459 in 1999 to .501 in 2002 before moderating to .477 in 2004.  Similarly, the 
McLoone Index, indicating the impact of inequity on the bottom half of schools in the 
distribution of non-tenured teachers decreased from .650 in 1999 to .553 in 2002 before 
increasing to .642 in 2004.  This means that the distribution of non-tenured teachers across all 
schools disproportionately impacted schools in the bottom half of the distribution between 1999 
and 2002.  The Gini coefficient declined from .2524 in 1999 to .267 in 2004.  Sequence-based 
analysis of the same horizontal equity statistics reveals equity statistics that are smaller in the 
cases of the coefficient of variation and the Gini coefficients, but larger for the McLoone Index.  
This means that sequence-based analysis shows more equity in the distribution of non-tenured 
teachers across sequences than across schools.  The coefficient of variation was .13 less for 
Table 4.6: Horizontal equity measures, non-tenured teachers, 1999-2004 
Measure of inequity Year Coefficient of variation McLoone Index Gini coefficient 
1999 .4585 .6495 .2515 
2000 .4495 .6149 .2552 
2001 .4486 .6684 .2496 
2002 .5097 .5527 .2891 
2003 .4703 .6381 .2647 
2004 .4770 .6419 .2668 
Mean 1999-2004 .4689 .6276 .2628 
Sequence .3401 .7216 .1934 
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sequences, the McLoone Index was .09 greater, and the Gini coefficient was .07 less in 
sequence-based analysis.  However, these differences were not statistically significant with a 
two-tailed t-test reporting a p-value of .65.  For horizontal equity in the distribution of non-
tenured teachers at schools, sequence-based analysis reinforces, but is not different from, school-
based analysis.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.7 shows three measures of horizontal equity for average teacher salaries in GPS 
from 1999 to 2004.  All three measures demonstrate an equitable distribution of teacher salaries, 
with statistics below the traditional thresholds for inequity.  In addition, the trend over time 
indicates slight increases in the equitable distributions of average teacher salary.  The coefficient 
of variation decreases from .069 to .067 between 1999 and 2004, which parallels similar 
decreases in the Gini coefficient from .039 in 1999 to .036 in 2004.  The McLoone Index 
increased from .94 to .95 between 1999 and 2004.  Sequence-based analysis of horizontal equity 
statistics is once again similar – and statistically the same as – findings from horizontal equity 
analysis conducted across schools.  The sequence-based coefficient of variation - .062 – is less 
than the average across years of .069.  The average school-based McLoone Index for mean 
teacher salary is .95, while the sequence-based statistic is .96, and the school-based Gini 
coefficient is .038 compared to the sequence-based Gini coefficients of .032.  Again, when 
Table 4.7: Horizontal equity measures, teacher salary, 1999-2004 (in 2004 constant dollars) 
Measure of inequity Year Coefficient of variation McLoone Index Gini coefficient 
1999 .0690 .9433 .0391 
2000 .0744 .9450 .0416 
2001 .0682 .9550 .0379 
2002 .0641 .9505 .0355 
2003 .0703 .9563 .0378 
2004 .0672 .9482 .0359 
Mean 1999-2004 .0689 .9497 .0380 
Sequence .0619 .9621 .0316 
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interpreted as population-based computations, sequence-based analysis provide a more equitable 
snapshot of the distribution of teacher resources when compared to the average of four years of 
horizontal equity statistics.  
 
 
Finally, Table 4.8 shows three measures of horizontal equity for average staff salaries in 
GPS from 1999 to 2004.  All three measures demonstrate an equitable distribution of staff 
salaries within conventional thresholds for equity.  Analysis over six years of school-based 
equity statistics indicates that the distribution of other professional staff salary stable over time.  
The coefficient of variation remained at .067 from 1999 to 2004, while the McLoone Index 
increased from .94 to .95 over the same period, and the Gini coefficient decreased slightly from 
.038 to .036.  
Sequence-based analysis of horizontal equity in average staff salary was statistically the 
same as four-year averages of school-based horizontal equity statistics, but again indicted in real 
differences that sequence-based analysis provides more equitable results than school-based 
findings. 
Taken together, these horizontal equity statistics indicate that expenditures for salary are 
equitably distributed across GPS; they are one of the few resources that are.  The proportion of 
non-tenured teachers on staff is inequitably distributed across GPS schools, as are poor and 
minority student peers.  Inequity in the distribution of free lunch students is the most pronounced 
Table 4.8: Horizontal equity measures, other professional staff salary, 1999-2004 (in 2004 constant dollars) 
Measure of inequity Year Coefficient of variation McLoone Index Gini coefficient 
1999 .0668 .9447 .0375 
2000 .0721 .9559 .0405 
2001 .0650 .9590 .0362 
2002 .0583 .9534 .0325 
2003 .0612 .9558 .0330 
2004 .0672 .9482 .0359 
Mean 1999-2004 .0651 .9528 .0359 
Sequence .0600 .9643 .0304 
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across student types.  The picture presented by these findings seems to be one in which teacher 
and other professional staff salary are invariant to school populations; that is, al school seem to 
have similar levels of expenditure for teacher and other professional staff salaries. 
Educator salary schedules include a combination two factors: years of experience and 
degrees or certification held by teachers.  Each contributes to increased salary.  In a situation 
where teacher salary is distributed relatively equally across schools, but teacher experience 
(proxied by the percentage of non-tenured teachers at a school) is not, then the differentiating 
factor may be teacher experience.  That is, in order to maintain equal spending on teacher and 
other professional staff salaries, schools may have more experienced, less credentialed teachers 
or more credentialed, less experienced teachers.  For example, according to the GPS salary 
schedule for 2005-2006, a new teacher with a master’s degree would earn the equivalent of a 
teacher with 4.5 years of experience and a bachelor’s degree.   
Horizontal equity analysis of five variables provides answers to two important questions.  
First, this analysis shows that horizontal equity analysis conducted across sequences of schools 
yields results that are not statistically different from horizontal equity analysis conducted across 
schools.  Analysis of horizontal equity statistics for each academic year shows that these 
numbers showed small changes over time.  If treated as population parameters; that is, if any 
finding of difference can be interpreted as actual differences, then sequence-based horizontal 
equity analysis consistently yields results that are more equitable than school-based analyses.  
That is, sequence-based analysis still yields findings of inequitable distribution of the five 
resources analyzed; however the sequence-based inequity is less extreme than inequity that arises 
from school-based analysis.   
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Another result of horizontal equity analysis is a view of the state of equity for five 
different variables in GPS over time.  Findings here will inform vertical equity analysis to 
follow.  Overall, horizontal equity is present in both mean teacher salaries and mean staff salaries 
across schools.  However, minority peers, peers in poverty, and inexperienced teachers are 
inequitably distributed across both schools and sequences.  The findings of inequitable 
distributions of minority and free lunch peers confirm earlier findings of segregation across GPS 
over time.  Increasingly inequitable distributions of minority students illustrate greater 
segregation within the district over time.  Inequity in the distribution of poor students is 
decreasing over time.  This may be due to better integration of poor students across schools via 
district policy.  However, the decline in inequitable distribution of poor students might also be 
due to increasing numbers of poor students entering into the system.  If the range of poverty 
levels at schools ranged from 20% to 100%, and more poor students entered into the system, the 
number of schools with low percentages of poor students would decline, the ceiling of 100% 
would remain the same, resulting in less variation in percentages of poor students across schools 
and in a corresponding decrease in the inequitable distribution of poor students according to 
measures of horizontal equity.    
In either case, vertical equity analysis will aid in better understanding the relationships 
between resource distribution, and student characteristics.   
 
Vertical equity analysis – school-based OLS 
There are two ways in which a situation may be determined to be inequitable.  The first is 
where resources are obviously distributed inequitably as measured by traditional methods for 
assessing horizontal equity.  This does not seem to be the case with school-level resources in 
   
  
 88
GPS when considering teacher and other professional staff salary.  Although these are trends 
towards inequity, these figures remain within the accepted ranges of equitable distribution for the 
three statistics used.   
Another way in which a situation may be determined to be inequitable is one where 
resources are distributed equally to groups that are patently unequal in circumstance.  This seems 
more likely to be the case in GPS.  Teacher and other professional staff salary resources seem to 
be impervious to changes in student school-level populations of poor and minority students.  An 
example of vertical equity would be one in which teacher experience and salaries were 
inequitably distributed across schools, and there was a positive relationship between teacher 
salary and the percentage of poor or minority students at a school, i.e., schools with higher 
percentages of poor and minority students received the benefits of better paid, more experienced 
teachers.  Vertical equity analysis via ordinary lest squares (OLS) regression has long been the 
accepted method for answering these types of questions.  This research posits the idea that 
sequence level analysis, conducted via quantile regression, will better approximate true levels of 
intradistrict equity.  For comparison, however, standard OLS regression should be conducted 
across schools to determine what relationships exist between students’ race and poverty status, 
school type and school-level resources. 
 To conduct vertical equity analysis, student data for all six years was pooled to create a 
database of 329,133 observations.  Models for this analysis, presented in equations 3.8 and 3.9 
are:  
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                     (4.2) 
  
Table 4.9 presents the number of observations, mean, standard deviation, minimum and 
maximum value for each dependent and independent variable.   
 Although these results are presented in order to provide a baseline for comparison ins 
forthcoming quantile regression models, it is also important to take time to interpret these results 
within the Goodville context.  These OLS regression findings present a picture of the inequitable 
distribution of resources across GPS students. 
 
 
 
These variables provide a snapshot of the district and the students used to conduct this 
analysis.  On average, 23% of GPS teachers are non-tenured.  The average number of minority 
Table 4.9: Descriptive statistics for ordinary least squares vertical equity regression 
 
Variable type Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Non-tenured teachers 328,856 .232 .113 0 1.0 
Percent minority 295,942 .548 .182 .10 .99 
Percent free lunch 326,407 .488 .238 .02 1.0 
Mean teacher salary 328,341 43,878.07 3,130.57 11,369.60 53,827.10 
Dependent 
Mean staff salary 328,341 45,228.89 3,022.26 18,093.83 54,528.37 
Enrollment 326,980 747.41 458.427 16 2,464 
Enrollment2 326,980 768,769.66 1,052,325.32 256 6,071,296 
Minority 329,133 .570 .495 0 1.0 
Free lunch 329,133 .468 .499 0 1.0 
Minority & Free lunch 329,133 .353 .478 0 1.0 
Design center 329,133 .016 .126 0 1.0 
Enhanced option 329,133 .015 .123 0 1.0 
Magnet 329,133 .104 .305 0 1.0 
2000 329,133 .167 .373 0 1.0 
2001 329,133 .186 .389 0 1.0 
2002 329,133 .186 .389 0 1.0 
2003 329,133 .167 .373 0 1.0 
Independent 
2004 329,133 .147 .354 0 1.0 
εβββββ
ββββββ
+++++
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students at a school is 55%, and the average free lunch population is 49%.  The average GPS 
teacher earns $43,878.07 in inflation-adjusted 2004 dollars.  The average staff salary is a little 
less than $2,000 more at $45,228.89.  The average GPS school has an enrollment of 747 
students.  Fifty-seven percent of GPS students are minorities and 47% of students in the database 
received free lunch.  Thirty-five percent of students were both poor and minority.  Only 2% of 
students were enrolled in enhanced option or design center schools, and 10% had attended a 
magnet school.   
 Results from this model for each of the five resource variables is shown in Tables 4.10 
through 4.14.  The sections to follow will address each dependent variable in turn, noting key 
findings from traditional analysis before performing a comparison analysis using quantile 
regression.  A table illustrating results from a fully specified model including all independent 
variables can be found in Appendix A.   
 
Table 4.10 – OLS vertical equity regression: percent of non-tenured teachers 
Variable Student School 
Intercept 0.26058 0.28309 
Enrollment -0.00007999 -0.00008174 
Enrollment2 2.48E-08 2.54E-08 
Minority 0.02825  
Free lunch 0.02556  
Interaction -0.01513  
Design Center  0.07857 
Enhanced Option  0.06918 
Magnet  0.00962 
2000 0.02253 0.02026 
2001 0.01007 0.00673 
2002 -0.03874 -0.04186 
2003 -0.00279 -0.00551 
2004 -0.06239 -0.06383 
F 3911.9 3626.77 
Adjusted R2 0.1069 0.0999 
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001. 
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Non-tenured teachers 
  The model as presented in equations 4.1 and 4.2 accounted for approximately 11% of the 
variation in the percentage of non-tenured teachers at a given school when student characteristics 
were used as independent variables, and 10% of variation when school type characteristics were 
analyzed.  Although statistically significant, the effects of enrollment and the square of 
enrollment very small.  Among student characteristics, a minority student was associated with a 
3% increase in non-tenured, or inexperienced, teachers.  A student’s free lunch status also 
contributed to a 3% increase in non-tenured faculty.  A poor and minority student was associated 
with a 4% increase in non-tenured teachers.  The standard deviation on non-tenured teachers 
variable was .113.  A 3% increase represents .25 of a standard deviation increase and a 4% 
increase represents 34% of a standard deviation.  These positive and significant results indicate 
inequity in the distribution of teacher quality as proxied by non-tenured teachers among poor and 
minority students. 
 Considering school type, the similarly tiny effects of enrollment and the square of 
enrolment hold.  Magnet schools were associated with small increased in non-tenured teachers – 
the effect was .9%, or .08 of a standard deviation.  Design center schools are associated with an 
8% increase in non-tenured teachers and enhanced option schools were associated with a 7% 
increase.  These increases represent 70% and 62% of a standard deviation, respectively.  Again, 
these findings present evidence of inequity.  Design centers and enhanced option schools – 
schools planned around providing additional opportunity to struggling students employer higher 
numbers of inexperienced teachers, while magnet school employ only very slightly higher 
number of inexperienced teachers.   
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Table 4.11 – OLS vertical equity regression:  school percent minority 
Variable Student School 
Intercept 0.48576 0.57375 
Enrollment -0.00011122 -0.00011533 
Enrollment2 3.31E-08 3.41E-08 
Minority 0.11147  
Free lunch 0.0822  
Interaction -0.03574  
Design Center  0.23164 
Enhanced Option  0.33813 
Magnet  0.0314 
2000 0.02175 0.01221 
2001 0.03748 0.02499 
2002 0.04839 0.03646 
2003 0.06347 0.05391 
2004 -0.02731 -0.03272 
F 6280.05 3958.25 
Adjusted R2 0.175 0.1179 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001. 
 
School percent minority 
Table 4.11 presents OLS findings on the dependent variable of percentage of minority 
peers experienced by students.  The model with student type characteristics explains 18% of the 
variation in the percent of minority peers, and the school type model accounts for 12% of the 
variation in the dependent variable.   
 The effects of enrollment and the square of enrollment are significant but small.  Among 
student type variables, a student’s minority status is associated with an 11% increase in minority 
peers.  This is 61% of a standard deviation.  Although this seems to be an overly simple 
relationship – minority students have more minority peers – it does point to the inequity effect of 
peer group composition for minority students.  Free lunch students are associated with 8% 
greater minority peers, indicating relationships between the school assignment of poor and 
   
  
 93
minority students.  The interaction term indicates that a poor and minority student sees an 
increase of minority peer group at school of 15%.  This means that a poor and minority students 
in GPS attends school with a peer group that is 64% minority as opposed to 49%.   
 All school types indicate increased minority student populations.  The increase in 
minority peers for enhanced options and design centers are large: 34% and 23% respectively.  
Since these schools were designed to target students in poor minority neighborhoods, these 
findings make sense.  Interestingly, even magnet schools are associated with a small but 
significant increase in minority student population of 3%.  This indicates that students who 
choose or are assigned to enhanced option, design center, or magnet schools experience an 
increase in minority peers.  These effects strengthen over time, as indicated by the significant 
and positive coefficients on the year-by-year fixed effect variables for 2000, 2001, 2002, and 
2003.  There seems to be a significant decline in minority peers in 2004.   
School percent free lunch 
Table 4.12 – OLS vertical equity regression: percent free lunch peers 
Variable Student School 
Intercept 0.57401 0.70851 
Enrollment -0.00043037 -0.00043012 
Enrollment2 1.04E-07 8.64E-08 
Minority 0.07391  
Free lunch 0.18521  
Interaction -0.05689  
Design Center  -0.03811 
Enhanced Option  0.29986 
Magnet  -0.21236 
2000 0.0083 0.00722 
2001 0.01383 0.01347 
2002 0.03236 0.03521 
2003 0.05447 0.06795 
2004 0.19831 0.21677 
F 22341.6 19449.3 
Adjusted R2 0.4063 0.3734 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001. 
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Figure 4.12 presents OLS regression coefficients with the dependent variable as the 
percent of minority peers in a school.  The student-level model accounts for 41% of the variance 
in peers in poverty, and the school type model accounts for 37%.  Again, enrolment is a small 
but significant factor in the provision of free lunch students.  Among student characteristics, 
minority status is associated with a 7% increase in free lunch peers, and an individual student’s 
free lunch status is associated with a 19% increase in free lunch peers – 79% of a standard 
deviation.  These findings indicate again that race and class do ride together in terms of school 
composition and that the distribution of free lunch students themselves is vertically inequitable.  
A poor and minority student is associated with a 21% increase in free lunch peers – or 88% of a 
standard deviation.   
 The relationship between free lunch peers and school types varies.  Design center schools 
are associated with a slight – 4% - decrease in free lunch peers, while enhanced option schools 
are associated with a 30% increase in free lunch peers.  It seems as though design centers are 
schools targeted for minority students but hot poor students, and that enhanced option schools 
are designed for students who are both poor and of minority status.  Magnet schools are 
associated with decreases in free lunch peers discussed in the descriptive statistics above.  As 
magnet school student may encounter greater numbers of minority peers, but far fewer peers 
from poverty backgrounds.  Year fixed effect coefficients indicate that the district overall is 
becoming poorer – the free lunch percentages are associated with increases every year – from a 
small .8% increase in 2000 to a 20% increase in 2004.   
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Average teacher salaries 
Table 4.13 – OLS vertical equity regression: average teacher salary 
Variable Student School 
Intercept 40962 40247 
Enrollment 5.02649 5.51499 
Enrollment2 -0.00133 -0.00146 
Minority -587.66982  
Free lunch -748.92196  
Interaction 682.99568  
Design Center  -1072.99249 
Enhanced Option  4489.39555 
Magnet  499.39615 
2000 132.21797 26.78936 
2001 171.04114 84.51971 
2002 2078.53449 1951.5022 
2003 957.74472 830.18122 
2004 261.68333 128.98275 
F 7887.36 9235.48 
Adjusted R2 0.1946 0.2205 
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001. 
  
Table 4.13 provides OLS output for vertical equity models using teacher salary as a 
dependent variable.  Again, enrollment has a small but significant effect on teacher salaries, 
perhaps reflecting the dynamic that secondary school teachers tend to make ore than elementary 
school teachers.  The models account for 19% and 22% of the variation in teacher salaries, 
respectively.  Among student characteristics, minority status is associated with a 19% of a 
standard deviation decrease in teacher salary, and free lunch status is associated with a 25% of a 
standard deviation decrease in teacher salary.  These findings indicate an inequitable relationship 
between student characteristics and teacher salary, confirming studies that indicate that poor 
and/or minority students receive less “treatment” vis-à-vis teacher salary.  A student who is both 
poor and minority received 654 dollars less teacher salary than non-minority, non-poor peers - 
approximately 20% of a standard deviation.  Cost-adjusted teacher salaries have increased every 
year, as shown by year fixed effects.  Teacher salary increased greatly in 2002 and 2003 but has 
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only increased modestly in other years.  This can be due to increasing teacher salaries as well an 
increasingly credentialed and/or experienced teacher corps in Goodville. 
 School type is also associated with changes in teacher salary.  Design center schools are 
associated with decreases in teacher salary of 34% of a standard deviation.  Enhanced option 
schools, however, are associated with large increases in teacher salary – 140% of a standard 
deviation.  Magnet schools are associated with a 16% increase in teacher salaries.   
 Taken together, the coefficients on student type and school type variables suggest that 
each factors contributes to the inequitable distribution of teacher salary – and teacher resources – 
across GPS. 
Average professional staff salaries 
Table 4.14 – OLS vertical equity regression: average staff salary 
Variable Student School 
Intercept 42448 41826 
Enrollment 4.77503 5.22947 
Enrollment2 -0.00125 -0.00138 
Minority -482.52115  
Free lunch -713.70469  
Interaction 633.30006  
Design Center  -1265.53262 
Enhanced Option  3989.80462 
Magnet  321.90892 
2000 122.97468 34.84643 
2001 304.06416 237.63731 
2002 1820.83488 1718.8914 
2003 747.6165 648.93246 
2004 198.85083 93.59986 
F 7091.14 8223.42 
Adjusted R2 0.1785 0.2012 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001. 
 
Table 4.14 presents results from OLS regression using other professional staff salary as a 
dependent variable.  This variable included school-level administrators, librarians, and guidance 
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counselors in the computation of school-level average salary.  Staff salaries are generally higher 
than teacher salaries - as evidenced by the intercept - by 170 to 200 dollars.  The model used 
describes slightly less of the variation in other professional staff salary than the model did for 
teacher salary – the student characteristics explain 18% of the variation and school type variables 
account for 20% of the variation in average staff salaries.   
Student type variables account for smaller changes in staff salary, although these changes 
track in direction and magnitude with the teacher salary variable.  For example, a student’s 
minority status is associated with a 15% of a standard deviation decrease in staff salary, and a 
free lunch student is associated with a 23% of a standard deviation – or $714 - decrease in staff 
salary.  School type variables also track with similar effect on teacher salary.  Design centers 
schools are associated with considerably lower salaries - $1,265 dollars or 42% of a standard 
deviation. Enhanced option schools exhibit similarly large increases in staff salary, and magnet 
schools also show similar modest gains. 
 
Conclusions from school-based OLS 
These OLS models represent a traditional vertical equity analysis of student and school 
characteristics for the distribution of five dependent variables of interest: teacher and other 
professional staff salaries, percent of non-tenured teachers, and poor and minority peers.  These 
results demonstrate inequity of resource distribution related to student ethnicity, student SES, 
and school type.  Poor and minority students are associated with fewer teacher and staff dollars, 
greater numbers of poor and minority peers, and higher percentage of inexperienced teachers – 
exactly the opposite pattern of resource distribution that a vertically equitable system would 
wish.  In addition, magnet schools seem to privilege students in the distribution of these 
   
  
 98
resources.  Schools designed to specifically address the needs of poor and minority students 
present a mixed bag – design center schools are associated with large decreases in teacher 
resources and experience, while enhanced option schools seem t provide increases in these 
resource variables.  These models are not only presented to provide a vertical equity analysis of 
GPS between 1999 and 2004, however.  These models establish a baseline with which to 
compare results from school-based quantile regression, which further opens the way for 
comparisons between school-level and sequence-level analysis using quantile regression.   
 
Vertical equity analysis – school-based quantile regression 
 As discussed in chapter three, quantile regression (QR) provides point estimates of 
relationships between key independent variables and dependent variables at specific points along 
the distribution of the dependent variable.  Because OLS analysis would provide the same 
answer in both school-based and sequence based analyses, this dissertation will utilize QR to 
determine how inequitable relationships present themselves along a distribution of the dependent 
variable.   
Using QR will 1) provide QR estimates that are comparable to OLS estimates, allowing 
for a transition between traditional vertical equity analysis and a newer methodology and 2) 
provide a set of findings with which to compare sequence-based quantile regression.  The 
following section will present results from school-based quantile regression models.   
Equations for quantile regression will be the same as equations 4.1 and 4.2, above.  For 
each dependent variable, relationships at five quantiles of interest will be assessed.  These 
quantiles are .10, .25, .50, .75, and .90.  Table 4.15 presents descriptive statistics at three 
quantiles (.25, .50, .75) for relevant variables in the model.  This information serves as evidence 
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that there is enough distribution across quantiles of the distribution to make quantile regression 
an appropriate tool.  
Table 4.15 – Descriptive statistics for vertical equity quantile regression 
Variable type Variable N 0.25 0.5 0.75 Standard deviation
Non-tenured teachers 326,740 .15 .22 .30 0.1125 
Percent minority 295,942 .41 .55 .67 0.1819 
Percent free lunch 326,407 .30 .46 .68 .2383 
Mean teacher salary 326,399 41,803 43,708 43,894.50 3,095.90 
Dependent 
Mean staff salary 326,399 43,260.60 45,039.80 45,245.70 2,982.80 
Enrollment 326,980 456 625 911 474.4 
Enrollment2 326,980 207936 390625 829921 1E+06 
Minority 329,133 0 1 1 0.4955 
Free lunch 329,133 0 0 1 0.4981 
Design center 329,133 0 0 0 0.1188 
Enhanced option 329,133 0 0 0 0.1206 
Magnet 329,133 0 0 0 0.306 
2000 329,133 0 0 0 0.389 
2001 329,133 0 0 0 0.4051 
2002 329,133 0 0 0 0.4051 
2003 329,133 0 0 0 0.3885 
Independent 
2004 329,133 0 0 0 0.2198 
 
Assessing differences between OLS and QR in school-based analysis 
 For researchers using quantile regression, there is an issue of distinguishing QR estimates 
from OLS estimates.  For some researchers, the point is moot: they report OLS estimates 
alongside QR estimates and interpret numerical differences without performing any statistical 
test of difference (see, for example, Eide and Showalter, 1998).  Another approach, cited is 
Koenker and Hallock’s 2001 overview of quantile regression – is that of Bassett, Tam and 
Knight (2002).  These authors plot quantile regression estimates along with confidence intervals 
for the conditional mean of the estimate of each independent variable.  Significance is 
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determined if the regression quantile estimate falls outside of the conditional mean interval for 
each estimate.  This method provides both a display of the significant of difference between 
quantile estimates and OLS estimates.  It further graphically represents the direction of change in 
coefficients between any given quantile and the OLS estimate.  An example of this is figure 4.2, 
below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: Generic comparison of OLS and QR results 
 
 Recall figures 3.1 and 3.2, where regression coefficients are displayed as lines with a 
slope (the regression coefficient) connecting similar spots on two distributions, one for each 
value of a binary variable.  A larger coefficient results in a line with a steeper slope or larger 
effect; a smaller coefficient results in a line with a flatter slope.  These same dynamics occur in 
figure 4.2.  By representing slope coefficients as points on a line graph, we can compare the 
strength of association between the same independent and dependent variables at different 
quantile of the distribution of the dependent variable.   
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Quantile
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 The two straight lines in figure 4.2 represent the upper and lower 95% confidence limits 
for the estimated relationship between an independent and dependent variable, obtained via OLS.  
Plotted along with these upper and lower confidence bands are the estimated relationship 
between the independent and dependent variable are specific points along the distribution of the 
dependent variable.  In the case of figure 4.2, as is the case with the quantile regression analysis 
conducted in this dissertation, the quantiles of interest are .10, .25, .50, .75, and .90.   
 In the case of figure 4.2, any point along the quantile regression line that falls outside of 
the 95% confidence interval is determined to be a significant difference.  The location of a point 
on the quantile regression line relative to the confidence bands reflects the direction of the 
difference.  For example, the estimated relationship between the independent variable and the 
dependent variable at the .10 quantile of the distribution of the dependent variable is greater than 
the estimated relationship at the mean, and the difference is significant.  The slope of the line, as 
expressed in figure 3.2, would be steeper at the .10 quantile of the distribution.  The relationship 
at the .90 quantile of the distribution is also significantly different from the OLS estimated 
relationship at the mean, but in the opposite direction.  In this case, the QR coefficient is smaller, 
resulting in a flatter line, and a smaller relationship between the independent and dependent 
variables.   
 The sections that follow will analyze results from school-based QR compared to results 
from school-based OLS fore ach of five dependent variables.  This analysis will include an 
assessment of inequity expressed by QR models.  This section lays groundwork for a 
forthcoming comparison of school-based QR and sequence-based QR.  Results from fully 
specified models can be found in Appendix B. 
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Non-tenured teachers 
 Table 4.16 presents quantile regression estimates for student characteristics and school 
type variables regressed on the percentage of non-tenured teachers in schools.  These findings 
confirm the general direction of relationships founds in the OLS vertical equity regressions 
presented above.   
Graphically, the relationship between OLS and QR estimates demonstrates than QR 
results are often different.  Among students who attend schools with very low percentages of 
non-tenured teachers (the .10 quantile) the difference between minority and majority students in 
exposure to non-tenured teachers is very small, but significantly different from OLS estimates.  
This could be interpreted as an equitable distribution of non-tenured teachers between minority 
and non-minority students who are most favored in the allocation of non-tenured teachers.  For 
every other quantile of the distribution of non-tenured teachers, QR estimates are different from 
– and greater than – the estimated OLS relationship.  That is, minority students see greater 
percentages of non-tenured teachers than estimated through OLS at the .25, .5, .75 and .90 
quantiles of the distribution of non-tenured teachers.   
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Table 4.16 – Vertical equity quantile regression: percentage of non-tenured teachers 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
 Student School Student School Student School Student School Student School 
Intercept 0.0994 0.1168 0.1647 0.1909 0.2533 0.2869 0.3461 0.3738 0.3991 0.4210 
Enrollment 0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 
Enrollment2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Design center  0.1209  0.0996  0.0673  0.0681  0.0262 
Enhanced option  0.0808  0.1184  0.0696  0.0247  0.0370 
Magnet  -0.0269  0.0053  0.0099  -0.0223  0.0424 
Minority 0.0124  0.0386  0.0380  0.0395  0.0348  
Free lunch 0.0170  0.0350  0.0366  0.0375  0.0276  
Interaction -0.0025  -0.0266  -0.0278  -0.0321  -0.0266  
2000 0.0051 -0.0011 0.0164 0.0168 0.0227 0.0198 0.0509 0.0337 0.0608 0.0480 
2001 0.0093 0.0051 0.0042 -0.0042 0.0060 0.0065 0.0146 0.0080 0.0380 0.0310 
2002 -0.0337 -0.0405 -0.0444 -0.0455 -0.0370 -0.0394 -0.0269 -0.0393 -0.0318 -0.0327 
2003 -0.0206 -0.0205 -0.0062 -0.0001 -0.0057 -0.0064 0.0076 0.0151 0.0175 0.0030 
2004 -0.0373 -0.0414 -0.0416 -0.0446 -0.0658 -0.0668 -0.0743 -0.0844 -0.0779 -0.0901 
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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 The pattern is similar in the relationship between free lunch students and non-tenured 
teachers, the only difference being that the difference between free lunch and non-free lunch 
students is within the confidence interval at the .9 quantile.  This pattern is  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 – Quantile estimates plotted against 95% confidence band for OLS estimates  
 
inverted for the interaction effect of race and poverty.  Recall that the appropriate interpretation 
of an interaction term is to combine arithmetically the coefficients on the interacted terms with 
the interaction effect itself.  In the graph for the interacted term, no QR estimate is within the 
95% confidence band of the OLS estimate.  Although QR estimates indicate stronger negative 
interaction effects (thereby dampening the effect of the combination of race and class variables) 
that dampening still results in QR estimates that are larger than OLS estimates at every quantile 
save for quantile .10.  This means that the differences between student type and access to non-
tenured teachers is increased across the distribution of non-tenured teachers.   
 Quantile regression estimates for school type variables are also significantly different 
from OLS estimates.  For students who encounter fewer non-tenured teachers; that is, more 
favored students, the gap between those who are in enhanced option schools and those who are 
not is greater than OLS estimates indicate.  The coefficient for students with the median 
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exposure to non-tenured teachers is not different from the OLS estimate, while the estimates at 
the .75 and .90 quantiles are less than OLS estimates.  This indicates that the largest gap between 
enhanced option schools and other schools vis-à-vis non-tenured teachers is at the low end of the 
non-tenured teacher distribution.  The pattern for design center schools is more of a diagonal line 
running from estimates at the .10 quantile that are greater than the OLS estimated relationship, to 
QR estimates at the .9 quantile that are less than the OLS estimates.  Among students who are 
more favored with low percentages of non-tenured teachers, the teacher quality gap is greater for 
design center students.  For those students who receive higher percentages of non-tenured 
teachers, design center students receive fewer non-tenured teachers than other students.  Among 
favored students, magnet school students have significantly fewer non-tenured teachers.  The 
same is true with less- favored students at the .75 quantile of the distribution of non-tenured 
teachers.  Among the least favored students, however – those who experience the greatest 
percentages of non-tenured teachers, magnet students see significantly higher percentages of 
non-tenured teachers. 
 Note that the changes in estimates for the magnet school variable switch signs across 
quantile estimates.  That is, although the OLS estimate of the impact of magnet schools is 
positive, two of the five quantile estimates are actually negative, and the highly positive 
coefficient at the .9 quantile looks as if it would bias an estimate at the mean up.   
School percent minority 
 Table 4.17 presents quantile regression results with the percentage of minority peers as a 
dependent variable.  As figure 4.4 demonstrates, results from quantile regression are often 
significantly different from OLS estimates.  For student characteristic variables, the impact of 
being a minority student on the racial makeup of one’s school peers is smaller than the OLS 
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estimate among students who attend schools with lower percentages of minority peers.  This 
relationship is the less at the .25 quantile, greater at the median, slightly less at the .75 and 
greater at the .9 quantile.  For free lunch status, QR estimates are the same as – or slightly less 
than – OLS estimates, save for the .5 quantile, in which the relationship between free lunch 
status and percentage of minority peers is larger.  Again, the coefficients on the interaction of 
these two terms results in a greater impact for students who are both poor and minority.   
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Table 4.17 – Vertical equity quantile regression:  percentage of minority peers 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
 Student School Student School Student School Student School Student School 
Intercept 0.1924 0.2745 0.3385 0.3892 0.4758 0.624 0.659 0.7494 0.7574 0.8217 
Enrollment 0.0001 0.0001 0 0 -1E-04 -2E-04 -3E-04 -3E-04 -3E-04 -1E-04 
Enrollment2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Design center  0.2624  0.1873  0.3047  0.252  0.1779 
Enhanced option  0.4718  0.4476  0.3418  0.2438  0.1773 
Magnet  -0.047  -0.017  0.0061  0.0922  0.0798 
Minority 0.0824  0.0677  0.1332  0.1053  0.1542  
Free lunch 0.0824  0.0677  0.125  0.0777  0.0695  
Interaction -0.0428  -0.014  -0.09  -0.034  -0.032  
2000 0.0041 -0.017 0.0027 -0.019 0.0212 0.0051 0.0003 0.0406 0.0441 0.0287 
2001 0.009 -0.001 0.0105 -0.002 0.0355 0.0159 0.0008 0.0696 0.074 0.0402 
2002 0.0286 0.0153 0.0379 0.0278 0.0498 0.0294 0.0008 0.0683 0.0765 0.0277 
2003 0.0285 0.0034 0.045 0.048 0.0789 0.078 0.0004 0.0901 0.0722 0.0475 
2004 -0.1525 -0.149 -0.103 -0.038 -0.023 0.0141 0.0003 0.0068 0.1105 0.0332 
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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Figure 4.4 – Quantile estimates plotted against 95% confidence band for OLS estimates 
 
Among school types, enhanced option schools have more of an impact among students 
who experience lower percentages of minority peers, and less of an impact among student who 
experience higher percentages of minority peers.  The pattern for magnet schools is reverse – the 
impact of a magnet school is less among low-minority peer students and greater among high 
minority peer students.  The pattern is mixed for design center schools, although the QR 
coefficients are outside of the OLS 95% confidence band.   
School percent free lunch 
 Table 4.18 presents QR estimates for models run with the percentage of free lunch peers 
as a dependent variable.  Additionally, figure 4.5 illustrates QR estimates along with a 95% 
confidence band for OLS estimated relationships.  The relationship between free lunch students 
and minority peers is less than OLS estimates every quantile of the distribution of free lunch 
peers save for the .25 quantile, at which QR and OLS estimates are indistinguishable.  Quantile 
regression estimates are lower than OLS estimates in describing the relationship between free 
lunch status and free lunch peers in every quantile save the .10 quantile, where the estimates 
relationship is greater than the OLS estimate.   
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Figure 4.5 – Quantile estimates plotted against 95% confidence band for OLS estimates 
 
The interaction of race and class is greater than OLS estimates in every quantile save the 
.10 and .25 quantiles.  For school types, enhanced option schools have a greater impact than OLS 
estimates indicate at eh .10 and .25 quantiles the same relationship at the median and a smaller 
relationship than OLS coefficients indicate in quantile .75 and .90.  Design center school effects 
on free lunch peers are larger than OLS estimates a quantile .10 and .25, smaller in quantiles .5 
and .675 and the same at quantile .9.  Magnet school effects are the same as OLS estimates at 
quantile .10 and .75, smaller at quantiles .25 and .5, and larger than OLS estimates and quantile 
.90.   
     
 110
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.18 – Vertical equity quantile regression: percentage of free lunch peers 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
 Student School Student School Student School Student School Student School 
Intercept 0.2567 0.3371 0.4073 0.5739 0.6272 0.7797 0.7718 0.929 0.9275 1.0272 
Enrollment -0.0003 -2E-04 -3E-04 -4E-04 -5E-04 -6E-04 -5E-04 -6E-04 -6E-04 -5E-04 
Enrollment2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Design center  0.0431  -0.022  -0.118  -0.1  -0.044 
Enhanced option  0.5396  0.433  0.2907  0.1427  0.127 
Magnet  -0.215  -0.246  -0.32  -0.205  -0.098 
Minority 0.0546  0.0776  0.0559  0.0576  0.0351  
Free lunch 0.2254  0.1611  0.1619  0.1689  0.1165  
Interaction -0.0546  -0.064  -0.024  -0.049  -0.016  
2000 -0.0014 -0.012 0.0085 0.0065 0.0094 0.0065 0.0235 0.0332 0.0307 -0.012 
2001 -0.0129 -0.008 0.0132 -0.019 0.0088 0.0135 0.0303 0.0602 0.048 0.0017 
2002 0.0072 0.0414 0.0362 0.0104 0.0306 0.0386 0.0599 0.0633 0.0565 0.037 
2003 0.0178 0.088 0.056 0.0487 0.0608 0.0775 0.0742 0.0915 0.0761 0.062 
2004 0.111 0.1813 0.1737 0.1472 0.2097 0.2141 0.2405 0.2417 0.2359 0.2458 
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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Average teacher salaries 
 Table 4.19 presents school-based QR estimates of relationship between student 
characteristics, school types and five resource variables.  Figure 4.6 presents these QR estimate 
plotted against the 95% confidence band of school-based OLS regressions.  Among student 
types, QR relationships between teacher salaries and minority status are different only at the .10 
and .75 quantiles.  At these points in the distribution of teacher salary, the relationship with 
minority status is larger than OLS estimates.  QR associations between free lunch students and 
teacher salary has a similar sloping pattern; QR estimates are greater than OLS estimates at the 
.10 and .25 quantiles, and lower at all of the others.  Among school types, enhanced option 
schools have estimated impact on teacher salaries that are greater than OLS estimates across all 
quantile s save quantile .10.  The sloping pattern reoccurs with design centers.  Magnet schools 
have greater relationship greater than OLS estimates at quantiles .25, .5, and .9, less at quantile 
.10 and the same at quantile .75.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.6 – Quantile estimates plotted against 95% confidence band for OLS estimate 
Teacher salary and minority status
-700
-600
-500
-400
-300
-200
-100
0
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Quantile
Teacher salary and free lunch status
-1200
-1000
-800
-600
-400
-200
0
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Quantile
Teacher salary and interaction term
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Quantile
Teacher salary and enhanced option school
4000
4200
4400
4600
4800
5000
5200
5400
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Quantile
Teacher salary and design center school
-2000
-1500
-1000
-500
0
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Quantile
Teacher salary and magnet school
-600
-400
-200
0
200
400
600
800
1000
0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9
Quantile
     
 112
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
Table 4.19 – Vertical equity quantile regression: average teacher salary 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
 Student School Student School Student School Student School Student School 
Intercept 37181.7 37181 38805 38105 40893 40102 43089 42371 45251 44996 
Enrollment 5.0014 5.0014 4.9307 5.3273 4.9449 5.4593 4.8472 5.1843 3.186 2.8064 
Enrollment2 -0.0013 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -4E-04 0 
Design center  -81.74  -529.5  -1363  -1538  -1886 
Enhanced option  4554.8  4657.1  4808.2  4716.2  5209.3 
Magnet  -358.4  764.59  806.86  486.52  805.97 
Minority -45.089  -561.8  -629.5  -433.8  -542.6  
Free lunch -1.6251  -561.8  -823.1  -798.9  -1089  
Interaction -2.3329  561.76  654  563.1  862.99  
2000 -453.09 -452.8 220.5 302.32 -86.96 22.511 -236.8 -430.7 1149 860.16 
2001 -118.17 -118.2 556.1 485.69 -10.01** -66.67 -635.8 -657.4 434.81 26.482 
2002 1559.89 1564.4 2671.3 2680.3 2329.3 2118.2 1794.8 1745.2 1514.5 966.72 
2003 923.404 879.61 1535.2 1528.7 913.92 696.08 672.54 744.69 615.23 114.63 
2004 386.947 333.86 1016.8 992.83 693.75 635.96 31.768 -54.25 -317.5 -670.4 
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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Average other professional staff salaries 
 Table 4.20 shows school-based QR coefficients for models using staff salary as a 
dependent variable.  In addition, figure 4.7 shows these QR coefficients plotted against the 95% 
confidence band of the OLS estimate.  The patterns of QR plots relative to OLS plots are similar; 
reinforcing earlier observations that differences between teacher and other professional staff 
salaries are evident in amounts of funding, but those patterns of funding are essentially the same.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 – Quantile estimates plotted against 95% confidence band for OLS estimates 
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Table 4.20 – Vertical equity quantile regression: average staff salary 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
 Student School Student School Student School Student School Student School 
Intercept 38479.8 38262 40361 39780 42028 41035 44546 43949 47063 46385 
Enrollment 5.5165 5.9443 5.7078 5.8756 4.8737 6.3741 4.2704 4.3677 2.4477 2.5632 
Enrollment2 -0.0016 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -9E-04 -8E-04 -2E-04 0 
Design center  282.7  -320.8  -958.9  -1752  -2368 
Enhanced option  4124.9  4882.3  4657.8  4065.9  4126.9 
Magnet  -271.1  818.97  836.72  477.95  518.6 
Minority -61.899  -570.9  -530.8  -351.1  -319.4  
Free lunch -61.899  -597.7  -563.9  -877.8  -867.8  
Interaction 61.8993  570.86  559.85  530.08  694.54  
2000 -11.274 19.001 -204.9 -279.3 70.234 -155.7 69.56* -167.4 955.69 931.03 
2001 406.597 404.67 296.44 287.6 266.24 22.68 -149.1 -342.8 555.31 393.04 
2002 1622.06 1677.5 1902.8 1636.6 2023.2 2047.3 1517.5 1467.9 1025.8 1254.4 
2003 964.273 925.43 812.36 568.52 1134.8 1008.6 514.99 539.73 -154.9 -460.5 
2004 87.5817 -1.45** 448.59 290.98 674.64 751.84 207.14 73.589 -472.2 -331.8 
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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Quantile regression relative to OLS  
 The above section reported on difference in QR coefficients relative to OLS coefficients 
in estimating vertical equity relationships using school-based data.  Table 4.21 presents overall 
results of this analysis.  Using five independent variables and five dependent variable over five 
quantiles yields a matrix of 125 cells.  Of these cells, 110 (or 88%) of QR estimates were 
significantly different from OLS estimates.  Only 15 cells, or 12%, exhibited no significant 
difference from OLS estimates.  Of the 110 significantly different cells, 60 (or 55%) provided 
QR estimates greater than OLS estimates and  50 (45%) reported coefficients smaller than OLS 
estimates.  All QR estimates were significant, indicating that vertical equity exists across GPS in 
terms of student characteristics and school types.  The nature of the distribution of that inequity 
is more fully understood through use of quantile regression.   
 
Having established the manner in which school-based QR deviates from traditional OLS-
based equity analysis, it its now appropriate to turn to an examination of sequence-based QR 
compared to school-based QR in order to answer a key research question : does a student’s 
sequence of schools yield different vertical equity results than traditional, school-based analyses? 
 
Table 4.21: QR and OLS differences 
 Non-tenured Percent minority Percent free lunch Teacher salary Staff salary 
 .1 .25 .5 .75 .9 .1 .25 .5 .75 .9 .1 .25 .5 .75 .9 .1 .25 .5 .75 .9 .1 .25 .5 .75 .9 
DC + + - - - + - + + - + + - - - + + - - - + + + - - 
EO + + nc - - + + nc - - + + nc - - nc + + + + nc + + nc nc 
Mag - + + + + - - - + + nc - - nc + - + + nc + - + + + + 
Minority - + + + + - - + - + - + - - - + nc nc + nc + - - + + 
Free 
lunch - + + + nc nc - + - - + - - - - + + - - - + + + - - 
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Modeling the impact of school sequences 
 
 In order to test the impact of school sequence based analysis on vertical equity, means 
across years for all dependent variables and relevant independent variables were constructed.  
That is, every student in the database was assigned the average value of each of the dependent 
variables weighted by the number of years that student participated in the district.  Salary 
measures were expressed as average teacher and other professional staff salary; teacher 
experience was expressed as the average percentage of non-tenured teachers experienced, and 
peer characteristics were expressed as the average percentage of minority or free lunch peers in 
school.  Independent variables were similarly transformed: enrollment is expressed as the 
average enrollment experienced by the pupil; minority as a marker remains a dummy variable 
with a value of “1” or “0”;22 the free lunch variable is expressed as the percent of years in the 
system that a student received free lunch; the interaction of minority and free lunch remains the 
multiplicative product of the two variables,; and school type variables, like the free lunch 
variable, are expressed in percentage terms, reflecting the number of years a student was enrolled 
within that school type as a ratio to the total number of years a student was enrolled in GPS.  
These percentage expressions for independent variables transform them from values of 0 or 1 to 
a categorical variable with 7 possible values – students could be free lunch status, in a design 
center, an enhanced option school or a magnet school for 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 years, yielding 
percentage values for each of these variables as 0, .167, .333, .500, .667, .833, or 1.0 
respectively.  Year by year fixed effects were computed by creating a weighted variable for each 
year in the data sequence for each student creating similar categorical percentage variables.   
                                                 
22 Students were checked across years to ensure that they were minority students consistently throughout the 
database.   
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These means represent the impact of multiple years of resource allocation across GPS 
schools.  The amount of variation in resource allocation over time will vary by the number of 
years a student participated in the system, as well as if a student attended a magnet school or 
transferred out of the system.  To capture this variation, while still providing a relevant 
comparison to the school-based vertical equity and quantile regression models described in the 
previous section, sequence based analysis proceeded in three steps.    
The first step is to create a model to align closely with the models used in school-based 
OLS and QR regressions.  Models used in sequence based quantile regression are: 
 
(4.1) 
 
 
and 
 
 
 
where Q is the specified quantile of the dependent variable, MEANE is enrollment and MIN is 
the minority status of a student.  Because this analysis occurs across sequences, the variable 
%FRPL, %DC, %EO, and %MAG indicate the percentage of years a student received free or 
reduced price lunch or was assigned to a design center, enhanced option, middle or magnet 
school.  Year fixed effects are weighted as described above and noted as 2000w, 2001w, 2002w, 
2003w, 2004w.  These models provide the closest alignment with school level analysis.  Each set 
of coefficients will be assed for difference using t-tests as well as the graphical analysis 
(4.2) 
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presented by Bassett, Tam and Knight and used to assess the differences between OLS and QR 
in the section above.  Any differences can then be reported and examined to determine what 
those differences explain about the distribution of resources across GPS students.   
 Table 4.22 presents descriptive statistics for the .25, .50 and .75 quantile for each 
dependent and independent variable in the model. 
 
Table 4.22 – Descriptive statistics for sequence-based quantile regression 
Variable type Variable N .25 .5 .75 Standard deviation
Non-tenured teachers 69,274 .1725 .2283 .2817 .0776 
Percent minority 69,274 .4423 .5486 .6508 .1508 
Percent free lunch 69,274 .3213 .4688 .6352 .2085 
Mean teacher salary 69,246 42,371 43,626 45,309 2,716.9 
Dependent 
Mean staff salary 69,246 43,593 44,754 46,425 2,703.2 
Enrollment 69,246 485.7 646 910.7 368.6 
Enrollment2 69,246 235,872 417,316 829,314 745,951 
%Minority 69,246 0 1 1 0.4973 
%Free lunch 69,246 0 0.4 1 0.4355 
Interaction 69,246 0 0 0.8333 0.4303 
%Design center 69,246 0 0 0 0.0983 
%Enhanced option 69,246 0 0 0 0.1095 
%Magnet 69,246 0 0 0 0.2435 
2000w 69,246 0.1667 0.1667 0.2 0.0494 
2001w 69,246 0.1667 0.1667 0.25 0.0494 
2002w 69,246 0.1667 0.1667 0.25 0.0494 
2003w 69,246 0.1667 0.1667 0.2 0.0494 
Independent 
2004w 69,246 0 0.1667 0.2 0.0494 
 
Vertical equity – sequence-based quantile regression 
 Table 4.23 through 4.27 presents coefficient estimates from quantile regression 
conducted across sequence variables for each of five resource variables.  These results will be 
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briefly discussed before examining whether or not sequence-based analysis yielded different 
results from school-based analysis.  Results from models with student characteristics and school 
characteristics are presented separately for each quantile examined: .1, .25, .5, .75 and .9.  
Results from complete models with both student and school type characteristics can be found in 
Appendix C.   
Non-tenured teachers 
 Table 4.23 presents sequence based quantile regression estimates for the dependent 
variable of the percentage of non-tenured teachers.  Some coefficients are not statistically 
significant: the square of enrollment at the .10 quantile for the school type model, the magnet 
school coefficient at the .50 and .75 quantiles, the year 2000 variables at the .25 and .90 quantiles 
in the school type model.  Overall, the directionality for sequence-based results is the same as for 
school-based results.   
Vertically inequitable relationships are apparent across all quantiles for student 
characteristics such as race and poverty, and for school types such as design center, enhanced 
option and magnet schools.  Minority status and free lunch status increase a student’s percentage 
of non-tenured teachers, enhanced option and design center schools increase a student’s 
percentage of non-tenured teachers, and magnet school attendance decreases a student’s 
percentage of non-tenured teachers in 3 out of 5 quantile.  At the .75 and .9 quantile, among the 
most experienced teachers, magnet school attendance actually increases a student’s percentage of 
non-tenured teachers.   
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Table 4.23 – Sequence-based quantile regression:  percent non-tenured teachers 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
 Student School Student School Student School Student School Student School 
Intercept 0.1511 0.1881 0.2268 0.2822 0.3468 0.3921 0.4313 0.4587 0.479 0.4784 
Enrollment -0.0001 0 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 
Enrollment2 0* 0** 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Design center  
0.0937 
 
0.0872 
 
0.0582 
 
0.0345 
 
0.0064 
Enhanced option  0.1137  0.1071  0.071  0.072  0.0379 
Magnet  -0.0214  0.0078*  -0.002**  0.0008**  0.0111 
Minority 0.0204  0.0369  0.0374  0.0202  0.0155  
Free lunch 0.0328  0.0452  0.0359  0.0199  0.0144  
Interaction -.0052*  -0.0239  -0.0291  -0.014  -0.013  
2000 0.0459 0.0215* 0.0057** -.004**   -0.0421 -0.03* -0.0315 -0.079* -0.065** 
2001 -0.041 -0.0774 -0.0748 -0.0852 -0.0985 -0.1263 -0.081 -0.1079 -0.1047 -0.1424 
2002 -0.0632 -0.0912 -0.1547 -0.1795 -0.1523 -0.1707 -0.140 -0.1491 -0.0699 -0.0583 
2003 0.0178* 0.0123* -0.0163* -0.0532 -0.0902 -0.1071 -0.076 -0.0892 -0.0978 -0.1037 
2004 -0.0264* -0.0376 -0.028 -0.0271 -0.0682 -0.0653 -0.106 -0.1232     
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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School percent minority 
 Table 4.24 presents coefficients from sequence-based quantile regression using 
percentage of minority peers as a dependent variable.  None of the student characteristics or 
school type variables are insignificant, although a number of the year-by-year control variable 
are insignificant, as is the coefficient for the square of enrollment variable at quantile .10.  
Student type results again confirm vertically inequitable relationships.  A minority 
student is associated with higher percentages of minority peers, as is a free lunch student.  School 
type variables such as design center and enhanced option school attendance are associated with 
higher percentages of minority peers.  This relationship is not necessarily inequitable; it is the 
intent of district policy that these school types serve neighborhoods with high concentrations of 
minority students.  For three out of five quantiles, magnet school attendance is associated with 
decreased percentages of minority peers.  At the .75 and .9 quantiles, however this relationship is 
reversed, and magnet school attendance is associated with increased minority peers.  This 
reflects large minority population at magnet schools across GPS. 
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Table 4.24 – Sequence-based quantile regression:  school percent minority 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
 Student School Student School Student School Student School Student School 
Intercept 0.3327 0.3067 0.4255 0.5179 0.5764 0.7117 0.7229 0.8411 0.8266 0.9977 
Enrollment 0.0001 0.0001 0 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 
Enrollment2 0** 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Design center  
0.518 
 
0.4767 
 
0.356 
 
0.2746 
 
0.2222 
Enhanced option  0.2359  0.2288  0.2532  0.2791  0.223 
Magnet  -0.007  -0.0173  -0.0282  0.0249  0.0699 
Minority 0.0776  0.077  0.1107  0.0929  0.1305  
Free lunch 0.1001  0.1035  0.1242  0.0916  0.0645  
Interaction -0.0205  -0.014  -0.0601  -0.0299  -0.0458  
2000 -.0764* -.026* -.0396* -.0552 -.0544* -0.0528* -0.0407* -0.0635 -0.020** -0.1381 
2001 -0.1469 -0.1124 -0.0909 -.1367 -0.0588 -0.0997 -0.002** -0.0571 0.0476 -0.0463 
2002 -0.1087 -0.1016 -0.0545 -.1046 -.012** -0.097 0.0006** -0.013* 0.0481 0.0118** 
2003 -.028** -.003** 0.0153** -0.0437 0.001** 0.0361* 0.0259** 0.0221* 0.031* -0.1213 
2004 -0.04* 0.12 -0.009** 0.0561 -.0303* 0.0008** -0.107 -0.1409 -0.1786 -0.2934 
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
   
  
 123
School percent free lunch 
 Table 4.25 presents sequence-based quantile regression estimates for school type and 
student characteristic models using free – lunch peers as a dependent variable.  None of the 
student characteristics or school type variables are insignificant, although a number of the year 
fixed effect variables are.   
 Among student characteristics variables, student minority status has a vertically 
inequitable relationship with free lunch peers, whereby minority students are associated with 
increased percentages of free lunch peers.  The same is true – and more greatly so – of free lunch 
students.  Among school type variables, enhanced option schools are associated with decreases 
in free lunch peers for every quantile of the distribution except quantile .10.  This pattern is the 
same for magnet school attendance: increased minority peers but decreases in free lunch peers. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
 124
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.25 – Sequence-based quantile regression:  percent free lunch peers 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
 Student School Student School Student School Student School Student School 
Intercept 0.1826 0.3825 0.3279 0.6295 0.5717 0.7653 0.6751 0.8809 0.8373 1.0165 
Enrollment -0.0002 -.0002 -0.0003 -.0004 -0.0004 -.0005 -0.0005 -.0005 -0.0006 -0.0006 
Enrollment2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Design center  
0.5487 
 
0.4346 
 
0.3005 
 
0.1772 
 
0.0967 
Enhanced option  0.1248  -0.0002  -0.1333  -0.1135  -0.0781 
Magnet  -0.1914  -0.2898  -0.35  -0.2885  -0.175 
Minority 0.0725  0.05  0.0513  0.0462  0.0381  
Free lunch 0.2639  0.2275  0.2126  0.1847  0.1399  
Interaction -0.074  -0.0464  -0.0393  -0.0479  -0.0413  
2000 0.0658* -.004** 0.0872 -0.033* 0.0142** -.002** 0.035* -.003** 0.0407* 0.0093** 
2001 0.0254** -0.123 0.0383* -0.1395 0.0186** -0.0565 0.0775 0.028* 0.0893 0.0483 
2002 -0.022** -0.0883 0.0255* -0.0961 -0.018** -0.0183 0.077 0.0548 0.0791 0.0183* 
2003 0.1047 0.0934 0.1441 0.0689 0.0912 0.089 0.1145 0.1389 0.1301 0.0543 
2004 0.2898 0.1398 0.2793 0.1247 0.2472 0.2489 0.2989 0.2606 0.2788 0.2904 
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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Average teacher and other professional staff salary   
 Table 4.26 presents estimates of sequence-based quantile regression using teacher 
salaries as a dependent variable.  
 All variables of immediate interest are statistically significant, although, again, many of 
the year fixed effect estimators are not.  Among student characteristic variables, teacher salary 
relationships are inequitable.  Both minority and free lunch status is associated with decreased 
teacher salaries.  Among school type variables, students who attend design center schools and 
magnet schools are associated with increased teacher salaries, while students who attend 
enhanced option schools are associated with reduced teacher salaries.  Table 4.27 demonstrates, 
as we have seen before, that results using staff salary as a dependent variable are similar to 
patterns and relationships found in an examination of teacher salaries.   
Although more coefficients from sequence-based quantile regression are not statistically 
significant, the remaining coefficients are mostly the same direction and strength as school based 
quantile regression.  The next section tests to see if sequence-based estimate are different from 
school-based estimates.   
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Table 4.26 – Sequence-based quantile regression:  average teacher salary 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
 Student School Student School Student School Student School Student School 
Intercept 37037 36765 37856.4 37157.5 40365.9 38991 42434.7 40671 43998.3 42325.7 
Enrollment 8.2296 8.7337 8.1634 8.9405 6.6657 7.5143 6.569 6.7106 6.8235 8.236 
Enrollment2 -0.0031 -0.0033 -0.0033 -0.0036 -0.0022 -0.0025 -0.0018 -0.0017 -0.0019 -0.0024 
Design center  5237.8  4400.17  4285.05  4678.45  4015.85 
Enhanced option  217.5604*  -281.27  -920.42  -1981.2  -2035.8 
Magnet  281.804  671.328  1027.46  1027.09  700.393 
Minority -114.48  -282.46  -732.294  -939.996  -577.426  
Free lunch -117.1*  -354.644  -919.389  -1489.75  -1257.79  
Interaction 201.563  428.214  935.139  1245.25  929.753  
2000 -352** -309.026* 133.4943** -15.8** -790.467* -500.9* -1393.7 -953.184* -1558.08 -870.598 
2001 891.032 803.143 1466.19 1707.64 482.4105* 843.387 -200.2** 739.837 354.1388** 288.918* 
2002 2235.69 2282.19 3101.18 3095.57 3533.06 3988.39 4284.15 5073.27 2608.07 2619.07 
2003 865.537 673.119 1493.23 1656.96 749.886 1379.62 -77.59** 253.8874** -1739.81 -1122.99 
2004 -1389.57 -1692.85 -807.497 -765.5 -1783.34 -1772.3 -3602.5 -2678 -3475.05 -2970.07 
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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Table 4.27 – Sequence-based quantile regression:  average staff salary 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
 Student School Student School Student School Student School Student School 
Intercept 38727.2 91.8309 39541.7 38841.1 42134.4 40962 44447.5 42864.5 45312 44747 
Enrollment 7.8031 0.0951 8.1522 8.8114 6.5246 7.1427 5.8915 6.1309 6.6992 7.9008 
Enrollment2 -0.0029 0 -0.0032 -0.0035 -0.002 -0.0022 -0.0015 -0.0015 -0.0019 -0.0023 
Design center  
4824.34 
 
4329.66 
 
4147.67 
 
3978.12 
 
3337.78 
Enhanced option  -3.5757**  -479.09  -1097.96  -2039.33  -1989.43 
Magnet  -74.5296**  553.632  885.871  842.391  172.502 
Minority -69.2011*  -216.613  -566.111  -831.985  -400.181  
Free lunch -147.621  -259.832  -788.734  -1306.12  -1064.14  
Interaction 216.822  396.113  831.945  1148.03  812.588  
2000 -383.834** -439.989* -154.114** -154.97** -1233.43 -1013.2 -1734.07 -1355.51 -1394.08 -2300.95 
2001 781.721 695.8 883.901 1326.15 174.6021** 677.484 -783.838* 183.0618** 251.5998** -382.292** 
2002 1966.29 1948.85 2541.79 2749.11 2564.44 2855.91 3389.09 4004.36 2139.72 2188.52 
2003 1059.79 543.65 1158.28 1448.39 -151.643** 552.3984* -1169.72 -619.282 -2334.53 -3286.73 
2004 -2685.5 -2869.69 -2697.06 -2360.72 -3682.76 -3502.18 -5265.78 -4640.85 -4716.12 -5174.07 
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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Comparing sequence-based and school-based results 
 A final piece of analysis is to determine whether sequence-based quantile 
regression estimates are different from school-based quantile regression estimates.  This analysis 
will compare estimates graphically by using sequence-based estimates plotted against the 95% 
confidence band of school-based sequence estimates.  This method will determine whether 
individual sequence-based estimates are different from their school-based counterparts.   
95% confidence interval plots, such as those used by Basset, Tam, and Knight reveal that 
point estimates for each quantile in sequence-based regression are often outside of the 95% 
confidence band for school-based quantile regression.  Figure 4.8 presents these plots for the 
dependent variable on non-tenured teachers.  
 
Figure 4.8: Sequence-based quantile estimates plotted against 95% confidence band for school-based quantile 
estimates 
 
Among student characteristic variables, sequence-based estimates are generally higher at the 
lowest ends of the distribution (.10), and lower at the higher ends of the distribution (.9).  This 
means that, even among the most advantaged students, free lunch students receive higher 
percentages of non-tenured teachers and among the least advantaged students lower percentages 
of non-tenured teachers relative to their more affluent peers.  These findings can be interpreted in 
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terms of stability: at the most privileged area in the distribution of non-tenured teachers, affluent 
students have consistently lower percentages of non-tenured teachers.  Free lunch students, 
however, must have some periods of higher percentages of non-tenured teachers to “average up” 
from their affluent peers.  At the worst end of the distribution of non-tenured teachers, the 
opposite is true; affluent students have more experience with higher percentages of non-tenured 
teachers.  This means that poor students are less consistently in better school and affluent 
students are less consistently in worse schools, when considering the distribution of non-tenured 
teachers.   
 Among school types, sequence-based estimates are slightly less for design center school 
at the lowest percentiles of non-tenured teachers and very slightly more for design school 
students with the highest percentages for non-tenured teachers.  Sequence-based estimates are 
slightly less for enhanced option schools at quantiles .25, .5, and .9 and very slightly greater at 
quantiles .10 and .75.  For magnet schools, sequence-based analysis is similar for all quantiles of 
the distribution save the .75 and .9 quantiles.  Sequence –based analysis reports greater effects at 
the .75 quantile and lesser effects at the .9 quantile.  
 Overall, the greatest observed differences between school-based and sequence-based 
estimates occurs at the highest ends of the distribution.  In all cases but one, the sequence based 
variable presents a smaller and significant difference from school-based estimates.    
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Figure 4.9: Sequence-based quantile estimates plotted against 95% confidence band for school-based quantile 
estimates 
 
Figure 4.9 presents a comparison of sequence-based estimates along with the 95% 
confidence band for school-based estimates for the percent of minority peers dependent variable.  
Sequence-based analysis indicates no difference from school-based analysis when examining the 
impact of student minority status on that student’s percentage of minority peers in schools at 
quantile .10 and .25.  However, sequence based analysis seems to indicate less of an impact at 
the high percentile of the distribution of minority peers.  That is, among students who encounter 
higher percentages of minority peers, sequence-based analyses reports a weaker positive 
influence than school-based analysis.  Among free lunch students, sequence based analysis 
reports stronger associations at the lower end of the distribution of minority peers.  That is, 
among students with lower percentages of minority peers, an individual student’s free lunch 
status has a greater impact when examining through the lens of sequences than when examined 
through schools.  This is true at the .75 quantile as well.  Among school type variables, 
sequence-based results for the impact of design center school on percentages of minority peers 
presents a flatter, more consistent set of quantile estimates: less than school based estimates at 
quantile .10, greater at quantile .25, less at quantile .50, and greater at quantiles .75 and .9.  
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Sequence-based estimates for enhanced option school type are very slightly greater than school-
based estimates across all quantiles.  Finally, sequence based estimates for the relationship 
between magnet schools and minority peers are greater at quantile .10, the same at quantile .25 
and less at quantiles .5, .75, and .9.  At quantile .5, the sequence-based estimate is in the opposite 
direction as the school-based estimate.  In most cases, the sequence estimate is closer to zero 
than school based estimates, meaning that sequence base estimates seem to yield more 
conservative relationships than school based estimates.   
 Figure 4.10 presents comparisons between sequence-base and school-based estimates 
using the percentages of free lunch peers.   
Figure 4.10: Sequence-based quantile estimates plotted against 95% confidence band for school-based quantile 
estimates 
 
Sequence –based estimates are consistently less than school-based estimates for the minority 
status student variable (save for quantile .10), and consistently greater for the free lunch status 
variable.  For the design center schools, sequence estimates are more strongly positive at quantile 
.10 and quantile .25, more strongly negative at quantile .50 and quantile .90 and the same at 
quantile .75.  While sequence-based estimates are virtually the same as school-based estimates in 
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reporting relationships between percent of free lunch peers and enhanced option schools, the 
sequence-bases results are consistently more negative than school based estimate when 
describing the relationship between free lunch peers and magnet schools.  At the highest 
percentage of free lunch peers, the sequence-based gap between magnet schools and non magnet 
schools is almost double that of school-based estimates.  
 Figures 4.11 and 4.12 present sequence-based and school-based estimates of the 
relationships between student and school type variables conducted with teacher and staff salary 
as dependent variables.  These two sets of graphics are virtually identical, meaning g that the 
vertical equity relationships are the same between student characteristics, school types and salary 
levels that exclude and include administrative pay.   
 
Figure 4.11: Sequence-based quantile estimates plotted against 95% confidence band for school-based quantile 
estimates 
 
Among student characteristics, both sets of graphs demonstrate sequence-based results that are 
less negative than school-based estimates at quantiles .10 and .25, statistically similar at quantile 
.5, and more strongly negative at quantiles .75 and .90.  Sequence-based and school-based 
estimates are similar in pattern and magnitude for enhanced option and design center schools.  
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Figure 4.12: Sequence-based quantile estimates plotted against 95% confidence band for school-based quantile 
estimates 
In each case, sequence-based estimates track the same patterns as school-based estimates when 
describing relationship with magnet schools.  Sequence-based estimates, however are closer to 
zero at quantile .1, .25 and .9, but greater than school-based estimates at quantiles .5 and .75.   
 Plotting sequence-based results against 95% confidence bands of school-based quantile 
regression results demonstrates that, although sequences-based analysis provide different results 
than school-based quantile regression, there is no pattern to the differences.  This is confirmed in 
table 4.28.  This table presents a matrix of the differences between sequence-based quantile 
regression and school-based quantile regression estimates.   
 
Table 4.28: Sequence based and school based quantile regression coefficient comparisons 
 Non-tenured Percent minority Percent free lunch Teacher salary Staff salary 
Quantile .1 .25 .5 .75 .9 .1 .25 .5 .75 .9 .1 .25 .5 .75 .9 .1 .25 .5 .75 .9 .1 .25 .5 .75 .9 
D.Center - + nc + + - + - + + + + - nc - + nc + - - - - - - + 
E.Option + - - + - + + + + + + nc + + - + - - - - + - - nc - 
Magnet + - - + - + nc - - - + - - - - + - + + - + - + + - 
Minority + - nc - - - + - - - + - - - + + + + - + + + nc - - 
Free 
lunch + + nc - - + + nc + - + + + + + - + nc - nc - + - - - 
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By using five independent variables and five dependent variable over five quantiles 
yields a matrix of 125 cells.  Of these cells, 113 (or 90%) of sequence-based estimates were 
significantly different from school-based estimates.  Only 12 cells, or 10%, exhibited no 
significant difference from school-based estimates.  Of the 113 significantly different cells, 58 
(or 46%) provided sequence-based estimates greater than school-based estimates and 55 (44%) 
reported coefficients smaller than school-based estimates.  Although sequence-based estimates 
confirm the vertical equity found in school-based quantile regression estimates, there is little 
pattern in the direction of sequence-based versus school-based estimates. 
 
Sequence effects on poor and minority students 
Sequence-based estimates for minority students varied according to the resource in 
question.  For non-tenured teachers, sequence-based analysis provided estimates that were 
smaller than school-based estimates for 3 quantiles out of five.  Four out of five quantile 
estimates for the dependent variable percent of minority peers were smaller than sequence-based 
equity analysis.  Three out of five sequence-based estimates were smaller than their school-based 
counteracts for the dependent variable describing the percentage of free lunch peers.  The 
sequence-based estimates for teacher salary were greater than school-based estimates three times 
out of five, but greater only two times out of five when examining other professional staff salary 
levels as a dependent variable.   
When examining free lunch students, difference between sequence based and school 
based estimates are “balanced” between positive and negative coefficients for the teacher salary 
and non-tenured teachers variable.  For the percentage of minority peers, sequence-based 
analysis provided estimates greater than school-based estimates.  This was overwhelmingly true 
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for the dependent variable of percentage of free lunch peers.  Staff salary estimates, however, 
were smaller using sequence based analysis when compared to school-based analysis.   
At a general level, table 4.27 illustrates that sequence-based equity analysis provided 
estimates that show school-based estimates to be under-estimated for minority students and 
generally over-estimated for free lunch students.  
  
Conclusion 
 Analysis conducted throughout this chapter has demonstrated that the distribution of 
teacher experience, student peer groups, teacher and other professional staff salaries are all 
inequitably distributed across GPS students with three or more years of experience in the school 
system.  These findings have policy implications for student assignment policies, which will 
discussed in more detail below.  Methodologically, this chapter has introduced the use of 
quantile regression in the vertical equity analysis and demonstrated the difference to be found 
between quantile regression and more traditional ordinary least squares regression analysis.  
Finally, this chapter has examined differences between vertical equity analysis based on school 
level models and school-sequence level models.  The hypothesis motivating this part of the 
analysis asserted that resource distribution measured across the sequence of schools a student 
attended would be different from resource distribution examined across schools without 
consideration of the sequences of schools.  Although sequence-based analysis did yield 
statistically different estimates than school-based analysis, those estimates were not different in a 
specific or systematic manner.  Sequence–based analysis sometimes showed greater impact of 
independent variables (such as the overall effect for minority students) and sometimes less (such 
as with free lunch students).  We are left with the idea that the unit of analysis in vertical equity 
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studies should conform to that theory being used by the researcher and the specific research 
questions at are asked.   
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CHAPTER V 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Review of findings 
This dissertation research posed two research questions: 
1.  Are measures of intradistrict equity different when measured across school sequences 
than when measured across schools? 
2. Do school sequences for poor and minority students differ from school sequences for 
other students?  If so, do poor and minority students attend sequences with greater or 
fewer resources than their non-poor, non-minority peers? 
Through an analysis of resource distribution, results indicate that there exist some small 
differences between equity analysis conducted across sequences and equity analysis conducted 
across schools.  When examining resource with measures of horizontal equity, sequence-based 
analysis seems to produce estimates that are smaller than school-based estimates.  When using 
measures of vertical equity, findings indicate that sequence-based estimates are almost equally 
greater than and less than school-based estimates.   
For poor and minority students, levels of inequity across sequences mirror inequity across 
schools.  That is, poor and minority students receive inequitable levels of key resources across 
sequences in much the same manner that they do when examined across schools. Viewed 
positively, poor and minority students are treated no worse over time than they are from year to 
year; viewed negatively, the resource distribution inequities faced by poor and minority students 
is not ameliorated over time.   
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The creation of student sequences yielded findings that GPS is a highly mobile district 
with relatively few students remaining in their district-assigned sequences and high transfer rates 
across all cohorts.   
Examination of the data using three standard measures of horizontal equity: the 
coefficient of variation, the McLoone Index and the Gini coefficient – demonstrate that 
expenditures for salary are equitably distributed across GPS but that inexperienced teachers are  
inequitably distributed across GPS schools, as are poor and minority student peers.  Inequity in 
the distribution of free lunch students is the most pronounced across student types.  However, 
very few of the horizontal equity measures were statistically different from one another.   
Traditional vertical equity analysis using ordinary least squares used a model that 
predicted anywhere from 8% to 24% of the variation in the dependent variables.  Each 
independent variable was a statistically significant predictor of each of the five dependent 
variables.  Analysis if these findings focused on relationships between poverty and minority 
status.  Although there were moderate and significant effects for different school types, the small 
number of magnet, design center and enhanced option schools dictated that those coefficients be 
interpreted with care as high leverage point may bias estimates.  School types were used as 
control variables in these models.  These models indicate inequitable relationships between 
student status (poor, minority) and school type.   
A first round of quantile regression (QR) models was used to approximate the equation 
used in OLS.  These findings confirmed OLS findings of inequitable relationships between 
dependent variables and student and school characteristics.  In addition, these QR models 
demonstrated that the inequity among teacher salary, other professional staff salary and teacher 
experience variables increased over quantiles; that is, the effect of poverty and minority students 
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was greater at higher ends of the distribution of each of these variables.  Relationships across 
quantile remained relatively stable for school-level percent minority and school-level percent 
free lunch variables.   
Finally, QR models were used to determine the impact of school sequences.  Although 
sequence-based QR provided different estimates from school-based QR analysis, these 
differences ere not systematic enough for an explanation of how sequence based analysis alters 
estimates from school-based analysis.   
To return to the two research questions posed: school sequences matter in the 
measurement of vertical equity, less so in measures of horizontal equity, and the impact of 
student racial and economic characteristics is generally less in models that include student 
sequence types.  The general conclusion, then, is that models that do not account for school 
sequence both overstate and understate by small to moderate amounts the inequitable 
relationship between race, poverty and school-level resources.  This analysis has provided a 
number of findings about school system assignment policies, intradistrict resource allocation, 
and methods for assessing vertical equity in school finance studies.  These research and policy 
implications are described in detail below. 
Research implications 
 As conducted, this research has research implications on two fronts.  First, the finding 
that school sequences matter has implications for the conduct of school finance research.  
Secondly, the use of quantile regression also has implications for equity analysis in school 
finance.   
 It seems apparent upon initial consideration that the use of longitudinal data will provide 
better estimates than cross sectional data.  Heretofore, based on a model of examining 
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intradistrict school finance equity; that is, equity across districts within states, the impact of local 
students’ assignment and choice policies as been ignored.  In the intradistrct context, local 
policies are viewed as simply part of a district effect on resource allocation.  In making the 
transition to intradistrict study, researchers have continued to assume that district level policies 
are fixed across students.  This is not a correct assumption.  As has been demonstrated, some 
district policies – those that allocate students into sequences of schools over time – impact a 
different group of students than those policies that provide choice in schools.  If data is available, 
constructing sequences for students provides not only an important independent variable with 
which to predict the distribution of resources across schools, but also a potential new level of 
analysis, as the creation and description of student sequence types can yield insights into the 
overall effect of policies on student mobility.   
 The use of quantile regression in estimating the effects of student racial and economic 
characteristics provide an additional methodological tool with which researchers can better 
understand the distribution of resources across students in an intradistrict context.  Quantile 
regression estimates exhibit more robust characteristics in their imperviousness to outliers than 
their OLS counterparts.  In addition, the ability to obtain estimates of relationships across the 
distribution of a dependent variable adds a level of insight into the nature of inequity.  Although, 
as has been shown in this research, interpretation of quantile regression estimates can be a bit 
counter-intuitive (the effects of the independent variable are interpreted as associations with a 
specific quantile of the dependent variable, making the determination of inequity more difficult), 
the ability to track associations across a distribution is an important addition, especially to a field 
of research concerned with distribution of resources across a population.     
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Policy implications 
 Findings regarding school sequences have additional implications for policymakers.  
Specifically, the findings of few students in district assigned sequences presents administrators 
with a challenge.  In addition, the finding that school sequences matter for resource equity 
concerns places an emphasis on thoughtful student assignment plans that provide resource equity 
across years of student attendance.  Finally, the finding of salary stability simultaneous with 
variations in teacher experience indicates that teacher salary issues may mask teacher quality 
disparities across schools. 
 First, the finding that few students participated in the district assigned school sequence 
has policy implications for district administrators.  Much has been made of the loosely coupled 
nature of school districts, and the manifold means in which participants in the system can game 
the system (Weick, 1976).  District administrators may wish to pay attention to the manner in 
which policies are implemented and the degrees to which the system allows exceptions to the 
system, particularly if the policies involved have resource equity implications.   
It is clear that student assignment matters at the aggregate student assignments matter as 
well.  This resents a fine line for school system administrators to work vis-à-vis student 
assignment.  On one hand, administrators must pay careful attention to the schools in which 
students are assigned.  However, constant change in the pursuit of such balance may have 
deleterious consequences for public support.  
Finally, findings from this research point subtly to problem within the single teacher 
salary schedule.  Implications of some findings indicate that, while students may be receiving 
equitable teacher salary spending, they are not receiving equitable distributions of teacher 
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experience.  Better alignment between teacher qualifications and teacher compensation may 
allow for better tracking of teacher quality distributed across different student types.   
 
Data limitations 
 First, the use of GPS data to test a theory of student assignment represents a data 
limitation of a sort.  It is important to note that few districts would have been able to provide the 
richness of data such as that provided by GPS.  Nevertheless, it is conceivable that data on 
student assignments could be pooled across districts to allow for a more powerful examination of 
these issues.  In addition, limitations confronted by this study were encountered with each type 
of data available: student level, teacher level, school level and district level.  An account of 
limitations follows. 
Next, the student database provided limited information on student status.  For example, 
special education status was not recorded on the student database.  Another imitation was that 
student records were not linked to an address.  Much of the sequence coding was based on 
comparisons of predicted attendance (via district assignment databases) to actual student school 
attendance.  Determining if a student has moved houses within the district would have aided in 
better coding of transfer students, and allowed for a determination of the precise number of 
students who remained in their residence but did not attend schools in sequence.    
Although teacher level data allowed for the construction of school-specific teacher salary 
variables, the teacher database itself was limited.  There were no records of grades or subjects 
taught, only teacher certifications.  In addition, literature on teacher qualifications indicates that 
some variable representing teacher academic performance – such as a college GPA or a 
standardized test score – would have allowed for better differentiation of teacher quality.  An 
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ideal situation would have been each teacher’s value added ranking from the Tennessee Value 
Added Assessment System (TVAAS).  This would have allowed for the construction of a school-
specific teacher quality index separate from the school-specific teacher salary variable.   
School-level data was incomplete for some schools for some years.  Newer schools 
especially, were hampered by limited data available via the State of Tennessee’s web reporting 
function.  Such omission may have introduced bias into the findings, if all newer schools were 
underreported.   
Finally, district student assignment files proved difficult to work with.  A longitudinal 
examination of GPS student assignment databases reveals that GPS only assigns streets to 
schools when those streets are populated with school age children.  As a result, the student 
assignment database is essentially reconfigured every academic year, and the street/address 
combinations do match up from year to year.  Matching these records over time was a laborious 
task.  As mentioned earlier in this dissertation, it need not be this way.  The Wake County (NC) 
Public School System, for example, assigns every street into a permanent node.  Nodes are then 
reassigned every academic year based on in- and out-migration of students, opening of new 
schools, growth another factors.  Tracing the impact on neighborhoods over time would be a 
much easier task within that framework.   
Next steps 
A number of options present themselves for continued research in this area.  First, 
continued work on the equity implications of the use of student sequences in a number of large 
urban districts would confirm or disconfirm a trend in the findings presented here.  Second, 
continued work in the field of school finance using quantile regression as a methodological tool 
would improve researcher’s understanding of the strengths and weaknesses of this application.  
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Finally, this research has focused solely on equity as a concept valued by policymakers.  Another 
concept, one of adequacy, has also been popular with policymakers.  Adequacy as a concept 
addresses the interrelationship between resources, students, and outcomes in a manner that hopes 
to clarify amounts of spending needed to bring all students in a jurisdiction up to appropriate 
levels of academic performance.  It may be the case that school attendance sequences have 
implications for the academic attainment of students.  It may also be the case that quantile 
regression as a methodological tool may be able to refine current applications in adequacy 
research by ensuring that students across a distribution of, say, academic outcomes, receive the 
resources necessary to meet those academic requirements. 
 
Concluding thoughts 
 In some ways, the use of school attendance sequences as a unit of analysis may seem a 
futile hairsplitting of an already over-sown field in school finance.  However, as recent 
legislation such as No Child Left Behind continues to focus researchers’ attention o the 
interrelationships between resources and performance, the ability to accurately describe exactly 
those resources received by each student is an important part of the policy puzzle.  School 
sequences help develop a better understanding of the manner in which students receive 
resources, and the distribution of those resources.  These findings merit inclusion in the policy 
debates that continue to challenge the field of school finance in general and intradistrict school 
finance in particular.   
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Appendix A: Fully specified models for school based ordinary least squares (OLS) analysis 
 
Table A-1: OLS models for each dependent variable 
Variable Non-tenured 
teachers 
Percent 
minority 
Percent free 
lunch 
Teacher 
salary 
Staff salary 
Intercept 0.25651 0.47062 0.57415 40832 42346 
Enrollment -0.00007229 -0.00008066 -0.00036873 5.31594 5.03928 
Enrollment2 2.32E-08 2.62E-08 7.30E-08 -0.00141 -0.00133 
Minority 0.02623 0.10526 0.07903 -609.06565 -491.73113 
Free lunch 0.02698 0.08642 0.16581 -727.6014 -709.27155 
Interaction -0.01621 -0.04156 -0.0602 573.01812 535.85322 
Design 
Center 
0.07468 0.21289 -0.04601 -997.33162 -1213.15823 
Enhanced 
Option 
0.05831 0.29153 0.2446 4694.28944 4164.4556 
Magnet 0.01285 0.04289 -0.18666 425.25363 245.18932 
2000 0.02031 0.0125 0.00735 26.36594 34.75731 
2001 0.00673 0.02513 0.01339 85.1473 238.4959 
2002 -0.04248 0.03421 0.03164 1966.02766 1732.53948 
2003 -0.00697 0.04831 0.05927 862.2926 678.95502 
2004 -0.06623 -0.04396 0.2024 181.46845 142.45768 
F 3366.15 6859.01 22954.8 7577.19 6703.22 
Adjusted R2 0.1181 0.2315 0.4776 0.2318 0.2107 
Note:  All estimates significant at p<.0001. 
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Appendix B: Fully specified models for school-based quantile regression 
Table B-1: School-based quantile regression: percentage of non-tenured teachers 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Intercept 0.0978 0.1685 0.2459 0.347 0.3917 
Enrollment 0 -1E-04 -1E-04 -1E-04 -1E-04 
Enrollment2 0 0 0 0 0 
Minority 0.115 0.0972 0.0669 0.0547 0.014 
Free lunch 0.0712 0.106 0.061 0.0103 0.0304 
Interaction -0.015 0.0061 0.0101 -0.02 0.0315 
Enhanced 
option 0.0138 0.0335 0.0377 0.0365 0.0327 
Design 
center 0.0166 0.0335 0.04 0.0333 0.0268 
Magnet -0.007 -0.025 -0.029 -0.031 -0.027 
2000 -6E-04 0.0138 0.0208 0.0532 0.0599 
2001 0.0079 -1E-04** 0.0061 0.0163 0.0375 
2002 -0.037 -0.049 -0.043 -0.029 -0.032 
2003 -0.022 -0.012 -0.008 0.011 0.0147 
2004 -0.042 -0.049 -0.069 -0.078 -0.08 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
 
 
Table B-2: School-based quantile regression: school percent minority 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Intercept 0.1879 0.3244 0.4601 0.646 0.7305 
Enrollment 0.0002 0 -1E-04 -2E-04 -2E-04 
Enrollment2 0 0 0 0 0 
Minority 0.238 0.1636 0.27 0.2204 0.1301 
Free lunch 0.4594 0.3751 0.3012 0.2154 0.1385 
Interaction -0.04 -0.012 0.045 0.0872 0.0781 
Enhanced 
option 0.0729 0.0661 0.1314 0.0958 0.1397 
Design 
center 0.0693 0.0661 0.1244 0.0759 0.0708 
Magnet -0.04 -0.019 -0.09 -0.038 -0.062 
2000 0** 0.0022 0.0198 0.0146 0.0431 
2001 0.0127 0.0139 0.0364 0.0469 0.0565 
2002 0.0229 0.0353 0.0502 0.0555 0.0619 
2003 0.0345 0.0427 0.0743 0.0694 0.0787 
2004 -0.161 -0.094 -0.024 0.0443 0.1024 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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Table B-3: School-based quantile regression: school percent free lunch 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Intercept  0.4773 0.619 0.77 0.9023 
Enrollment -2E-04 -4E-04 -5E-04 -5E-04 -5E-04 
Enrollment2 0 0 0 0 0 
Minority 0.0019 -0.022 -0.084 -0.019 -0.069 
Free lunch 0.4762 0.3616 0.2378 0.1412 0.0916 
Interaction -0.179 -0.229 -0.245 -0.165 -0.135 
Enhanced 
option 0.059 0.0521 0.0867 0.0584 0.046 
Design 
center 0.1295 0.1182 0.1574 0.159 0.1185 
Magnet -0.059 -0.033 -0.053 -0.05 -0.036 
2000 -0.01 0.0068 0.013 0.0073 0.0242 
2001 0.0096 0.0137 0.0249 0.0193 0.0342 
2002 0.0254 0.03 0.0406 0.0365 0.043 
2003 0.0648 0.0536 0.0713 0.0636 0.0666 
2004 0.1464 0.1635 0.2152 0.2318 0.2456 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
 
Table B-4: School-based quantile regression: average teacher salary 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Intercept 37090 38355 40689 43235 45157 
Enrollment 5.2838 5.7571 5.3554 4.5226 3.6204 
Enrollment2 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -9E-04 -6E-04 
Minority -10.95 -818.4* -1250 -1328 -1504 
Free lunch 4611.7 5047.2 4899.7 5018.5 5485 
Interaction -356.7 578.49 908.14 420.93 433.57 
Enhanced 
option -75.12 -629 -743.9 -701.2 -569.2 
Design 
center -75.12 -654.1 -822 -858.2 -1083 
Magnet 75.115 628.96 743.94 701.24 682.41 
2000 -441.5 201.31 -197.6 -512 767.94 
2001 -108 597.94 -92.05 -681.7 300.32 
2002 1587.1 2751.1 2318.6 1657.6 1336.6 
2003 910.27 1654 868.65 438.37 381.87 
2004 314.48 1186.2 678.56 65.938 -478.6 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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Table B-5: School-based quantile regression: average staff salary 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Intercept 38385 40032 41671 44559 46998 
Enrollment 5.8841 6.4689 5.6669 4.03 2.8128 
Enrollment2 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -8E-04 -2E-04 
Minority 330.81 -463 -1188 -1795 -2178 
Free lunch 4110.1 5009 4679.8 4165.2 4127.6 
Interaction -359.6 776.45 896.63 314.53 403.76 
Enhanced 
option -100.8 -556.1 -626.5 -391 -334.1 
Design 
center -100.8 -556.1 -626.5 -860 -863.8 
Magnet 100.78 556.07 605.55 477.06 446.46 
2000 -77.33 -364.7 -50.67 -122.7 467.6 
2001 352.38 214.82 314.58 -328.7 92.127 
2002 1669.7 1589.9 2117.8 1497.8 864.75 
2003 930.9 556.78 997.74 607.13 -392.9 
2004 11.085 261.74 780.26 297.46 -612.8 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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Appendix C: Fully specified models for sequence-based quantile regression 
Table C-1: Sequence-based quantile regression: percent non-tenured teachers 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Intercept 0.2934 0.4136 0.5625 0.6928 0.8209 
Enrollment 0.0001 0** -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 
Enrollment2 0* 0 0 0 0 
Minority 0.0791 0.0729 0.1089 0.0942 0.12 
Free lunch 0.1095 0.1024 0.1263 0.1038 0.0808 
Interaction -0.0302 -0.0174 -0.0654 -0.0518 -0.0614 
Enhanced 
option 
0.4328 0.3681 0.2932 0.2369 0.1931 
Design 
center 
0.2247 0.2056 0.2371 0.2628 0.2016 
Magnet 0.0272 0.0116 0.0226 0.0443 0.0631 
2000 -0.0477* -0.0453* -0.0644 -0.0607 -0.0963 
2001 -0.1141 -0.0914 -0.0785 -0.0421 -0.0499 
2002 -0.1016 -0.0619 -0.0322* -0.0181** 0.0039** 
2003 -0.0497* -0.0086** -0.0116** -0.0155** -0.0567 
2004 0.0124** -0.0133** -0.0505 -0.1332 -0.2231 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
 
Table C-2: Sequence-based quantile regression: school percent minority 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Intercept 0.2934 0.4136 0.5625 0.6928 0.8209 
Enrollment 0.0001 0** -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 
Enrollment2 0* 0 0 0 0 
Minority 0.0791 0.0729 0.1089 0.0942 0.12 
Free lunch 0.1095 0.1024 0.1263 0.1038 0.0808 
Interaction -0.0302 -0.0174 -0.0654 -0.0518 -0.0614 
Enhanced 
option 
0.4328 0.3681 0.2932 0.2369 0.1931 
Design 
center 
0.2247 0.2056 0.2371 0.2628 0.2016 
Magnet 0.0272 0.0116 0.0226 0.0443 0.0631 
2000 -0.0477* -0.0453* -0.0644 -0.0607 -0.0963 
2001 -0.1141 -0.0914 -0.0785 -0.0421 -0.0499 
2002 -0.1016 -0.0619 -0.0322* -0.0181** 0.0039** 
2003 -0.0497* -0.0086** -0.0116** -0.0155** -0.0567 
2004 0.0124** -0.0133** -0.0505 -0.1332 -0.2231 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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Table C-3: Sequence-based quantile regression: school percent free lunch 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Intercept 0.2685 0.4811 0.6354 0.722 0.851 
Enrollment -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0004 -0.0005 -0.0005 
Enrollment2 0** 0 0 0 0 
Minority 0.0418 0.0499** 0.057 0.0561 0.0443 
Free lunch 0.1874 0.1847 0.1779 0.1688 0.1413 
Interaction -0.0416 -0.0401 -0.0441 -0.0534 -0.0441 
Enhanced 
option 
0.4037 0.3409 0.2313 0.1315 0.0682 
Design 
center 
0.051 0.001 -0.0638 -0.1191 -0.097 
Magnet -0.1707 -0.2263 -0.2767 -0.2436 -0.1641 
2000 0.0149** -0.0091** -0.0129** 0.0222* -0.0048** 
2001 -0.0506* -0.0896 -0.0209* 0.0484 0.066 
2002 -0.0441* -0.0803 -0.0518 0.0648 0.042* 
2003 0.1039 0.0682 0.063 0.1078 0.1012 
2004 0.1158 0.1357 0.199 0.2528 0.2233 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
 
 
Table C-4: Sequence-based quantile regression: average teacher salary 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Intercept 36829.9 37446.3 39846.8 42058.7 43815.5 
Enrollment 8.7441 8.7633 7.0548 6.5234 7.581 
Enrollment2 -0.0033 -0.0035 -0.0023 -0.0017 -0.0022 
Minority -153.581 -294.184 -724.791 -925.706 -614.007 
Free lunch -96.9683* -310.751 -829.626 -1341.32 -1256.35 
Interaction 166.1863* 382.771 798.317 1040.45 729.111 
Enhanced 
option 
5298.55 4428.363 4584.97 5301.94 4637.16 
Design 
center 
245.025* -269.749 -847.581 -1589.33 -1678.21 
Magnet 322.7109* 685.571 1048.58 729.718 423.79 
2000 -373.444** 64.1214** -572.189* -1284.91 -2049.88 
2001 924.43 1536.75 794.474 105.1703** -368.854* 
2002 2134.89 3017.52 3537.74 4203.36 2462.25 
2003 667.82 1529.2 1193.18 -110.319** -2065.73 
2004 -1571.26 -591.314 -1573.92 -2979.78 -3505.06 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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Table C-5: Sequence-based quantile regression: average staff salary 
 0.1 0.25 0.5 0.75 0.9 
Intercept 38629.4 39122.4 41462.1 44066.1 45557.5 
Enrollment 8.3133 8.6362 7.1295 6.061 7.2949 
Enrollment2 -0.0031 -0.0034 -0.0023 -0.0016 -0.0021 
Minority -70.9747* -221.419 -550.462 -880.205 -385.624 
Free lunch -154.971 -263.291 -724.139 -1271.44 -1086.41 
Interaction 165.0996* 340.26 702.15 1024.07 489.877 
Enhanced 
option 
4829.04 4351.88 4379.18 4479.82 3805.47 
Design 
center 
-37.2371** -456.72 -1211.24 -1731.08 -1636.61 
Magnet -97.3441** 550.579 768.917 623.125 -115.198* 
2000 -446.623** -193.549** -950.246 -1606.84 -2205.94 
2001 681.1859* 1276.06 467.4167* -620.624* -665.25* 
2002 1851.76 2520.28 2689.75 3753.89 1751.31 
2003 618.3363* 1394.04 630.537 -1095.62 -2741.66 
2004 -2820.13 -2427.61 -3391.64 -4867.86 -5224.13 
Note: All estimates significant at p<.0001, except *-p<.05 and **-p>.05. 
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